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This thesis is a study on movement. Movement is defined as the relational and transitional 
activity of ecologies of experience that can not be recognized in legible categories of subject and 
object nor knower and known. Movement is what happens at the interstices of what can be 
recognized in clear and distinct sense perception. Through these indistinct relations and 
transitions in return, movement generates perceptions, environments, and bodies. The disciplines 
lending techniques to study the indistinct quality of movement are those of process and affect 
philosophy, somatic practices, and choreography. These carry conceptual and practical 
techniques to live the research immanently, without establishing a distance from experience that 
would return to a clear and distinct perspective. 
 
This lived research is done through three separated but mutually included scenarios: the 
‘intervals of perception’, the ‘architectures of experience’, and the ‘schizosomatics’. Every 
scenario researches while it gives shape to techniques: the interstices of perception, the emergent 
architectures of the ecologies of experience, and transversal modes of embodiment.  
 
If this study were to be a proposition for certain questions, it can be said, retrospectively, that the 
questions would be the following ones: assuming there are ontogenetic power operations shifting 
the way in which the relational and transitional movements emerge to generate perceptions, 
environments, and bodies, could these techniques shaped be of help to those movements that are 
less capacitated to emerge? And secondly: assuming that today’s theories of perception —
influenced by the separation between the ‘conceptual’ and the ‘physical’ (rationalism, 
empiricism) and also influenced by the internalization of experience inside a distinct category of 
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the human (phenomenology)— give fewer chances to register the ontogenetic operations in 
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To write on the topics of the ‘intervals of perception’, the ‘architectures of experience’ and 
‘schizosomatics’ is a lived research on the immediate movements of experience. This lived 
research entails the creation of somatic practices by way of finding a style of writing that can 
follow the ecological aspect of these immediate movements of experience: what is happening in 
this room, at this moment of the day, with this particular atmospheric quality. To follow these 
immediate movements, the style of writing is endowed by a study of process and affect 
philosophy and borrows as well the dynamic quality of choreography. 
 
The ‘intervals of perception’ and the ‘architectures of experience’ function as two different but 
interwoven platforms with their specific ecologies offering diverse scenarios to experiment with 
the style of writing. One series of scenarios writes with the ecology of the room and the day of 
the week in which the actual process of writing is happening (intervals of perception). The other 
series of scenarios unfolds across various urban landscapes of the everyday (architectures of 
experience). The activity—to follow by writing the ecology of movements—is inseparable from 
the immediate generation of a mode of embodiment, which is also ecological. Thus, to research a 
style of writing is equally to give shape to somatic practices embodying these immediate 
movements. The scenarios of the ‘writing room’ and the ‘urban landscapes’ —such as the scale 
of an iconic city, an alleyway, a boulevard or flying in an airplane—  allow the registration of the 
manners in which embodiment is called forth by the choreography of the “elements in relation” 
of each specific ecology. And because the immediate movements are what follow the elements in 
relations, the embodiments called forth are experienced as multiple, more-than temporally linear 
and spatially decentered, as if pulled by many angles. 
 
Moreover, while shaping a style of writing —that is as well the shaping of somatic practices for 
embodiment— by way of studying process and affect philosophy, a third experimentation was 
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grown in parallel: the schizosomatics workshop series, initiated and curated by visual artist and 
somatics practitioner Csenge Kolozsvári and myself. The schizomatics sessions were held from 
January until December 2018, mostly every Wednesday of the week, at the SenseLab at 
Concordia University.1 Each session asked invitees (choreographers, visual artists, poets, 
musicians, theorists) to bring a practice that lured the participants to collectively research the 
manners in which embodiment can be felt as an ecology, moving beyond the categories that 
understand the body as contained by the limits of a human subject. What differentiates the 
schizosomatics sessions from the intervals and architectures is that the practices are not 
necessarily shaped by a ‘style of writing’ with the immediate ecologies of experience, though 
some of the practices had a literary and/or poetic component. The practices came from the people 
invited and thus were as varied as practices for voicing, sculpting, meditating, cutting, 
choreographing and playing with a baby, just to mention a few. What the intervals, architectures 
and schizosomatics share is a same plane of study (an ecology of questions felt through qualities 
that spread the limits of what embodiment can be) from which their different movements of 
inquiry cross-pollinate each other nourishing their parallel growing. 
                                                     
1 The schizosomatics workshops series grew up out of a series of previous somatic experimentations that combined 
the theoretical frame of process and affect philosophy with scores and exercises inspired by the performing arts, 
together with somatic techniques mostly coming from the discipline of Body Mind Centering (an experiential study 
of the major body systems —skeletal, muscular, fluid, organ, neuroendocrine— and the evolutionary patterns of 
human movement) created by Bonnie Bainbridge Cohen. These previous iterations were the ‘Knots of Thought’ 
(organized by choreographer and philosopher Mayra Morales and myself by request of the SenseLab, during Fall 
2014 at Usince C, Montreal), the ‘Cartographies of the Immediate’ (workshop lead by media theorist Christoph 
Brunner and myself during Fall 2015 at HZT BA Dance School in Berlin), and the ‘Somatic Warm Up for 
Conceptual Work’ (organized by myself with the assistance of visual artist Ramona Benveniste during Summer and 
Fall 2015 at SenseLab, Montreal). These events carried in bud, many of the questions that now take shape in this 
thesis. Just to mention a few of what those questions were: a) How to choreograph the contingent movements of 
arriving and leaving an event in search of a quality of excess that drifts from the actual conditions of the encounter, 
without ever canceling the experiential rhythms of the quotidian? b) How to think and register the choreographies of 
the everyday as composts made of somatic activities not limited to human agency? c) How to share a technique in its 
micro form? This is a ‘partially formed’ technique that is open to the contingencies of the ecology of the encounter 
to move with the indeterminacy of the generated effects, rather than imposing a predetermined result. More 





Ecologies of processes 
 
In the context of theses lived experimentations, the immediate movements of experience are 
understood as an ecology of processes made of potential and actual entities with the capacity to 
shift, define and bring into life worlds of experience. The potential entities—carrying the most 
complex side of the ecological processes— can be felt as immediate momentums affecting the 
limits of human perception. Affective momentums allow humans to register the potential 
processes, though the complexity always remains at the limit of what a human can perceive 
consciously. The potential processes remain at the limit of human consciousness because their 
processual force is transitional. The ecology of relations is in a complex web of movement 
transits in which the positions of subject and object, knower and known are not settled and 
contained. In short, at the scale of human perception there is not yet a formed category to think 
and feel the transitional processes. The present scale of human perception is surrounded and thus 
collectively accompanied by the transitional process that would then, in a proximal future, 
calibrate new modes of perception for the human as much as for the ecology. In this sense, the 
limit of human perception is not a radical abyss— it indexes the soft edges in which the everyday 
or the habitual is already fully populated of ecological process ready to create alternative modes 
of perception. 
 
The philosopher who conceptualizes the ‘world of experience’ as an ecological transition of 
relations is William James. James conceptualizes a life of experience exceeding a kind of 
philosophical analysis that subtracts that life as a datum to be contained by the subject. This type 
of analysis qualifies the subject as the conscious knower of thing or object, and by this gesture 
gives the subject the power to capture and subtract life. This form of capture is understood in this 
thesis as the imposition of habitual modes to repeat the same modes to come into relation within 
the ecology of perception. This is an imposition because it ignores by pushing to the background 
the ecological transitional processes full of rich yet vague and not clearly legible modes of 
perception. This thesis argues that there are dominant powers that restrict the further proliferation 
of nascent process of perception that are more contrasting, ecological, and hence, with a 
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movement complexity capable of destabilizing those very dominant and habitual ways to come 
to perception (more about this later). Now, back to James, these dominant habitual powers 
bracket the life force of the relations, because for James life is mostly in the ‘relations’ between 
portions of experience, beyond the aforementioned conscious categories. Below he gives us a 
sense of the ecological world of the life of the experience: 
 
Experience itself, taken at large, can grow by its edges. That one moment of it 
proliferates into the next by transitions which, whether conjunctive or disjunctive, 
continue the experiential tissue, can not, I contend, be denied. Life is in the transitions as 
much as in the terms connected; often, indeed, it seems to be there more empathically, as 
if our spurts and sallies forward were the real firing-line of the battle, were like the thin 
line of flame advancing across the dry autumnal field which the farmer proceeds to burn 
(James 2003, 45). 
 
The aim of this research is to intensify the potential momentum of the ecology with the belief 
that it will generate future worlds of experience instead of bringing its complexity back at the 
level of human conscious perception. Affectively registered but at the limit of the human, the 
ecology of experience will ask for modes of living that are trans-individual: a life of experience 
moving through the relations across and beyond the category of the human. This force of futurity 
is pursued by affectively registering the transitions of experience, which by not having settled in 
the aforementioned position of subject-object, knower and known, still carry an intense 
processual force of indeterminacy. At the level of the transitions of experience the human is a 





The style of writing in the ‘intervals of perception’ and the ‘architectures of experience’ follows 
the affective register of the movements that define the actual conditions of what is immediately 
occurring (this table, that street, these qualities). By moving with the transitions it attempts to 
unfold the force of futurity folded in the immediate imperatives of the contingent situation.  This 
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is done by following the relational feelings of the ecology of immediate movements as 
indeterminate categories of experience: not finished epistemological dynamic shapes to think-
feel. The style of writing drifts through, along and away the actual givens of the situation to 
preserve the ‘portions of experience’, so that they continue their autonomous movement of 
coming into and out of relations. The belief is that the force of futurity, while less interfered by a 
conscious capture and more affirmed by an affective register, will compose potential worlds of 
experience to come in which the human subject is not considered the centre of experience, but 
rather one of the many ecological limits “growing by its edges”. As it was previously mentioned, 
the style of writing to liberate the force of futurity is inseparable from the research of somatic 
practices that attune a type of embodiment. The pragmatic concept of ‘schizosomatics’ —
written, studied, invented, and collective researched at the workshops series at the SenseLab— 
articulates the modes of embodiment that are generated by the transitional force of futurity of the 
ecology of experience. ‘Schizosomatics’ is the mode of embodied transitional feelings created by 
the world of experience in excess of the imperatives of the present situation: an embodiment of 





Somatic is the concept that speculates what it means to carry a body through the immediate 
movements of experience. Though, again, this concept of somatic practices is mainly explored at 
the angles of experience in which embodiment remains the most unknown: the most slippery and 
transitional to complete epistemological categories. This somatic concept spreads out and moves 
away from knowledge categories that match embodiment with a structure of experience located 
inside of the human subject. Consequently, this perspective on embodiment by slipping beyond 
the human subject as a category to structure the processes of experience, evades the perspectives 
that gives to the human the central position of willingly controlling the ecology of worlds of 
experiences. Embodiment is considered one of the many activities that shifts the movement 
quality of the ecology of experience —speed, weight, connectivity— but is not the human 
subject who guides, contains and assimilates those activities. It is the transitional and relational 
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world of experience doing. How the human can register the transitional movements of the world 
of experience is in affective perception, one that follows the relational movements as ‘feelings’. 
 
In this thesis ‘feelings’ are understood through Alfred North Whitehead’s process philosophy, as 
nexuses of relations that generate worlds (events), entities (the more-than human elements 
populating the event), and their modes of perception (their taking account of each other). 
Whitehead, like James, foregrounds an epistemology that values the potential complex process 
occurring at the transitions, which can’t be perceived by clear and distinct conscious states of 
perception because the modes of perception and knowing are in a phase of processual generation. 
Affective perception is a mode of embodiment of feelings that does not contain in a complete 
shape what can be known, but allows what is happening to continue to drift for some form of 
knowledge to crystallize in the future, maybe. Likewise, affective perception is a mode of 
embodiment generated by the transitional life of experience and thus, it does not close a body 
around the human subject; instead, it distributes the body as portions and points of contact 
affectively resonant with the relational nexus of the ecology of experience. Hence, when the 
human affectively perceives the relational feelings, she becomes a distributed embodiment along 
the portions of experience of the ecology. The human becomes a more-than human relational 
entity of the ecology of experience, where it looks more like a distribution at the edges of a world 
of experience without centre. 
 
That the concept of somatic practices shifts its point of view rapidly and unstoppably throughout 
the thesis tells the story of a pragmatic speculation that follows closely the assumptions around 
this term coined by philosopher, teacher and somatic practitioner Thomas Hanna. Hanna 
developed a theory of somatology and of the field he named somatics in the United States during 
the 1970’s. In his first essay ‘Bodies in Revolt’, Hanna defines somatics as the field which 
studies the soma: “the body as perceived from within by first-person perception”, in contrast 
from an observation from the outside or “from a third-person viewpoint” (Johnson 1995, 341). 
Although the term somatics is coined in the 1970’s, according to somatic practitioner and scholar 
Martha Eddy, “due to a global communication explosion and the cultural shifts of this period” 
(Eddy 2009, 7), somatic practices refer to a vast group of ‘practices of embodiment’ emerging 
already at the end of the nineteenth century with a focus on heightening sensory motor awareness 
 8 
for self-healing or self-knowing (Eddy 2009,8). Eddy explains that at the turn of the century 
rationalism began to be influenced by existentialism and phenomenology and “a gradual shift 
towards theoretical support for experiential learning and sensory research occurred in parts of 
academy and scholar culture” (Eddy 2009, 6). She names the theories of John Dewey, Merleau-
Ponty and Whitehead as the responsible for this shift of paradigm. 
 
Here it needs to be clarified that in the contexts of this thesis Whitehead’s philosophy is not 
considered as ‘phenomenological’, but as ‘process philosophy’. The fact that Eddy describes 
Whitehead’s philosophy as phenomenology indicates that both theories and practices create their 
own ‘field of research’ in accordance to the way they are approached. The philosophical worlds 
emerging out of a research depend upon the way in which the research is conducted. 
 
Eddy traces two generations of somatic practitioners growing from the beginning of the century 
until our times. The first generation includes: F.M. Alexander (1869-1955), Moshe Feldenkrais 
(1904-84), Gerda Alexander (1904-1994), Ida Rolf (1896-1979) and Irgmard Bartenieff (1900-
81). The second generation includes: Bonnie Bainbridge Cohen, Joan Skinner and Anna Halprin 
just to mention a few. One point to keep in mind from Eddy’s analysis is that both generations of 
practitioners share an exploration of movement. This leads to the fact that the second generation 
of practitioners are all involved in dance somatic education. She states that “dance professionals 
have especially driven the development of somatic movement and the field of Somatic 
Movement Education and Therapy” (Eddy 2009, 7). This is to stress that somatic practices are 
inseparable from an exploration of movement, whether for therapeutic or artistic purposes. 
Hence, the interest in this thesis to think movement inseparably from the thinking on modes of 
embodiments. 
 
The cultural shift in the 1970’s that Eddy refers to as the cause for the boom of somatic practices 
in the United States, which motivated in turn the creation of the terms somatics by Thomas 
Hanna, is further articulated by Body Mind Centering practitioner and theorist Carla Bottiglieri. 
Bottiglieri argues that somatic practices’ emergence has been part of a history of resistance to 
traditional methods to think the relation between body and health. She explains that these 
practices have been designed “towards the resolution of problems that traditionally available 
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methods in medicine, dance, physical education and psychology could not offer” (Bottiglieri 
2013, 120). She adds that these practices were developed into training programs and schools 
“most often refusing to frame their methods as therapies, and preferring to highlight their self-
educational and pedagogical dimension (…) in order to preserve their autonomy with regards to 
the institutional field of care” (Bottiglieri 2013, 120). As we will see, what Bottiglieri argues by 
remarking the ‘quality of resistance’ to previous institutional ways to think the body and therapy, 
in connection with the ‘self-educational’ and ‘pedagogical’ aspects inherent to somatic practices, 
is that these practices boomed in the United States at the historical moment in which the 
necessity for alternative ways to be and sustain a community, through an experimentation with 
knowledge and learning, was increasingly being felt.  
 
Bottiglieri articulates together with Thomas Hannna the revolutionary potential that somatics 
“brought about in the history of dance, theatre and performance, by transforming the uses of and 
representations of the body” (Bottiglieri 2013, 120) with the potential for sustainability that these 
practices brought to the declining American counterculture of the 1970’s. In ‘Bodies in Revolt’ 
Thomas Hanna situates the increasing proliferation of the somatic practices in the United States 
at the moment in which the Militant movements began to feel the toll in their bodies due to their 
ways of enacting resistances. This shows that for Hanna, somatic practices connect to an 
exploration on alternative modes of sustainability in which the body is the main axis. 
 
Underlying the various techniques and schools [of practices of embodiment], one finds a 
desire to regain an intimate connection with bodily processes: breath, movement 
impulses, balance, and sensibility. In that shared impulse, this community is best 
understood within a much broader movement of resistance to the West’s long history of 
denigrating the value of the human body and the natural environment (…) Just as solar 
engineers and organic farmers have developed alternatives to the technologies that 
alienated us from the earth, these somatics innovators have challenged the dominant 
modes of exercise, manipulation and self-awareness that alienated people from their 
bodies (Johnson 1995, xvi). 
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Bottiglieri expands on the topic of somatics and sustainability introduced by Thomas Hanna, but 
she diverts from his further discourses on adaption and assimilation, based in evolutionary 
arguments, such as the following one: 
 
The short-lived destiny of these two groups-expressions [Hippies and Militants] of proto-
mutation is due to the fact that they have one foot in the technological environment (a 
positive adaption factor) and one foot in the moribund cultural tradition (a negative 
adaptational factor) upon which they must depend in order to orient themselves 
(Bottiglieri 2013, 121). 
 
 For Bottiglieri, sustainability comes from “the proliferation of micropolitical experiences: the 
creation of communities, experimentation with various healing techniques (…) attempts in 
construing new pathways of relations that might weave collective and individual experiences, in 
a new genealogy of filiations and alliances that questions the inadequacy of the traditional 
nuclear family” (Bottiglieri 2013, 122). She offers an argument that, instead of putting the 
weight in the evolutionary adaptation of the human body to the technological and cultural 
changes —an argument that follows closely the very logics “with which capitalism annexes the 
myth of the ‘individual emancipation’” (Bottiglieri 2013, 121) —, translates the power of 
sustainability towards the creation of collectivities through the use of somatic practices. 
Bottiglieri also bypasses a phenomenological reading of somatics (based in the interiority and 
intentionality of the human subject of experience) and proposes to follow somatics as techniques 
for ‘trans-individuality’ (transitional, relational, more-than human).  
 
With Bottiglieri and beyond Hanna, this thesis is interested to think somatics as practices of 
embodiment which are helpful for collectively creating modes of sustainability: modes in which 
capacities for living in relation are intensified. The collective means the actual coming together 
of a group of practitioners — as it happens in the schizosomatics workshop series held at 
SenseLab— though the collective is also considered a force of futurity of the transitional 
relations that are more-than human and so in principle, the collective stands also for the lonely 
process of searching a style of writing, seating at the table and moving through the everyday — 
as in the case of the ‘intervals of perception’ and ‘architectures of experience’. In short, the 
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search for the collective include the individual and the group of humans but is mostly opened to 
the more-than human entities (qualities, atmospheres, patterns of relations, etc.) inhabiting the 
ecology of experience and offering a proposition for future modes of being in relation, more 
capaciously. 
 
This research, still following Bottiglieri, also moves with and further away from the 
phenomenological influences that brought into existence the term of somatics. This research does 
not separate experience as that that happens to the subject, which is the intentional agent that 
extracts the experience from the object. Movement is not pre-determined by a subject-object, 
knower-known structure of experience. And the subject is not a self-contained category that can 
be perceived from within (Hanna’s “first-person view from within”). It bears repeating one more 
time that in the frame of this thesis, the practices of embodiment are a spread out question that 
launches the research on what it means to cultivate ecologies of movements when the 
embodiment is tending to the more-than and not contained in the individual body of the human 
subject. 
 
Something important to be remarked about the connection between ‘somatics’ and 
‘phenomenology’ is that the pragmatic use of the practices is what unfolds and defines their 
philosophical world. In this sense, somatics disciplines such as Alexander technique and Body 
Mind Centering can structure experience inside the anatomical and intentional containment of 
the subject [tending towards phenomenology] as much as they can open cartographies for 
experiences beyond the present body and environment [tending towards process philosophy]. In 




The questions of immediacy  
 
Throughout the ‘intervals of perception’ and the ‘architectures of experience’ there is a persistent 
return to Whitehead’s process philosophy analysis of the construction of the modern theories of 
knowledge. Whitehead’s analysis on modern traditions of knowledge —with their consequent 
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theories of perception— is followed closely throughout this thesis because these modern theories 
are still influencing the ways in which language is used to categorize the experience of 
immediate movement. Language carries certain assumptions about the way in which experience 
takes form. The above mentioned phenomenological assumptions on the categories of experience 
carry within them some of these modern traditions of knowledge—to be soon explained below—
such as the structuring of experience under a subject-object binary and the assumption of a 
movement of interiority or introspection of experience inside of the subject. Because of the 
persistence of these assumptions in the present, one of the vital practices of this thesis is that of 
finding a style of writing with and through the immediate movements of experience. And this is 
why the exploration of somatic practices is one with the exploration of a way of writing that 
perceptually feels what happens with the ecology of experience. In sum, to find a way of writing 
equals to attune to a way of moving of experience. 
 
One of the modern assumptions analyzed with Whitehead is that of the separation between 
substances and accidents (Whitehead 1978, 77-82). This is a modern categorization of 
knowledge established by Descartes’ philosophy (Whitehead 1978, 77). In this perspective, 
substances are given an essential attribute that allows them to remain self-identical. Accidents 
are what suffer the qualitative change through the relationships between substances. Following 
this logic, change is something accidental which does not transform the identity of the substance: 
the qualitative color infusing the atmosphere is an after-effect attributable to the numerical self-
identity of the room. The color is only an accidental change that transforms neither the present 
nor the future of the room. The room remains always the same, with or without colors, in winter, 
or haunted by heavy thoughts. What this assumption does is to qualify change as a force without 
power of transformation. There is no indeterminacy in the way in which the future of the ecology 
could be played out. There is a transcendental law of identity that will always prevent change 
from actually changing, mutating, and transforming anything. 
 
Another effect following directly the previous one, is to think ‘movement’ as one of the 
accidental effects between the subjects and objects of a situation. Whitehead helps to articulate a 
concept of movement (as becoming) through a dialogue full of agreements and disagreements 
with Newton’s physics (Whitehead 1978, 70-73).  Whitehead agrees with Newton that when 
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motion is understood as accidental, it becomes the measure of external displacements between 
entities. Hence, movement is seen as the displacement from point ‘a’ to ‘b’ of that subject 
towards that object. What Whitehead disagrees with Newton is to theorize movement as a 
transcendental category (Absolute movement) separated from the accidental movement used to 
measure (Relative movement). Whitehead disagrees with Newton, because by making movement 
an Absolute category he separates the possibility for change into a Transcendental realm. As we 
will see, for Whitehead the potential to transcend what is given is enmeshed in the concrete. This 
assumption about the concept of movement has a direct influence on how to think the role of 
movement embodiment (somatic practices).  
 
Performance studies theorist Andre Lepecki follows a similar critique to that of Whitehead, but 
he connects the tradition of knowledge of ‘classical physics’ to the development of Western 
choreography. Lepecki argues that Western choreography was born of a kineticism based in the 
epistemology of classic physics, sustaining a transcendental law of movement. This 
epistemology formed “a conception and perception of the dancer’s body and the dancer’s agency 
as being subservient to transcendental laws of (fluid) motion” (Lepecki 2016, 145). He 
elaborates further that classical physics formulated laws governing the motion of the bodies and, 
by extension, regulated conceptions of physical labor, which in turn had a direct impact on 
“those whose work embodies most directly the physicality of physics: dancers” (Lepecki 2016, 
144-5). In this perspective, movement becomes again, a tool to measure the efficacy of the labor 
of the bodies. In other words, the embodiment of movement functions as a tool to regulate, 
respond, and resolve, with more or less efficacy, the labor forces imposed upon those very 
bodies. 
 
 Contrary to this regulatory use of embodiment, this thesis understands movement as an 
immanent becoming of relations between different entities. Its potential to transcend the 
conditions of the given actual situations is folded with and through the actual. Hence, movement 
is not thought as a transcendental force that could be exercised by a subject in a higher rank of 
authority over others: the choreographer of work and learning — think Enterprises and 
Universities. Moreover, movement does not give agency to the end term of a relation (subject-
object), it distributes with and through the relations the capacity to produce collective agencies: 
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agencement (the term coined in French by Deleuze and Guattari (1987)). Lastly, movement is 
not theorized as a labor force, but as a playful aesthetic-political quality in excess of the given: 
movement is something that plays and to play with. 
 
Another assumption of the modern traditions of knowledge which Whitehead articulates in 
dialogue with Hume and Descartes, is what Whitehead calls the ‘error of introspection’. This 
assumption divides the ‘conceptual’ from the ‘physical’. The conceptual is understood as the 
abstract thought inside of the human mind, and the physical is seen as the material field in which 
the changes occurs for the mind to pick them up, through sense perception. Change is the 
accidental quality of the relationship between physical objects and the concept is what subtracts 
an essential law out of that change via the senses. Hence, sense perception is the activity that if 
approached consciously allows a transfer of knowledge to the conceptual mind. In all of those 
assumptions mentioned above, ‘movement’, ‘quality’ and ‘relation’ are the accidents that happen 
to the world, a world in which the human subject is capable to extract (as introspect or introject) 
an essential law from them and thus, perpetuate its power and separation from it. 
 
This thesis stands for ‘movement’, ‘quality’ and ‘relation’ as concrete facts (and if you want 
‘accidental’ facts) that carry a force of potential (a transient force from what is given). These 
activities are what open the world towards the indeterminacy of the future, towards the autonomy 
of the portions of experience for coming into trans-individual relation. In turn, these activities do 
not introject (introspect) the autonomy of the portions of experience of the world inside the 
human, if anything, these activities extroverts the entities towards the coming into relation 
towards the others. The entities traversed by movements, qualities and relations are launched 
towards the indeterminacy of being with others, to become alter. 
 
This is the paradox of movement. If one is asked about the immediate experience of how one 
moves through environments, the feeling of it is totally different from any ‘modern’ categories of 
knowledge. The movements’ momentums propel an affective atmosphere that feels decentered 
and uncontained. However, when verbal language begins to explain the experience sequentially, 
the old ways of organizing the elements of it come back: ‘I’ walked to the kitchen, the yellow 
light out there painted the chair, it made ‘me’ feel happy inside. This is to say that when an 
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experience is verbally articulated after the immediate moment of its occurring, there is a habit to 
sort it out retrospectively through categories that assume: 1) the room is separated from the body 
and both remain untransformed by their mutual relation 2) the atmospheric quality given by the 
yellow colour is understood as something accidental and separated from of the body and 3) the 
affective quality of happiness is introjected inside the body. In sum, the embodiment of 
movement became a narrative to express the centrality of the human in the ecology of the 
situation —due to a clear and distinct perception of the relations— as well as a regulation 
(delimitation) of the affective surplus of happiness —again inside of the limited contours of the 
human body and not as an ecological quality in excess of the elements in relation. There is 
nothing wrong with it. It does not kill the immediate experience. The question is, if the past 
notions of movement, body and environment, keep coming back to reorganize our experiences 
retrospectively, what other modes of organizing experiences are not allowed to return? In other 
words, if historical past categories of knowledge come back time and time again to sort out 
immediate experiences, what other types of sorting out patterns of experience could benefit from 
the same power of repetition? And secondly, if immediate experience has a lived quality that is 
quickly organized by categories that do not seem to correspond with it anymore, why are those 
categories still so useful? Meaning, which types of communities benefit from the repetition of a 
category of experience that is out of sync with the immediacy of living? 
 
To move and to return time and time again to an immediate experience was pursued in this 
research by a practice of writing instead of dancing in a studio. This choice is explained by the 
fact that to give shape to a new vocabulary, it was necessary to not capture the experience again 
under those past theories. Process and affect philosophy concepts provided the language to move 
with the experience without categorizing it with habits of the past. In this sense, this thesis is an 
exercise on dancing process and affect philosophy. Doing it not only for the fun of it, but for the 
cultivation of other modes of experience that would be otherwise denied. The new vocabulary 
had to have the agility of a choreographic drawing, the enticement of an architecting of time 
closer to poetry, and the technical rigor to lend enough stamina to the concepts that is proper to 
philosophy. In return, the concepts will carry their stamina to the modes of ecological 






Process and affect philosophy and somatic practices: all these disciplines play a strategic game, 
taking turns, making alliances, moving one in front of the other, sometimes one of them 
disappears for a while to come back later and surprise the other disciplines with polemic news. 
The strategic game played by these disciplines aims to study an alternative take on therapy. What 
is ‘alter’ about this study in the therapeutic is an affirmation of the ‘connectedness of 
experience’.  
 
Whitehead articulates the concept of the ‘connectedness of experience’ to demonstrate that 
philosophy needs to deal with the paradox that “the world within experience is identical with the 
world beyond experience, the occasion of experience is within the world and the world is within 
the occasion” (Whitehead 1967, 228). Whiteheads interconnects experiences through their 
‘beyond’: there where they connect to other experiences and also then, when they include past 
and future timelines within and through them. For Whitehead philosophy needs to give account 
of the mutual inclusion of the ‘transient’ —the beyond— within the ‘concrete’. And to do this 
philosophy should follow the immediate experiences, what in this ‘outroduction’ is called the 
‘immediate movements’ of experience. Hence, for Whitehead, each immediate movement is a 
multiple ecology of time-lines and space-lines. Immediate movement carries the potential 
enmeshed in the actual in various degrees. Immediate movement passes and leaks experiences 
anytime and everywhere. Patterns of experiences already culminated in the past gloss over the 
actual situation, future imagined worlds of experiences fold an extra membrane as well through 
the already complicated mixture tendencies of the present: the incipient tendency to respond to 
an email, the dizziness of the just finished physical exercise, the anxiety for a task to be delivered 
tomorrow, all of these experiences interconnect and co-habitate through the immediate 
movements. Whitehead would add that each time that experience is perceived as an unitary (only 
of one type: just this sitting at the table) and easy continuation (only one present situation: just 
this timeline moving towards finishing the reading of the paragraph) in fact, that simple 
perception is generated by multiple occasions of experience. These multiple occasions of 
experience include many types (seating at the table, with the poking of the social media, with the 
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dog wining for a walk, with the University listening for theoretical rigor) and multiple times and 
spaces in passing (moving towards the finishing of the paragraph, with the conversation with a 
grandmother dead fifteen years ago, with the rooms of the apartment of the city to be visited next 
month). All these multiple experiences coexist at each immediate movement of the cresting of 
experience. Affect philosopher Brian Massumi would say that immediate experience carries the 
capacity for ‘ontopower’: the power to generate the emergence of experience by inviting the 
return of events of experience that already expired and others that did not take place yet 
(Massumi 2015, 221). 
 
The entryway to the multiplicities of experiences actual and potential (transient) occurring at 
every immediate movement is possible when the unitary understanding of a category of 
experience is leaked out. This breaking of the unitary and easy going continuation of experience 
(just this seating at the table to advance the reading towards the end of this paragraph) is what 
throughout this thesis is called the ‘schizz’, the ‘cut’ or the ‘interval’. At the ‘cut’ of the unitary 
containment of experience it is that the multiple ecologies of experiences make feel their 
intertwined and contrastive cohabitation.  At the ‘cut’ the re-shuffling of time-lines and time-
spaces for worlds of events that happened and did not happen can be tweaked to intensify life 
with more capaciousness. At the cut it is that the ontogenetic power of experience to emerge 
differently than it was and would be, resides. How exactly to do this? How to tweak processes of 
intertwined experiences at the cusp of what be consciously perceived to register and act on the 
immediate movements? This is what this thesis ask time and time again, one page after another. 
A way to begin with, is to think the affirmation of the inter-connectedness of experience as the 
affirmation of an ‘autonomous doing’. This is to say that the activities of experiences themselves 
have a transformative capacity that, if possible, shouldn’t be blocked. This autonomous capacity 
is what the thesis calls the ‘artfulness of experience’, a concept that is similar to what Whitehead 
calls the ‘creative advance’ (Whitehead 1978, 21) or ‘creative urge’ (Whitehead 1967, 192). 
 
When trigger warnings pop up regularly throughout the thesis concerning the phenomenological 
use of somatic practices, or in respect to the assumptions that structure the movement of 
experience in clear and distinct categories (Whitehead analysis of the European tradition of 
knowledge based upon sense perception), what is being warned about is the understanding that 
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therapy (an intensity for living) can be found and contained inside the centered, present and 
balanced human being.  Practices of embodiment do a good job at healing by way of balancing 
the anatomic structures of the body or by quieting the time and space-lines into the meditative 
present. But by highlighting the identity of relations between the anatomical image and an 
energetic and experiential state (balance), as well as by managing the flux of time and space lines 
in another experiential state (presence), they become less effective at allowing the ingress of the 
interconnectedness of experience. They do good. They feel good and do produce health. What is 
being problematized in this thesis, is the ability of those practices to tweak the emergent 
ontopower of the multiple occasions of experiences for events of the past and the future to return. 
What is a ‘balanced and present’ health that cannot play with the incessant transformation of the 
ecologies of experience? What is the value of an ‘individual’ state of health that has less capacity 
to renew the relations with and of the world of experience, ‘collectively’? 
 
Moreover, when the power to tweak the incessant emergence of multiple occasions of 
experiences is purposefully utilized to shape the continuation of certain worlds of experience by 
locking away the contrastive ingression of many other worlds, this thesis launches another 
trigger warning, this time under the names of ‘dominant powers’ and even ‘neoliberal powers’! 
The cultural contexts in which those powers are cultivated are only suggested in this thesis. 
Because at this phase, this study is investing all its focus on using a philosophical vocabulary, a 
style of writing and somatic practices to intensify the capacity to register the autonomous doings 
of experience overflowing those dominant powers rather than denouncing them. 
 
Lastly, it needs to be stated that this problematization of somatics is done with the belief these 
practices are also practiced, in ways that they drift the experience of embodiment through the 
interconnected field, beyond the here and now. There are countless ways in which somatic 
practices move through the portions of experiences, beyond the human anatomy and the concrete 
architecture of the room, and they register the power of improvisation of the connectedness of 
the worlds of experiences: their entryways and passageways, their intensity. When somatic 
practices practice through the interconnections and do not return to a structure of experience of 







This ‘outroduction’ is being written after the experience of dancing philosophy has finished, 
because at the immediate past moments of those dances, these explanations given presently were 
not yet clear. At that past moment, there was a strong intuition and necessity that the dance had 
to happen while sitting in front of a table, accompanied by certain philosophers. There was a 
strong intuition that in order to keep cultivating the movement with the immediacy of 
experience, a process of studying by dancing with process and affect philosophy had to be 
simultaneously happening. But since the writing had to take place while the immediacy of the 
experience was happening, the dancing of it had to be a movement of concepts. However, not 
just any concept could dance the movement of the immediacy of experience and in turn, not just 
any mode of writing could appear with this immediacy. This is to say the mutual relation 
between movement and concepts began to shape the ecology of the modes of experience while 
the writing was happening. The composition between writing, moving and conceptualizing 
became the centre of attraction, giving shape to a technique to allow modes of immediate 
experience to intensify their trans-individual life. The technique to cultivate immediate 
movements of experience could only be articulated if the process of studying was already 
happening. And thus ‘to study’ feel together with the transitional pulses that brought experiences 
to life, while moving with conceptual writing. Study was done with the intuition that it was not 
about accumulating knowledge about a certain topic, but to attune, shape and test one time after 
the other, a technique to live immediacy. You could feel that the technique was being shaped by 
the process of study when, once you left the writing table and walked into the city, the immediate 
movements of experience continued to grow. Once the process of study became portable —from 
the writing table to any everyday experience— then the technique would give the feedback of 
being well underway. The technique would be well underway because through various ecologies 
of the everyday the trans-individual movement of experience would make feel their momentum, 
affectively. The momentum would be felt affectively as a nascent embodiment propelled by the 
trans-individual ecology. The study would continue to go on through different situations as a 
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nascent embodied feeling, going on autonomously from the will of the human being 
experimented by this very process of study.  
 
The feeling of a process of study connects with the vision of Fred Moten and Stefano Harney on 
a particular mode of sociality that they call the ‘undercommons’ —what here is called a 
collective generated by the trans-individual life of experience. In The Undercommons Harney 
and Moten elaborate the concept of study as a process that if occurring through the 
‘undercommons’ of the University, produces social debt. Social debt is a mode of relationality 
that diverts to Neoliberal credit, which aims to make the interest of the student transparent 
(legible) to connect her —lending credit — to the capitalist apparatus of policy (control). To 
study for social debt is to study not to get to know something already known, but to move 
through relations with and towards the other of knowledge and the other of sociality: “debt to 
each other in a study group, to others in a nurses’ room, to others in a barber shop, to others in a 
squat, a dump, a woods, a bed, an embrace” (Harney and Moten 2013, 67-8). To study is to 
cultivate relations for future modes of coming together in relation, not necessarily to accumulate 
knowledge about a particular topic. These undercommon relations are not ‘transparent’ or 
‘legible’, they are at the transparent (as conscious) limit of what can be embodied, thought and 
felt and thus, resist the capture of the capitalist apparatus. In the context of this thesis, together 
with Harney and Moten, study is done with the urgency to recompose the undercommons 
(subterranean, imperceptible) relations (social in the making) with the immediacy of the worlds 
of experience (in the writing room, like a portable activity composing with the everyday, and in a 
schizosomatics session), as a way to make less legible and thus, more intense the force for 
potential alter-relations. 
 
The study of shaping a technique to cultivate immediate ecologies of experience is done in three 
phases, divided in the three sections of the thesis: the ‘intervals of perception’ the ‘architectures 
of experience’ and the ‘schizosomatics’. The intervals of perception are the intensive seeding of 
the technique.  The investment happens mainly around the writing table and the visiting of the 
intervals of process that can’t be consciously perceived is done very persistently. In the second 
phase, ‘the architectures of experience’ bring the interval for a walk through several spaces 
across the city. The portability of the technique is tested across spaces for experience beyond the 
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writing room. If the spaces change their ecology, when the technique plugs to the intervals that 
hold them, then a sign of the study’s technical growth becomes palpable. The schizosomatics is 
the space for research-creation where many of the studied concepts of the previous phases 
became techniques to be tested with a group of persons. 
 
 
From technique to technicity 
 
An alternative landscape to think the different operations done via the intervals and the 
architectures is given by Erin Manning’s concepts of ‘technique’ and ‘technicity’ (Manning 
2013, 33). It can be said, assuming the mutual transversal flows between intervals and 
architectures and thus, not imposing an excluding divide, that the intervals of perception are the 
‘technique’ that becomes ‘technicity’ along the architectures. Manning gives us the image of 
gardening for an early spring planting.  She asks us to consider the relation between the knee-
hand-garden as an operative logic that is an active technique for creating a taste of spring. 
“Technique engages the repetitive practice that form a composing body- be it organic or 
inorganic- technicity is a set of enabling conditions that exact from technique the potential of the 
new for co-composition” (Manning 2013, 33). The intervals of perception persistently and 
repetitively, research the tools for the techniques to be generated together with their world of 
experience (ecology). The architectures of experience invest in the qualitative excess opened up 
by the intervals and brings it to visit various urban everyday event of experience: “Technicity 
captures the affective tonality of a process, a tendency, and catapults it toward new expression” 
(Manning 2013, 33). 
 
That the ‘intervals’ are the intensive cartography for the ‘architectures’ can be proved by the fact 
that both movements of study drifted through similar conceptual paths: from movement to affect 
and from affect to an alternative envisioning of somatic environments. The crafting of a place to 
host the cultivated ecology of movement of the intervals and of the architectures is the most 
urgent activity appearing towards the end of the arc of both studies. The hosting place speculates 
around the form of experience that could move with an alternative notion of somatics, and that 
becomes the concept of ‘schizosomatics’. At this moment of the study is when the 
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schizosomatics workshops sessions at the Sense Lab began to happen. The schizosomatics 
workshops series began to study the links between the concept of the ‘schizz’ —coming from the 
theoretical frame on ‘Schizoanalysis’ by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari — and the ways to 




Conceptual Cartography: One of Many 
 
Even if an overall arc of study can be described, the sections of the intervals, architectures and 
schizosomatics can be read in any order, because the nature of every partial section is to begin 
and end a particular train of thoughts that is called forth by the singular movement of the day or 
the space. Consequently, every partial section is a universe of study on its own, though 
simultaneously, it contains in potential all the others, because every singular movement of study 
affects the other sections by way of resonance. For instance, one partial section will move with a 
cadence around one particular concept, and that particular quality of moving will touch upon 
other associated concepts. In turn, these conceptual accompaniments to the main cadence would 
usually return later, whether holding the movement of another concept or, as the main concept to 
surround the dance. 
 
The spirit in which the study has been pursued is one that followed the necessity of the 
processual immediacy of movement. You would know the movement of study was necessary 
because you felt that the processes wanted you to learn something that didn’t have a shape. 
Funnily enough, the unknown shape became present in the space not when you didn’t have 
words to mention it, but when it felt like something that you had never thought about but was 
always there, in a sense haunting you. Therefore, it was necessary for the process of study to 
always decrease its speed to reach the end of the section before a knowledge would be 
crystallized into a complete form. In such a way that to study somatically meant to inhabit the 
ecological angles of the unknown. 
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What follows is a conceptual cartography for a possible drifting across the courses of the 
‘intervals of perception’, the ‘architectures of experience’ and ‘schizosomatics’. The drifting 
described here is traced from the beginning to the end of the three separated texts. Nevertheless, 
in this path from the beginning to the end, the trace already enters, passes and leaves many 
conceptual entanglements that are multilinear. Hence, the conceptual cartography is given as a 




Intervals of perception 
 
The intervals of perception begin by opening the question of how an alternative concept of 
somatics can shape a technique that does not accumulate knowledge in the room, but that instead 
mobilizes knowledge— to make felt through qualities— the intervals holding a seamlessly 
continuous perceptual feeling of the room. The quality of a Friday afternoon—which is the real 
day in which the shaping of the somatic practices started—stands as an indication for all the 
intervals to come, of the importance to research the ‘qualitative’ rather than ‘quantitative’ side of 
experience. The qualitative is suggested as a movement of experience that gives more than what 
it takes to be activated.  The qualitative is thought as the dispersed minor and immediate 
movements pulsing affectively through less perceptible modes of felt embodiment and thus, they 
are un-quantifiable (illegible, unmeasurable, non-based in a labor logic, but playful). From this, 
the intervals begin a critique of the assumptions carried by modern traditions of knowledge on 
the immediate movements of experience, engaging with the work of Whitehead as well as with 
Massumi, James and Manning. This critique aims to articulate the movements along the intervals 
of experience as something generative (qualitative) rather than regulative (quantitative). Later 
on, the quality of the Friday afternoon of the intervals is tackled through a different angle, that of 
‘play’. The concepts of ‘play’ and ‘work’ are operationalized to attune the somatic practices of 
the interval, towards the investment of modes of life continuation that are not based in extractive 
labor, but, to emphasise it again, through a qualitative playful immersion in the relational life of 
experience. Then, the concept of ‘technological lineages’ allows us to question the genealogical 
ways in which certain ecologies of experience repeatedly give birth to techniques to live in the 
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world. Since these technological lineages traverse bodies, the question of the alternative modes 
to host a concept for ‘transversal bodies’ (nascent embodiments across various ecologies of 
experience) begins to resurge. The next question posed is that of the use of the ‘conceptual’ by 
neoliberal operations to colonize the ‘technological lineages’ that in turn, produces bodies and 
environments. The conceptual is articulated not as the thought that thinks inside of the human 
mind but instead as technique operated at the nascent intervals of perception (in the trans-
individual life of experience). Therefore, in the last intervals the questions gyres around the ways 
in which the trans-individual life of experience is given a capacity to proliferate or not, due to the 
conceptual operations occurring in them. 
 
 
Architectures of Experience 
 
The first architecture of experience asks how to plunge in an ecology of experience that exceeds 
what is given concretely to sense perception. Through this plunge, the first architecture launches 
all the concepts to be dealt subsequently: ‘transversality’, the ‘diagram’ and ‘affective signs’, 
among others. Soon the question of how to plunge into a transversal experience of an 
architecture becomes a question of ‘feeling’. The concept of feeling is articulated minutely by 
way of Whitehead. The ‘conceptual’ and the ‘physical feelings’ do the work of undoing the 
modern theories of knowledge that separate the ‘potential’ from the ‘actual’. Right away, the 
‘antecedent phases’ of feeling formations become the topology to understand the power of the 
ecologies of experience in cultivation, beyond human consciousness and beyond concrete times 
and spaces. Can the interval of perception be considered the locus where to tap for the 
complexity of feelings in formation to intensify their architecture-ing? If yes, how to register an 
architecture of feeling in formation that feels like nothing yet? These questions snowball towards 
the concept of ‘proposition’ to have a term for those potential vectors calling from the future, to 
the architectures of experience not actually existing. Consequently, another argument against the 
modern traditions of knowledge is introduced by the concept of the ‘interconnectedness’ of the 
future in the past. Can feelings be understood as entryways and passageways to ecology of 
experiences that move beyond the present and thus actual time and space? Feelings are 
approached as tools to unlock the entryways of dimensions of experience backgrounded in the 
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foreground that is habitually considered the actual.  From then on, a conceptualization of the 
space is developed: Euclidean and Topological spaces and the ‘mentality’ of those spaces is 
reconnected with the theory of schizoanalysis. What would mean to schizoanalyze the ‘mind’ of 
ecological process? Being the mind the vector towards the future, or the ‘desire’, of and for 
ecological architecting? Towards the end of the writing, the ‘affective signs’ make their entrance, 
as a way to help register those vectors of the future encapsulated at the intervals of perception, 
where the processual phase of feeling formations happens. The affective signs are the zones of 
ecological experience capable of being actually experienced across the most imperceptible 
intervals of perception. They are the diagram of affects spread by the intervals of the actual. 
Along the arc of the last written architectures of experience, the concept of ‘schizosomatics’ 
comes back, this time linked to the spaces hosting it. The concept of schizosomatics returns this 
time hosted by the space in order to help to ask some questions of the affective signs: how can 
they be registered as they are immediately and immanently generating the architecting of a felt 
embodiment that is distributed and decentered? The last architecture listens to the writing of 
Renee Gladman, and understands with her the aesthetic-political power that carries the gesture to 
return, time and time again, to those processual movements that cultivate the plasticity of 
experience. Gladman’s style of writing indexes the ways in which the entryways and 
passageways towards the complex and multiple emergence of feeling can be blocked. That 
gesture to block the diversity of the multilinear processual movements is what Gladman calls the 
experience of the atrocities of the political and social present. What comes to mind at this 
moment, is if then the schizosomatics practices—by way of re-schizing and re-bridging 
experience to its transitional and relational filed—can function as an antidote against those 






This last section speaks about the concrete play with the questions that emerged through the 
study of the ‘intervals of perception’ and ‘architectures of experience’. Using examples based in 
the interventions made by the invitees activating the workshops, conceptual parallelisms are 
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being drawn to the theory of ‘schizoanalysis’ by Deleuze and Guattari and the ‘interpersonal and 
developmental psychology’ of Daniel Stern. The aim of this section is to reinforce the 
connections between schizosomatics and schizoanalytic practices. One of the question reiterated 
through practical examples asks about the capacity of the schizzed somatic practices to generate 
a surplus of experience that detaches from the present moment of encounter in order to come 
back, as a relay. The relays for the future of experience are unveiled through the concept of 
‘affective contours’ by Stern. The surplus detachments of experience become portable and 
imperceptible ‘contours’ that facilitate the access —as much as they promote the evasion — to 
worlds of experiences to come. Another question that returns is that of the force of play of 
experience understood in itself, as an autonomous force that can be affirmed through 
schizosomatics: is it possible to engage in an indeterminate experience —one that feels almost 
like nothing at the human scale of perception— and still to support the belief that such 
‘nothingness’ is full of rich and complex doings able to come back later as relays? If yes, what 
are the conditions for a space for research creation that cares for those processes that feel like 
nothing but are always already contouring us? How to deviate the critical habit to dismiss 
indeterminate modes of experience? These questions are pragmatically answered while writing 
about ways of inviting the participants, ways to affectively care for the collective event, and 




Thesis: un-archived  
 
The thesis of the research is the generous personage that emerges out of the compost, made of 
the kneaded elements that have been studied.  The personage is fat, its skin shiny and its feet are 
well grounded in the compost. At the same time, the personage carries an agility that allows it to 
move with the complexity of the ecology composted, this time around, with ease. The ground of 
the earth gives it the levity to move through processual knotted complicities as if it were a 
twister: with physical improvisation and un-anchored into a human body. 
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This fat and twisting personage is there, waiting to be re-shaped through the readings of the 
intervals, architectures and schizosomatics. It is ready to appear again and again, called forth by 
the incantation of reading, this time thin and with long hands, the other time bulky and short, and 
some other day as a swampy tempest. Honoring its apparition, what remains now is to mention 
the past archived thesis, the one that launched the process of composting that brought it to life: 
 
The thesis for that research creation project was to explore the interstices of sense 
perception and non-conscious modes of thought, through the use of somatic practices and 
process and affect philosophy. This with the aim to design pedagogic interdisciplinary 
events with an emphasis in the performing arts, and as a way to develop skills to read 








INTERVALS OF PERCEPTION 
  
 29 
Interval 1: The Interval. 
 
 
The interval can be explored with somatic practices and the surplus that can be found is similar 
to the surplus that can be gained through other ecologies of practices: philosophical, aesthetic, 
and schizoanalytic practices. Nevertheless, now is not the moment to dig into the surplus, nor is 
it the moment to delve into the transversal connections between somatic practices, art, 
philosophy and schizoanalysis. Right now it is Friday afternoon, the perfect moment to begin 
writing a thesis: imbuing its future with a festive quality, which instills in it the promise that 
anything written will function as a playful platform, one that gives more than what it takes to be 
recorded.  
 
The Friday afternoon swells with the weight of numerous texts, accumulating their thoughts in 
the space.  The snowballing density of thoughts erases the contrast between the tactile texture of 
the uneven floor, the luminous green of the climbing plant, and the fur of the dog. If today 
wasn’t a Friday afternoon, the atmosphere of the room would get devoured by the digested 
knowledge of the texts. So, Friday afternoon moments will function as a platform to be returned 
to each day in the coming weeks, so that a festive quality will preserve each day’s atmosphere 
from the abundant density of thoughts, begging to be recorded.  
 
The specific quality of the Friday interval allows a somatic experience to be expressed. The 
movement of the interval allows this expression to come forth, along with a festive quality: at 
any moment, over any previous knowledge, they press away the presence of the surrounding 
known environments. Thus, the perception of the movement of the interval opens the room as a 
site of somatic practices. In turn, the body, when experienced as a quality of a Friday interval, 
can also be considered a site of somatic practices. The body is not one thing, but more of a site 
— opened by the interval — composed of many practices. This body has the capacity to register 
intervals through the perception of movement, since movement is what allows the interval to 
take place. What, then, is the particular type of movement perception that looms up in the space 
of the room as weeks pass by?  
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The perception of movement is a kind of listening, one that is linked to the vestibular nerves 
located in the inner ear. The vestibular nerves are the first to myelinate, starting at uterine life; 
even before touch is formed. The founder of Body Mind Centering, Bonnie Bainbridge Cohen 
says that “We learn first through the perception of movement. Not only is movement a 
perception, but as the first perception of learning, it plays an important role in establishing the 
baseline for our concept or process of perceiving” (Cohen 1993, 115). She goes on to describe 
how these nerves are accompanied by the ‘proprioceptors’ and ‘kinesthetic receptors’ in the 
bones, joints, ligaments, muscles and fascia, the ‘interoceptors’ in the organs, glands, blood 
vessels and in each ‘cell’ (Cohen 1993, 115). Vestibular perception of movement registers the 
contingencies of movement, the pull of gravity, the shape of luminosity, the pockets of distances 
carried by sound. This perception is not concerned with the inner or outer vision of the body, the 
categorization and division of the body into inside and outside, nor with the exploration of the 
body through supplementing an experiential pathway with mental visualization. Vestibular 
perception slides over the intervals of the pathways of physiological perception. It registers the 
transmission of the skin, the peripheral nerves of the limbs, and the circulatory fluids as sounds; 
as movements shaping an emerging undefined partitur. Through somatic listening to the 
contingency of movement, an ecology of activities is opened up: beyond the exact positions of 
physiological layers of a body (skin, nerves, and fluids), and beyond the activities of the 
architecture of spaces —as well as the atmospheric memories carried on by the habits inhabiting 
them. In this manner, the dance of the body, supported by the register of movement perception, 
finds incisive openings that decompress the pressure of the years of accumulated read and lived 
knowledge. These are the years that today —active as a memory force—push away the 
luminosity that covers the walls creating a fluid rhythm with the floor.  
 
Movement perception finds and registers the intervals that sort out a mode of choreography. 
Movement perception composes with a force of habit surpassing the givens in the room. The 
intervals separate and recompose habitual modes of perception, filtering the pitch of the 
architecture, the body and the ecology of knowledge around us, as they re-occur, continuing now 
and then and now again back then. Intervals autonomously re compose the habitual activities of 
daily life, and re-choreograph them with and more-than the body.  
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This Friday afternoon hears at the distance the rumbling sound of a storm. Process philosophy 
sounds at the distance its wish to say something about movement. The air smells tick, electricity 
crisps the angles of the room. These are meteorological signs indicating that a gentle clash 
between somatic practices and process philosophy is about to start. 
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Interval 2: The Extensive Continuum. 
 
 
Process philosophy has something to say about the perception of movement, dressing the almost 
imperceptible dynamic of the interval. Intuition suggests that the vocabulary of process 
philosophy can help to express, with more precision, the sensitivity awoken by the interval. The 
concept of ‘movement’ becomes the entry point into process philosophy, as it registers the 
interval through a somatic sensitivity. Yet, the atmosphere of this Friday begins to be stormed 
right now. Because in principle, the concept of ‘movement’ in process philosophy does not seem 
to match the movement of the interval. The main reference of process philosophy throughout this 
thesis, is the English philosopher and mathematician Alfred North Whitehead. Whitehead 
affirms in several sections of his magnum opus book Process and Reality, and especially in 
Chapter II, ‘The Extensive Continuum’, that an ‘actual entity does not move’. Does this imply 
that when the interval makes felt the qualities of the room, nothing is really moving? Or, does the 
movement of the interval, which elongates the qualities of the room, become static at the actual 
moment of perception?  
 
These questions will be answered slowly. By engaging in a precise and lengthy dialogue with 
Isaac Newton and Renee Descartes, Whitehead articulates the concept of the ‘extensive 
continuum’ from which his own concept of movement —as becoming— derives. He considers 
these authors as major examples of the scientific and philosophic traditions of the seventeen 
century. Whitehead argues that Newton and Descartes’ contributions with their theories of 
‘Absolute and relative space’ and the ‘Material bodies’, respectively, have become common 
ideas shaping the modern philosophies of perception. Thus, Whitehead will tackle those 
assumptions, while conceptualizing the ‘extensive continuum’—a notion that has the strongest 
parallel to the somatic experience of the interval in this thesis— and simultaneously stating his 
view on theories of perception.  
 
The concept of the extensive continuum allows Whitehead to expose the problems of the modern 
European traditions of thought, based in perceptive modes, that have a conscious and distinct 
perception of the extensive world: its extensive time and space. For Whitehead, at the human 
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scale of perception, when a sensory perception with the extension of time and space is 
consciously registered — the touch of a table, the sound coming from next room, or the light 
diffused through the balcony window— in fact, a selective process of abstraction has been 
operative. This selective process has abstracted —as subtracted— the perception of the table, the 
sound coming from the other room and the light of the balcony while selecting out –as 
excluding— other elements that the human has not become habituated to register. For 
Whitehead, there are always more-than-human activities that are ‘abstracted out’ from the 
surroundings, in order for the extensive human perception to appear seamlessly unitary and 
continuous. If it weren’t for this operation of abstraction the perception of the world would 
appear atomized and discontinuous.  
 
As we will see, Whitehead gives to the body’s senses the function of perceiving continuity. But 
this perception is not just something given and granted for once and for all. This perception of 
continuity through the senses is a generation, a creative act that produces the perception of a 
world at each immediate moment. For Whitehead, the concept that launches the generation of the 
continuity of sense perception is ‘potentiality’. Thus, when Whitehead will engage in 
conversation with Newton and Descartes, he will show us how his own concept of potentiality 
lends to a different theory of perception than theirs. 
 
“The contemporary world as perceived by the senses is the datum for contemporary 
actuality, and is therefore continuous — divisible but not divided. The contemporary 
world is in fact divided and atomic, being a multiplicity of definite actual entities” 
(Whitehead 1974, 62). 
 
Another point to have in mind is that ‘potentiality’ operates the perception of the extensive 
continuously by way of ‘relating’ the elements that come together in that event of continuation. 
This is to say that ‘potentiality’ operates the continuation perceived through the body senses in 
an assemblage of relations distributed by it. The operation of potentiality is one that ‘gives’—as 
make ingress— the capacity to sense and ‘relates’—as distributes— the sensed elements.  
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Thus the sense-data are eternal objects [potentiality] playing a complex relational role; 
they connect the actual entities of the past with the actual entities of the contemporary 
world (…) For instance, we see the contemporary chair, but we see it with our eyes, and 
we touch the contemporary chair, but we touch it with our hands. Thus colours objectify 
the chair in one way, and objectify the eyes in another way, as elements in the experience 
of the subject (Whitehead 1978, 62-3). [Text modified]  
 
Potentiality is what gives and distributes the sense-data that forms the extensive perception of 
qualities of the world. When the quality of colour appears in between the sense-data perception 
of a human body and a zone of the room, it is because a potential has ingressed. The component 
parts of the human body such as the visual apparatus, the architectural frame of the window, and 
the light waves, are being related by the potential. All the elements have actualized their relation, 
generating a duration and place in the process of sensing a quality. ‘Potentiality’ is relational, 
meaning that it gives elements the capacity to interconnect each other as sense-data, and to 
generate through qualities.  
 
The elements that come together through sense perception, at each place and duration, are in fact 
from and part of an atomic and divided physical world. Potentiality relates the sense-data of the 
environment, meaning that each processual step of perception is an act of assembling separated 
components. A potential relates sense-data, meaning that at each processual step of perception 
there is a call to assemble from separation. On the other hand, the perception of the 
contemporary world is not divisible into other contemporary actualities because once an act of 
perception takes form — like the act of walking beside the light of the window towards the 
sound of the kitchen —  that act is in itself independent from other acts: present, and future. The 
act of walking remains independent from the other act of plants receiving sunlight on the 
balcony, which is also independent of the proceeding act of opening the fridge to get a 
refreshment.  
 
In short, when the act of perception passes from the phase of emergence into full actualization, it 
carries with it an independence (elbow room) from the other perceptual acts in its immediate 
surroundings: becoming a singularity: just that act. This is to say that ‘potentiality’ makes 
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ingress the capacity to ‘sense’ and to ‘assemble’ through ‘qualities’, while at the same time 
maintaining certain ‘independence’ between the elements assembled or interconnected.  
 
Whitehead calls this capacity of potentiality to keep the interconnection and independence of the 
events of perception the ‘solidarity of the universe’. Before going further, it is important to 
highlight that through the philosophical journey studied above, Whitehead is already showing us 
that his theory of perception tends to more-than clear and distinct data as given to the senses. 
Perception carries the capacity to make ingress, to relate, and to maintain an independence of the 
elements assembled. This capacity carried by the potential element of perception is not ‘clear and 
distinct’ to the human intellect, because its operations exceed the merely presented sense-data. 
Each sense-data presented carries the operations of making ingress, relating and keeping 
independence beyond its presentation: it moves from the antecedent past to the anticipated 
future. 
 
Now, without going deeper into the temporal consequences of Whitehead’s theory of perception, 
let’s see how his theory of the ‘solidarity of the universe’ brings him in conversation with 
Newton. It is in Chapter II, ‘The Extensive Continuum’, where Whitehead articulates his 
theoretical frame on the ‘solidarity’ of the universe — the interconnectedness of elements — and 
shows how it can’t be thought without philosophizing sense perception. In addition, we will 
finally see how the concept of ‘movement’ is involved in this problem of perception.  
 
To tackle the problem of sense perception (how modern tradition conceptualizes it through the 
direct connection with the ‘present and sensible’) Whitehead will visit Newton’s distinction 
between ‘Absolute time and space’ and ‘Relative time and space’. As we will see, Whitehead 
will affirm with Newton that sense perception can’t be directly and completely linked to the 
Relative time and space —because something of the Absolute always remains in reserve (the 
excess of potentiality). Nevertheless, we will also see that Whitehead will not agree with 
Newton’s radical disconnection between the Absolute and the Relative—because for Whitehead 
they are both mutually included.  
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To tackle the problem of sense perception Newton proposes the distinction between ‘Absolute 
time and space’ and ‘Relative time and space’. ‘Absolute’ time and space are immovable and not 
apprehended through the senses. Newton says that common vulgar opinion understands ‘relative’ 
time and space as quantitative measures, made in relation to sensible objects: 
 
I do not define time, space, place, and motion, as being well known to all. Only I must 
observe, that the vulgar conceive those quantities under no other notions but from the 
relation they bear to sensible objects. And thence arise certain prejudices, for the 
removing of which it will be convenient to distinguish them into absolute and relative, 
true and apparent, mathematical and common (Whitehead 1978, 70). 
 
Common vulgar opinion confuses ‘relative time’ as ‘absolute time’ because it measures time by 
means of a sensible motion, through the quantity of an hour, a day, a month, and a year 
(Whitehead 1978, 70). It also misunderstands ‘relative space’ as ‘absolute space’ because it 
measures space by the movable and quantified positions between bodies (Whitehead 1978, 70). 
 
Whitehead identifies his “atomized quantum of extension correlative to an actual entity- with 
Newton’s absolute place and duration” (Whitehead 1978, 73), agreeing with Newton’s proof that 
motion does not apply to absolute place “which in its nature is immovable”. He concludes that 
“an actual entity never moves, it is what it is” (Whitehead 1978, 73). He departs from Newton, 
however, in that he “confused what is ‘real’ potentiality with what is actual fact” (Whitehead 
1978, 73).  
 
Little by little through Whitehead’s conversation with Newton, we get to see what the connection 
is between movement, perception and the extensive continuum. We will soon see that this 
conflict with the notion of movement is what entices the next conversation with Descartes. But 
we are getting ahead of ourselves. Let’s continue with Whitehead’s Newton. 
 
Whitehead seeks to preserve the experience of the actual as something beyond quantitative 
measure and, in return, to release the notion of movement and sense perception from the duty to 
quantify and measure. Whitehead proposes another take on sensible perception by embedding 
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the extensive continuum in the capacity to transform potentiality into an act, without confusing 
them. The extensive continuum functions as a passageway from potentiality to actuality through 
scales of gradations: from ‘general potentiality’ (Absolute space and time) to ‘real potentiality’ 
and to ‘actuality (Relative space and time)’. When the ‘potential eternal object’ ingresses the 
capacity of ‘sense-data’ to hold a relation between independent elements, the ‘general 
potentiality’ becomes defined by its relation with actuality. The actual elements that enter in 
relation to one at other come to define how the potential can make ingress. Thus, the potential 
loses its ‘generality’ and becomes a ‘real potentiality’. Potentiality and actuality are not 
philosophically confused, but are folded into each other, and constitute one another. 
 
The prehension of this scheme is one more example that actual fact includes in its own 
constitution real potentiality which is referent beyond itself (Whitehead 1978, 72). 
 
In this paragraph, the word ‘beyond’ describes what makes the sense perception of the actual 
something more-than measurable and quantifiable. When the sense of stability in the room is 
experienced by the rhythm of the floor, the actual experience is enmeshed with the potential to 
walk and transform the quality of stability into something else, perhaps into the quality of 
appetite enticed by the food in the fridge luring the subject to begin walking. Sense perception, 
therefore, is always enmeshed into a ‘potential’ surplus that functions as a vector, sliding away 
from its ‘actuality’. Sense perception is always blurred by the process of emergence into 
actuality, and once it is satisfied, is still blurred by the next proximal act. 
 
Moreover, since actuality is constituted by potentiality, place and duration emerge from the 
potentiality of the extensive plenum. In the process of temporalization and extensiveness, each 
sense perception is an atomization, a sensed portion, or a cut from the plenum from where it 
arises. At each atomization, at each sense perceptible act, time and extension emerge. In the 
immediacy of this sensed emergence, perception does not have time to measure or perceive 




Little by little this Friday afternoon begins to recover its faith in the concept of movement, as 
that dynamic which makes the interval felt. The philosophical impetus, however, keeps on 
knocking on the door to the room of the extensive continuum: echoing thoughts that, 
paradoxically, can only be kept at bay from the room if discussed in philosophical writing style. 
The Friday, therefore takes on a philosophic dimension as the festive and the philosophic 
become mutually included differential qualities. The interval becomes a room for proximity, in 
which philosophy belongs to the festive because it enacts the unmeasurable.  
 
In the same chapter of ‘The Extensive Continuum”, Whitehead conducts a conversation with 
another representative of the modern traditions of the seventeenth century, Descartes. In the 
same fashion as with Newton, Whitehead adjusts his ‘philosophy of the organism’ with 
Descartes’ theory of ‘material bodies’ in order to offer alternatives to the modern theories of 
sense perception and in return, to tackle the problematic connection between movement and 
sense perception from a different angle. 
 
Whitehead affiliates with Descartes by saying that his “(…) doctrine of the physical world as 
exhibiting an extensive plenum of actual entities is practically the same as the ‘organic 
doctrine.”; and continuous in disagreement by adding: “but Descartes’ bodies have to move, and 
this presupposition introduces new obscurities. It is exactly at this point that Newton provides for 
Whitehead a clear conception in comparison with Descartes. “In the ‘organic’ doctrine, motion is 
not attributable to any occasion” (Whitehead 1978, 77). Again, it seems that ‘movement’, as 
considered by the modern philosophical tradition, is not of help to understand Whitehead’s 
extensive continuum. In what comes after, Whitehead explains what is at stake by affirming an 
immobile physical perspective of the extensive perception of the world, as does Newton, 
differently than Descartes. 
 
Whitehead explains the consequences following the Cartesian theory of the material bodies, 
together with its logic of sense perception:  
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In the perception of a contemporary stone (…) the separate individuality of each actual 
entity in the nexus constituting the stone is merged into the unity of the extensive plenum, 
which for Descartes and for common sense is the stone. (Whitehead 1978, 77). 
 
 The next logical step is to effect a complete objectification — instead of a partial objectification 
of the atomized continuum — by the extensive perception of the stone, which is then 
“specialized into the specific perspective of a sense-datum, such as colour, for example” 
(Whitehead 1978, 77). From then on, this logic of perception understands the material stone as 
something complete and unchanged — as always the same extensive whole — which is 
perceived through its colour (quality): in return, what is capable of occasional change.  
 
Whitehead stresses the problem of the theory of perception that separates ‘substances’ and 
‘accidents’. In his opinion, modern philosophy falls into this separation each time it goes beyond 
the immediate deliverance of direct perception (This is a relational mode of perception, which in 
fact, is in accordance with Descartes: “one perceives with these hands and feet” (Whitehead 
1978, 75)). Through the modern logic of separation, ‘substances’ are granted an essential and 
undifferentiated attribute, where activities are explained through their ‘accidental’ qualities and 
relationships. Change only occurs through the accidental qualities and relationships of substance, 
but substance remains numerically self-identical in essence.  
 
“Thus the imaginations of men are dominated by the quiet extensive stone with its 
relationship of positions, and its quality of colour- relationships and qualities which 
occasionally change” (Whitehead 1978, 78). 
 
In this actual moment, this Friday interval gets the answer about movement that it deserves. 
When Whitehead separates movement from participation with the actual, and freezes movement 
into immobility —which is towards the side of the Absolute, and in line with Newton’s work—
he protests the modern notions of movement and change as accidental qualities referring to 
essential identical substances. Though, Whitehead also protests Newton’s isolation of the 
Absolute, because it is eternal and self-identical too: 
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“From the point of view of the philosophy of the organism, there is a great merit in 
Newton’s immovable receptacles. But for Newton they are eternal” (Whitehead 1978, 
81). 
 
Whitehead replaces the concepts of ‘absolute and relative space’ from Newton and ‘substance, 
movement, and change’ from Descartes for those of ‘extensive continuum’ and ‘becoming’. He 
is less interested in conceptualizing ‘movement’ as something accidental and isolated. As he says 
later, movement is the relational difference across independent elements coming together in the 
extensive continuum (Whitehead 1978, 80). Whitehead utilizes the concept of ‘becoming’ to 
index the singular act of formation of each act of perception (just this singular act). In this sense, 
the actual dynamic of formation is not an accidental motion (external displacements), but a 
growing into concreteness (internal concrescence).  
 
The physical field is, in this way, atomized with definite divisions; it becomes a nexus of 
actualities. Such a quantum (i.e., each actual division) of the extensive continuum is the 
primary phase of the creature. This quantum is constituted by its totality of relationships 
and cannot move. Also the creature cannot have any external adventures, but only the 
internal adventure of becoming. Its birth is its end. (Whitehead 1978, 80) 
 
What is perceived in the quantum of each actual division is a ‘creature’: something emerging out 
of the datum of potentiality and limited by the already existing actualities. At each immediate 
perceptual experience, something is being created into and through perception. Perception of the 
actual is not perception of a world of separate material bodies with a quantifiable space and time 
between them. Perception is a creation of the world in the making. As it is being created it has a 
‘perception in the making’ of what is happening: time and space do not pre-exist the moment of 
perception, so there is no pocket of stable time-space where the commotion of motion can be 
externally registered.  
 
Through the concept of relation, the connection between the ‘solidarity’ of the universe and the 
value of the ‘perception in the making’ becomes clear. The extensive continuum of the world is 
created as perceived through ‘relation’ itself. It is not external and accidental relation, but an 
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inter-connected relation across the actualities that co-habit the extensive quantum. Another word 
for relation is event:  
 
An event is a nexus of actual occasions inter-related in some determinate fashion in some 
extensive quantum (…) The most general sense of the meaning of change is ‘the 
differences between actual occasions; and such a route is an ‘event’. (Whitehead 1978, 
80) 
 
By now it can be understood that the festive quality of the Friday happens not in one individual 
interval, but across many. Then, the movement of the interval allows it to become a quality, 
spreading across the many intervals of independent elements co-habiting the event. To cultivate a 
festive quality is to stay attuned to the relations and movements of atomized elements in the 
event of experience. The intervals of perception make perception vague — beyond a clear and 
distinct indication of the stable accidental material world — and allow it to register the 
movement of the event. In order to not anger Whitehead, let’s say that the movement of the event 
is its becoming. 
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Interval 2B: Relations. 
 
 
Last Friday afternoon had a long conversation with process philosophy as a way to friend 
philosophy with the festive. It worked, yet the long conversation with philosophy left a toll in the 
room. Today can feel like a repetitive loop of Wednesdays with no weekend in sight. So, the 
question posited by the room is how to activate one more time the technique of the last interval 
so that the interval opens again to the festive quality. In fact, today’s question is the basic 
question that drives every writing of the intervals: can philosophy be a somatic technique to 
register the abstractions immanent to the contingencies of the living without flying away from its 
constitutive festive quality? 
 
The last interval 2 said that the topic of the interval quality in the room is inseparable from a 
mode of understanding perception. This is to say that the extensive time, space, and quality of 
the room generates its own perception. Though the extensive time, space and quality are also 
generated at the moment of perception. Thus, a paradox arises, where the extensive place and 
duration are not pre-existing elements of the experience, but also not an unbounded infinity, 
which was dealt with in the last interval 2 via the concepts of the potential and the actual. The 
extensive continuum is the plane that transduces the passage from potentiality to actuality. In the 
plane potentiality ingresses the relational element of eternal objects: the capacity for sense-data 
to be felt as a quality. In return, the actualities in the plane that the process of ingression has 
already ended are what limit the unbounded potentiality of the eternal objects, transforming it 
into ‘real potentiality’. The perception generated by the extensive continuum is not limited to the 
modern theories of sense perception based in a register that is distinctive and conscious. With the 
extensive continuum, there is not a measure of quantities of external change from the event of 
perception. In it, what is changing is a process internal to the relations of elements, not of an 
individual actuality, but of a nexus of actual occasions — which is exactly Whitehead’s 
definition of the event (Whitehead 1978, 73). That which is perceived in the extensive continuum 
emerges out of an atomization or division of the extensiveness of time, space and quality.   Then, 
the perception emerging with no pre-existing extensiveness of the room is an atomic perception, 
one that emerges out of the quantum that divides the extensive continuum. Perception in the 
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making is alternative to modern theories of sense perception in that it registers the divisions of 
the extensive continuum. At each time that the perception of the room appears as seamlessly 
continuous, this processual perception is capable of registering what is truly happening: the 
atomization of continuity that populates intervals. 
 
From now on, an answer begins to arise to the question of how philosophy can be a somatic 
technique to register the festive quality of the interval. Philosophy can be approached as a 
technique to feel the population of the intervals rather than the common overall sense of flowing 
continuity.  Philosophical thought can be a mode of feeling the manner in which the sense of 
continuation emerges, together and with interruptions. To pursue the crafting of this 
philosophical felt technique the focus should be, again, in the concept of the potential relational 
objects, because they are what allows continuity to re-emerge or to re-continue. They are what 
interrupts and re-continues events of perception, by giving a lure to continue from the end of one 
act to the other and by defining each act of perception as a singular that: related but independent 
from the other. In short, what is to be analyzed is ‘relation’. ‘Relation’ is what continuous the 
link with today’s interval. It is what helps to craft the philosophical felt technique of the interval.  
 
In the next paragraph, affect philosopher Brian Massumi adds some more vocabulary to envision 
the role of relation. He conceptualizes it as an operation immanent to the event of perception, 
through the actual and yet exceeding it (potential). He stresses the fact that perception of relation 
is non-sensuous: it is with and beyond what conscious and distinct modern perception can catch. 
It is a perception of movement that does not subtract quantitative measure but feels the qualities 
emerging via the sense-data ingressed. 
 
The linkage is what the objects share through their combination: implication in the same 
event. The felt perception of continuing movement is qualitative because it directly 
grasps the changing nature of the shared event ‘behind’, ‘across’ or ‘through’ its 
objective ingredients and their observable combinations. It is simply: relationship. 
Directly perceptually-felt’ “nonsensuously” perceived (Massumi 2011, 107). 
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To feel through intervals the non-sensuous emerging perception is to perceive more-than what is 
presented to the senses in the act of the now. It is to feel the behind, across and through, not only 
of the many divided entities that already took form, but also of the time vectors moving through 
them. Paradoxically, to feel this way is to feel along the act of perception a quality that gets 
everything at once, but through pieces. 
 
Feeling the non-sensuous along the act of the now is an act of listening to quality as a mosaic of 
elements, separated and together, carried by vectors of continuations, which are indeed vectors of 
re-continuations and re-energizing.  They are vectors of re-continuations instead of simple 
continuation, because the becoming of extensiveness — the changing nature of the event — is 
not something happening just for once and forever, but every time in the physical atomized 
contemporary world. Whitehead is very clear about this: he says that “there is a prevalent 
misconception that ‘becoming’ involves the notion of a unique seriality for its advance into 
novelty. This is the classic notion of ‘time’, which philosophy took over from common sense” 
(Whitehead 1978, 35). For him, the “‘creative advance’ is not to be construed in the sense of a 
uniquely serial advance” (Whitehead 1978, 35).  What becomes is continuity itself, in a non-
serial fashion. Continuity is created at each moment of the processual operations of the extensive 
continuum. It is not that the process of becoming just continues, but again that becoming 
generates endless continuities. This point is resumed in the famous Whiteheadean formula: 
“there is a becoming of continuity, but not continuity of becoming” (Whitehead 1978, 35). 
 
Therefore, if continuations are created every time, how do they preserve their quality from non-
serial actualization to non-serial actualization? How is it possible that the process of relation 
keeps repeating its mode of relation in such a way as to feel like an overall continuation? Or, 
how is it that at each second the experience is not of the everyday world, then of a chaos of 
atoms, then of the atmosphere of the moon, etc.? There is an active memory of relations that 
relays form in the process of relations. Under this perspective, the continuations are modes in 
which the activities - the modes of feeling entities - come to know how to relay themselves in 
different rhythmical patterns for inter-relation. The continuations are how the world has crafted 
an active memory that keeps re-ingressing relations — non-serially — to feel the seamlessly 
unitary event of perception. Relation, when it is not felt in its temporal, spatial and qualitative 
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actualization, is felt as the relaying force that capacitates the extensive continuum to go on. In 
other words, if subtracted from feeling, relation is a patterned memory that allows the extensive 
continuum to go on with its continuity, despite the non-serial atomization populating it at every 
single atomic step. 
 
The memory of inter-relation subtracted from the capacity to be felt is what Whitehead also calls 
the ‘general scheme of relationships’: 
 
Extension, apart from its spatialization and temporalization, is that general scheme of 
relationships providing the capacity that many objects can be welded into real unity of 
one experience (….) These extensive relationships are more fundamental than their more 
spatial and temporal relationships (Whitehead 1978, 67).  
 
When an act of feeling occurs temporality, spatiality, and quality are foregrounded in the 
processual making, yet there is something else that is backgrounded: the inherited capacity for 
acts of feeling to continue to relate and to reconnect through their atomicity. There is an excess 
of ‘relation’ that did not become a quality to be felt. Whitehead uses the concept of ‘negative 
prehensions’ to express the influence of the general scheme of relationships in the feel of the 
extensive continuum (Whitehead 1978, 41). Negative prehensions are like a tone for relation that 
add something to the way in which the event of perception is qualitatively felt. They are 
themselves not felt, only negatively prehended: somehow registered as an intuition or déjà vu, as 
an overall atmosphere of something familiar to our feelings but just resting on the tip of the 
tongue. Negative prehensions add their patterned relations (linkage) for the non-sensuous 
perception to be perceptually felt “‘behind’, ‘across’ or ‘through’ its objective ingredients” 
(Massumi 2011, 107). If non-sensuous perception is perceptually felt beyond and across 
individual body senses, negative prehension adds a relational pattern to that limit perception, but 
not a feeling.  
 
Thus, if actual felt perceptions are capacities that are inherited from modes of patterned relations 
between inherited activities, we can say that there is an ecology of relations reactivated at each 
moment in which an act re-plunges into the extensive continuum. We can also say that there is an 
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ecology of relations that always re-continues more or less in the same inter-related patterns in 
such a way as to create a sense of perception of smooth continuation, as usual. Then, the 
following question would be: if the cut of the continuum is a re-emergence, a re-becoming, how 
does it arise that we humans re-perceive always more or less the same? What are the operations 
of inter-related patterning occurring at the non-actually perceivable ecology of activities, which 
continue to foreground the repetition of the same identical types of sense perception and, for that 
matter, which type of stable community of acts are favoured?  
 
This is still the same old foot and floor, they are the same lazy people, this is the inevitable 
catastrophic environment. Are we confusing the actual facts of perception with the excess of 
ecological richness that generates its continuity? What are the ecological processes that recorded 
our habits to see the quantitative product of perception over the creative qualities, working like 
hell to keep our boring repetitive sense of stability together? 
 
And most important, how can the philosophical technique to feel the interval not only register the 
operations for continuation but intensify the differential force of the cut, so that the quantum of 
emergence records differently the memory of the ecology of relations for new and non-dominant 




Interval 2C: Quality. 
 
 
After some days, on this grey Sunday, the Friday returns carrying certain affirmations found 
along the experiential writing sessions of the past intervals: ‘quality’ is what makes felt the 
ecological richness of relationship, which is not limited to the quantifiable perception of 
experience. Operating as a relational memory, the ecological relationship re-continues through 
the cuts of the extensive continuum to reappear with the emerging quantum of the actualities. 
This Sunday midday, recalls the question posited some days ago: if philosophy could be a 
somatic technique to feel the quality of the interval, how could it register not only the re-
continuations of the self-identical, but also the differential force of the cut of the quantum? 
 
The concept of ‘quality’ will be useful to understand the differential quantum that re-continues 
with increasing variation, from self-identical repetition. For the Friday to overcome the gravity 
of the Sunday midday, it needs to feel ‘quality’ as something concrete, grounded, in short: 
chewable. Quality is how the abstract movement of potential relationality re-continues the 
process of extensiveness, yet it is also an expression of the palpable enmeshment of the abstract 
potential with the actual, concrete, and concise event from which perception emerges. 
 
William James is another philosopher who describes the expression of quality in a process of 
becoming perception. The concept he uses to name the process of becoming is ‘bare activity’, or 
in his words: “the bare fact of event or change” (James 2003, 84). Thus for him, activity equals 
the Whitehedean process of enmeshment of potential, which occurs through the actual in the 
plane of the extensive continuum. 
 
He feels the tendency, the obstacle, the will, the strain, the triumph, or swiftness or 
intensity, the movement, the weight and colour, the pain and pleasure, the complexity or 
whatever remaining characters the situation may involve (…) If we suppose activities to 
go on outside of our experience, it is in forms like these that we must suppose them (…) 
for the word “activity” has no imaginable content whatever these experiences of process, 
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obstruction, striving, strain, or release, ultimate qualia as they are of the life given us to 
be known (James 2003, 87). 
 
Activity — the bare process of change — is felt through very concrete qualities, like the gravity 
of today’s room and the strain that exercises over the force of Friday, attempting to kick in the 
calendar. James continues to say that whatever principle that brings the effect of quality to 
experience, should be understood not as something that transcends the qualitative act of 
experience. It “is just what we feel it to be” (James 2003, 97). On this topic, he continues saying 
that philosophy should “leave off grubbing underground for what effects effectuation, or what 
makes action act, and to try to solve the concrete questions of where effectuation in this world is 
located…” (James 2003, 97). 
 
There are two important points to be subtracted for the research of the interval out of this short 
compilation of James’s thoughts: the force of movement and the agency indexed by quality. 
 
On the one hand, James underlies the fact that if there are activities outside of our conscious 
experience, they should be similar to the concrete effects carried by quality. When quality 
transpires in an extensive perception, it makes felt a ‘form of process’ that indexes the relational 
memory of the extensive continuum. Quality in its actual effect indexes a form of process that is 
more-than the extensive, but is mutually included in it. The form of process is double: it makes 
felt a qualitative aspect, while indicating something of the patterned memory that is part of the 
relational nexus, which re-continues along the atomization of the physical field. Now, what the 
quality indexes in its form of process is a form of movement: form should be understood as 
something dynamic, open and in transit. The dim light across the furniture of the room, the 
rhythmic sounds in the street, and the thickness of the air pressure are qualities that index the 
overall movement of pulling the day in two: a Sunday-Friday. 
 
Quality, as defined by James, is felt and carried by a form of movement, making the agency in 
the event of perception come to the forefront. The event is not individual but a nexus of actual 
occasions: a multiplicity. Quality is the medium by which an ecology of agencies is felt. Quality 
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is not only that colour, that sound, or that brightness, but also their inextricable, relational, 
moving, and expressive autonomy. 
 
This link between the feeling of quality and the agency of an ecology of relations is beautifully 
articulated by Philosopher Erin Manning: “{the feeling} defines the quality of the event in the 
event” (Manning 2016, 133), it “is that which moves the event toward what Whitehead calls its 
satisfaction. It is the event’s agency” (Manning 2016, 134). Manning articulates the operation of 
the ecology of relations through the very concept of non-sensuous perception (interval 2B) that 
“describes the folding of past tonalities into present events” (Manning 2016, 133): “it is a 
‘pastness’” (Manning 2016, 134) that runs through the event.  Non-sensuous perception is the 
force of ‘pastness’ luring other feelings: feelings that in return will actualize novel forms of 
experience. 
 
By remaining proximate to this Sunday interval, James’ and Manning’ findings on the concept of 
‘quality’ can bring something new to the table. The autonomous agency of the ecology of 
relations re-continues — from pastness to futurity — to be expressed through qualities. It brings 
an ‘excess’ to the extensive experience, one ‘excess’ that is ‘free’. Quality is in excess of what 
can be quantifiable in the actual world of perception, therefore, it is what gets free from the 
satisfied actual form, to return and re-energize other processes of form taking. Quality plunges 
back to the extensive continuum to give force to other quantum cuts in the process of 
actualization. Quality is what gets freed from the actual satisfaction of form and modulates the 
memory of relationships. Quality feeds forward the force of memory of the world to keep 
capacitating patterning for actual perception, to keep delineating ecologies of feeling. Quality is 
a dynamic blueprint that feeds the force for future encounters. 
 
In the perception of quality, there are signs of freedom. Freedom understood as more than a 
human thought or action — as the ecological force of relation beyond actual forms of perception, 
which injects their agency with the quantum for actualization. The way in which the quality of 
the event resolves (or satisfies) itself, is a sign of freedom that feeds forward other modes of 
actual living, feeling, and perceiving the contemporary. It is a freedom from quantity, from 
staying once and for all in the actual world: allowing the subject to become a non-sensuous force 
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at the edge of space-time, a ghost forcing the quantum of the extensive continuum to re-emerge. 
Manning undertakes the concept of ‘freedom’ through another philosopher, Henri Bergson: 
 
The activation of change in quality is what Bergson defines as freedom. Freedom is here 
not linked to human volition, nor is it allied to intentionality or agency. Freedom is 
instead allied to the in-act, to the decisional force of movement-moving, to the 
agencement that opens the event to the fullness of its potential. Freedom is how the event 
express its complexity, in the event (…) Freedom, for Bergson, is dynamic, ecological. 
(Manning 2016, 23) 
 
Freedom describes the nature of quality to inject change from the contemporary state of affairs of 
perception: it moves through and across an event, instead of being limited to a singular self-
identical thing, object, or entity. The question, therefore, of the philosophical somatic technique 
of registering a differential, can be answered through the movement of a quality, not an attempt 
of capturing the same. 
 
Through registering the movement with an alien agency, the habitual movements patterned in the 
contemporary state of affairs can become palpable. This alien agency is a part of an ecology of 
relations, which is a memory of freedom that returns as ‘pastness’ (present and future). It can be 
understood as an ‘appetite’: a Whiteheadian concept to explain the urge of processes towards 
actualization. The perception of movement parallels a feel for appetites with a quality for the 
alien. This alien quality is not non-existent, but something that is already at play in the ecology 
of relations: if it were to take form in the act, it would shift the quantum of the field of 
actualization beyond its predominant forms. To experiment with philosophical somatic 
techniques that register the qualitative movement of the interval, is to yearn for ecological 
appetites already almost in the act. The techniques are a mode of experimenting with what it 
means to have an appetite, less as an individual human, but as a choreographic event: more an 
ecology than a person. 
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Interval 3: Interconnectedness. 
 
 
Today the night has come. It is hard to say if it is the night of Friday or if by a non-linear jump 
today is the night of a Sunday or a Monday. In any case, despite the promise to keep philosophy 
at bay from too much overthinking, some stubborn problems have come to stay for a while, 
demanding some even slower philosophical study to be blown into this experimental writing. 
 
So, here is the affirmation of the fact that against the wall of stubbornness, an ‘ecology of 
relationships’, ‘excessive and free qualities’ and the ‘choreographic appetites’ had come to crash; 
and at the crash a quantum of possibility glowed, some new problems screaming through the 
fractal bits and pieces the following sentences: ‘what is the pedagogy of the event?’ and ‘how is 
the (pedagogy) of the event implicitly signaling to the inherent capacity of perception to play’? 
To make these new sentences heard more intensively, a descent into the night of process 
philosophy has to be undertaken in one, two, three seconds… 
 
Whitehead, in his chapter on ‘Philosophic Method’ in Adventure of Ideas articulates the function 
of process philosophy “to discover some of the major categories under which we can classify the 
infinitely various components of experience” (Whitehead 1967, 226). He posits the problem of 
the imperfection of philosophical language to discover those categories, insofar as language is 
inadequate to tackle precisely -  with the technical vocabulary accumulated until the moment - 
“the paradox of the connectedness of things: the many things, the one world without and within” 
(Whitehead 1967, 228). 
 
To illustrate the inadequacy of language to tackle the paradox of interconnectivity, Whitehead 
develops a conversation with idealist philosopher F.H. Bradley that shows the different 
conceptual terminology they use to apparently deal with a similar perspective on experience. For 
Whitehead, the concept that articulates the interconnectedness of experience is ‘relation’, where 
for Bradley, the concept is ‘feeling’. For Bradley, the concept of relation does not really relate 
but instead, it functions as the ‘abstract universal’ of ‘betweenness’ (Whitehead 1967, 230), what 
is in between the cities of New York, Boston, and Philadelphia, for example. In other words, 
 52 
Bradley sees the charge in the concept of relation to function as an ‘external relation’ instead of a 
concept belonging immanently to an ‘inclusive whole’. On the other hand, Whitehead prefers the 
concept of ‘relation’ than (only) ‘feeling’, because he wants to bypass another additional 
problem attached to philosophy, which is to assume that the data for perception is clearly cut 
between the ‘emotional’ or ‘conscious’. He calls this problem the error of introspection, which 
pushed to the background the vague aspects of experience that are mostly derivative from the 
body. 
 
What is interesting about this conversation between Whitehead and Bradley, despite this Sunday-
Monday-night atmospheric loop, is the explanation of how their concepts differ and overlap 
through the example of a puzzle, since from the puzzle, intuition immediately emerges that there 
is something ludic about how the experience lends eyes and hands to perception.  
 
Whitehead then continues sorting out the conceptual distances and proximities with Bradley by 
using a short sentence that illustrates his take on ‘feeling’. 
 
“These puzzles are insoluble unless that which I feel, and which is not an object before 
me, is present and active. This felt element is used and it must be used in the constitution 
of that object which satisfies me” (Whitehead 1978, 232). 
 
Whitehead says that the component of feeling “which is not an object before me” equals his 
concept of “subjective form”. The “subjective form” is the manner in which the feeling of the 
event determines the process of integration of the experience. The manner in which each single 
piece of the puzzle, together with the human in front of it, generates the arching affective 
atmosphere of ‘insolubility’, which is paradoxically the way in which the event resolves itself: 
connecting the disparate elements. In this way, Whitehead makes ‘feeling’ free from human 
internal emotion and lends it to the distributed and relational dynamic of disparate elements. In 
sum, the feeling is of the relation, not of the human subject, but of the subjective form. 
 
Whitehead also reads out from the phrase “that which I feel, and which is not an object before 
me”, his own concept of ‘negative prehension’. He explains that “such a prehension is active via 
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its contribution of its subjective form to the creative process, but it dismisses its ‘object’ from the 
possibility of entering into the datum of the final satisfaction” (Whitehead 1978, 232). The 
negative prehension is a way of taking account of processes that don’t become feelings, but 
which add their patterned memory of relationships — indeed their negative subjective form —  
to the finally emerging felt, actual, and positive subjective form. A negative prehension can be 
considered the magic element of the process, the memory relationships of the past and future 
momentums adding something extra to the actually felt elements of experience (interval 2B). 
 
Whitehead concludes that Bradley’s concept of ‘feeling’, if understood in connection with the 
concepts of subjective form and prehension, is similar to his own concept of ‘relation’, if 
‘relation’ is apprehended as ‘immanent’: that which gives the inclusive whole or the 
connectedness of the components of experience, beyond sense perception. 
 
Before this Sunday-Monday loop makes the connection with the inherent capacity of perception 
given by play, there is something else that begs to emerge from the puzzle: the beginning of the 
thought on the pedagogy of the event. 
 
In perceiving experience as something inter-connected and emerging from an immanent memory 
of relationship, we can understand what can be done through the process of learning and teaching 
process philosophy. After the example of the puzzle, Whitehead continues explaining that 
philosophy deals with “the ascent from a particular fact, or from a species to the genus 
exemplified” (Whitehead 1978, 235), and that the inverse procedure, the descent from genus to 
particular facts or species, would be impossible, “for facts and species are the product of the 
mingling of genera” (Whitehead 1978, 235). A telling argument is carried through the example 
of the notion of a backbone, which Whitehead explains, alone does not indicate anything about 
the notion of suckling or of swimming in water: “Thus no contemplation of the genus vertebra, 
taken by itself, can suggest mammals or fishes, even as abstract possibilities” (Whitehead 1978, 
235). In other words, the role of philosophy is not deconstructing the complexity of a mingling of 
experience (or event) in its individual elements, looking for an origin that caused its production, 
but to continue to combine the mingling with other genus, to see the contrast of the combined 
events and give something novel to be learnt. Whiteheads position is similar to James (interval 
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2C), when he says that philosophy should “leave off grubbing underground for what effects 
effectuation (…) and to try to solve the concrete questions of where effectuation in this world is 
located…” (James 2003, 97). 
 
“The metaphysics implicit in this speculative philosophy is of an ‘Immanent Creativity’ 
(versus a transcendental metaphysical external to the events) that follows the processes of 
individual disparate activities in their growing together, a ‘concrescence’” (Whitehead 
1978, 236).  
 
Whitehead’s metaphysics gives a pedagogic perspective of the event, pursued by the now 
overfull philosophical somatic technique of the interval, which states that when an event 
happens, to register it does not mean to dissect the individual facts that made it possible. To 
register an event is to attend to the specific global force of its effect, the interconnectedness of its 
elements that affect this intensity, this rhythm, this shape, which in return speaks of a memory of 
relationships that will keep on returning, as further modes for combination. 
 
In other words, the intuition of what happens in an event is not to get to know the history of the 
past, but the immanent generative forces of a future about to come. A future, not as a new 
individual fact, but more as the echo of multiple ‘mingling of experiences’ to resolve into events 
that in turn would be able to inject more quantum of possibilities through their combinations: 
event plus event plus event. To feel the quality of the affective tone of an event is to listen to the 
force of the genus, to be inter-laced for uncertain but irrevocable future entanglements.  The 
pedagogic function of a philosophical somatic technique is to register the interval, relaying the 
possibility of combining events of experience from one context to another. The immanent 
creativity of an event, through mingling disparate individual entities into the subjective form of 
one event, shows that what holds the relation in a partial world of experience (an inclusive 
whole) is not the share of self-identity of the elements, but the subjective form that carries them 
in difference. Thus, there is a radical value to otherness and multiplicity in what constitutes each 
single event. The subjective form, therefore, of one event can match the affective tone 
(atmospheric arc) of other events, even when the individual components of each single event do 
not have any obvious connection. The connection would happen through the affective tone and 
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not through the common self-identity of each individual element to an ever bigger group identity. 
In short, an event can match with affective tones of other events across distant contexts from 
where it was created. For example, an event of dancing can match with the affective tone of the 
event of reading a queer book, and also with an everyday walk in the city. The contrast between 
the modes of coming together in difference of each event — their genus — is what makes it 
possible to learn something new. The power of this singular knowledge would be less in its 
content — again, in the individual identities that it signifies or denotes — but in the moving 




Interval 3B: Play. 
 
 
Let the event of the Sunday-Monday night loops intensify, as the loop breaks away to another 
day - hopefully another Friday - and moves towards what it wanted to say in the first place 
during the last interval 3: an immanent creative metaphysic has an irrepressible capacity for play. 
 
The immanent creative metaphysic was discovered through the example of the puzzle given by 
Whitehead. The example in which a person stood in front of the puzzle’s pieces and played with 
it through the relational feelings. Those feelings that were given by a subjective form—an event 
distributed beyond the individual person — and that carried unfelt relations—the negative 
prehensions that were the memory of relations that didn’t become feelings, but added something 
to the subjective form of the event. Therefore, let’s return to the puzzling event example to 
discover the inherent capacity for play holding the event. 
 
We can think that the puzzle would be unsolvable if the materiality of the puzzle pieces didn’t 
have the capacity to entice a perception of play. The dentate shape of the piece of the puzzle and 
the segment of the image printed on it are the design of a technology that takes into account the 
capacity of perception to couple one section of space with another and to look for the other part 
of an image. This designed technology also takes into account the capacity of fingers to grasp 
them and of the eyes to include them in their visual range. The materiality of the pieces of the 
puzzle and of the body are kicked away from the mere perception of thingness and are always 
already agitated by desires to play. 
 
Perception of play activates a perception of things, plus the force of capacity that runs through it. 
A hand, the eyes, the ears and the puzzle’s pieces in their assembling — their knotted genus — 
bring forward the felt relation of potential: what can be done. The mistake is to assume that the 
potential of “what can be done” is a verbal thought post-facto. If the felt relation of the subjective 
form is the antecedent potential that composes the actual perception, then a perspective of 
potential arises prior to the fact. In this sense, potentiality is prior to the actual perception of a 
static thing, as a hand and a bunch of puzzle pieces. What perception of play does is to reawaken 
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us, humans, to the immediate perception of potential — the complexity of the genealogy of 
processes — in which the perception of an actual felt thing is vectored through a force of habit 
(antecedent processes) and a force of capacity (immediate novel future process). 
 
If perception begins from play, then what are stable, common and everyday things in a room 
begin to fly. The mug does not come through as the perception of a coloured thing, but as the 
potential through to the wall disseminating an octopus-like ink stain. The set of keys become 
inseparable from the twist of the wrist and the burst of fresh air welcomed by the open door. And 
the light hitting the window entangled with the tunes emitted by the laptop displaces at once the 
repetitive night of a Sunday-Monday loop to a playful Friday afternoon, again. 
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Interval 3C: Tools and Weapons. 
 
 
By following in the repetitive night of a Sunday-Monday loop, the importance of conceptualizing 
the perception of play as adding to a world of festive experiences or to a repetitive world of hard 
work becomes more palpable. The importance lies in finding concepts that can tell of the 
difference of play, which can add to a memory of relationships to search for alien appetites or, 
contrary to it, the type of difference that instead, remains in a perception of relationships that can 
only concretize the world that we already know: the repetitive loop of Sunday-Monday night 
atmospheres commonly known as ‘hard work’, the manifestation of ideas of contemporary 
successful modes of life. 
 
Therefore, what this interval is exploring today - by paradoxically resonating in a mode of hard 
work - are concepts for differentiating between a perception of play for alien appetites and 
festive experiences, and the perception of play that instigates more of the same mode of hard-
work life. In the past interval perception of potential preceded a conscious awareness of what can 
be done in the midst of an event, and thus perception of play was the immanent living of the 
necessity of the past technologies for modes of life, which fortunately could be played 
differently. There was a flow of technologies operating across things and bodies: this flow was a 
kind of intermediary between things and bodies, and it operated beyond modes of conscious 
emotion, knowledge or perception.  
 
Philosopher Gilles Deleuze and philosopher and psychoanalyst Guattari provide a set of concepts 
to understand the connection between play and technology as an intermediary of potentials 
(antecedent processes making something actual at the qualitative in-between of things and 
bodies). According to their analysis in the chapter “1227: Treatise on Nomadology - The War 
Machine” from their book A Thousand Plateaus, a technology is a set of genealogical relations 
across assemblages - understood here as events - which captures and designs forces expressed 
through things and matter.  
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“We speak of a machinic phylum or technological lineage, wherever we find a 
constellation of singularities, prolongable by certain operations, which converge, and 
make operations converge upon one or several assignable traits of expression.” (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1987, 448). 
 
A technology is a flow of matter-movement whose operation repeats and invents forms of things 
and matters together with their affects. So, a technological lineage is less an ‘object’ than a 
‘potential’ that is repeated in actual things, enmeshed by their singular expressed affects (more 
about the affects expressed by technologies later). 
 
Deleuze and Guattari, through the above mentioned chapter, work around a main distinction of 
technical objects and their affects, namely the ‘tools’ and ‘weapons’ (in connection to the 
differences between the State apparatus, which controls and quantifies processual forces, and the 
War machine, which makes forces drift qualitatively). What is interesting to subtract from this 
distinction between tool and weapon is a set of characteristics attached to them which are helpful 
to sort out the perception of emergent experience as something adding to alien or to repetitive 
hard work relationships. 
 
According to Deleuze and Guattari, the tool has a relation with introjection “it prepares a matter 
from a distance, in order to bring it to a state of equilibrium or to appropriate it for a form of 
interiority.” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 436). By introjecting the forces in relation to matter, the 
tool has a quantitative relation to movement or to speed. The quantitative tendency to movement 
is modelled through a structure of work: “In work what counts is the point of application of a 
resultant force exerted by the weight of the body considered as “one” (gravity), and the relative 
displacement of this point of application (…) Linear displacement from one point to the another 
constitutes the relative movement of the tool…” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 438). 
 
On the contrary, the weapon has a relation to projection and therefore its tendency to movement 
is qualitative and its model is that of “free action” instead of work. “Anything that throws or is 
thrown is fundamentally a weapon, and propulsion is its essential moment (…) the weapon 
invents speed, or the discovery of speed invents the weapon (the projective character of weapons 
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is the result.” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 436). The weapon is of the model of “free action” in 
which the body escapes gravity, its relation is with an absolute movement. The weapon moves 
itself while the tool needs to be moved. 
 
When the experience of something inter-connected, given by a memory of relationships, follows 
the logic of the ‘tool’ and the function of ‘work’, there is an introjection of feelings that gives 
form to the subject of perception. This logic of experience quantifies its feelings as sentiments 
that measure the felt processual forces as a way to frame them: introjecting them into the scale of 
the category of human perception, it gives human meaning to the digestion of free processual 
forces. “The work regime is inseparable from an organization and a development of Form, 
corresponding to the formation of the subject. Feeling implies an evaluation of matter and its 
resistances: a direction (sens, also “meaning”)” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 441). 
 
On the other hand, the assemblages under the logic of “free action” are of the forces of affect 
(projectile affects): the exteroceptive discharges beyond form and the interiority of a subject 
capable of assimilating its meanings. Free action of processual forces un-codes the meaning of 
feelings, it effectuates the passions of the assemblage. These are experiences of processes that 
tend to the excess of activity beyond the categories of bodies, subjects and things. “affects (...) 
relate only to the moving body in itself, to speeds and composition of speeds among elements” 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 441). 
 
After the exploration of the technological object of tools and weapons, the characteristics to be 
extracted to help take into account the inter-connected elements of the event have become more 
palpable. One of the characteristics is ‘speed’ and the other is ‘exteroception’. The speed of 
perception of the event, while being maintained, gyres with an absolute movement across all the 
disparate elements, without resting inside of them, without introjecting them, but by keeping an 
exteroceptive quality, a quality moving at the edges of the individual.  
 
When perception of play is thought as the continuation of a technological lineage (a genealogy of 
processes) that returns as a potential intermediary (at the edges of the self-identical individual) 
and thus qualifies as a ‘weapon’, it can be said that the weapon cuts further at the interval of 
 61 
perception. To perceive the experience of the technology of potentials, returning as a weapon in 
an event, is to exteroceptively distribute perception through all the interstices in which 
movement drifts across the elements, so that the force of the interstitial intensifies. Resulting, is a 
weaponized mode of perception that cuts once, while simultaneously moving through multiple 
bleedings. 
 
It can be asserted that the movement perception of the interval is a perception that tends towards 
the search for weapons. There are angles of perception that kick off more absolute movement: 
the displacement of certainty and knowledge, where the earth, the body, the thing, the animal, 
and the plant are not perceived as inert objects, but as exterior (as exteroceptive) surfaces of the 
speed of bleeding affect. Absolute movement is the movement at the interstices of the actual, the 
more than the actual that Whitehead would say is not possible to be perceived if it is not in 
relation to many occasions of experience, or in other words, if it is not grasped at the level of 
interconnected events rather than of particular entities (Whitehead 1978, 73). 
 
Perception of movement and play is a weaponizing of perception: the catch of the rush and the 
arrest, conjunction, and intensity of the assemblage of activities glowing more despite the actual 
form of the pseudo inert matter. 
 
Therefore, attending the interval is not as it seems an attention to something immobile. It is an 
attention to the speeds that are exteroceptive to the coalesced and introjected perception of unity. 
Whatever that which now seems to be one united atmosphere of Sunday night, with one room 
and one tone of obscure luminosity, by attending to the interval, begins to be perceived as an 
atmosphere full of autonomous and disparate activities playing beyond “I”: the human 
introjecting them. There it is, the luminous sun, the air pressure, and the orange surface of the 
table playing themselves independently and breaking open a Saturday afternoon out of the 
unitary perception of Sunday night. 
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Interval 3D: Affective Expressions. 
 
 
Saturday afternoon atmosphere, finally. Kaitlyn Aurelia Smith sounds through the speakers. A 
diffuser spreads eucalyptus and the sun of autumn heats still with enough force to imbue the 
room with a quality of levity. The thought that the room is the perception of all the movements 
that escape through windows and walls beyond the visual range and through the corners where 
the sound does not reach, somehow a complicated thought (a thought of the unfinished and of the 
non-unitary, perhaps) is delayed in favour of levity. 
 
What matters now is the continuation of another thought: the very thought of ‘continuation’, or 
the operation that allows activities to continue by the very play of ‘assembling’. There is a world 
capacity for activities to ‘assemble’, allowing for activities to return and sustain themselves, 
appearing here and there as that one form of perception with the overall semblance of a Saturday 
afternoon. The capacity to assemble is what allows autonomous activities such as pressure, 
gravity and circulation to feel each other, allowing a singular semblance of perception to emerge. 
 
Then, when the experience of a portion of the world, like the feedback between pressure, gravity 
and circulation taking form in the perception of this room - with a Saturday afternoon 
atmosphere of levity - happens, it is through the genealogy of techniques for relation: techniques 
of matter in movement which listen to the call to assemble. The technological genealogies 
express the modes of operations to continue, through a call to assemble. Let’s re-visit the 
Deleuze and Guattari quote from the last interval: 
 
“We may speak of a machinic phylum or technological lineage, wherever we find a 
constellation of singularities, prolongable by certain operations which converge, and 
make operations converge upon one or several assignable traits of expression” (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1987, 448) [the underline is mine]. 
 
Every world activity, like that pressure, gravity and circulation would be an operation of its 
technological lineage, expressed at the very mattered moment in which they converge or 
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assemble. When the flow of the machinic phylum or technological lineage cuts itself and 
converges in an assembled event, the operations express themselves: this Saturday, this levity, 
this sunset.   
 
The assemblage is a cut or an interval from the world activities’ operations, which expresses the 
activities’ technological lineages: their modes to come into relation (in this occasion as Saturday 
sunset-ing). So, we return to Whitehead. The extensive continuum actualizes its potential while 
atomizing the actual (interval 2). The actual perception of the assembled world, however, seems 
to coalesce precisely because through the gaps of the atomized actual, a mode of continuation is 
figured, which is operated and propelled by no other than the technological lineages: the very 
processual flow that forwards the atomized actual elements assembled. 
 
The choreography of continuation, through the gaps of what is actually perceived, is the capacity 
to play with the technologies of relation. For instance, there is an Aikido trouser drying up on top 
of the heater and in front of it there is a human body. What lends a seamlessly continual tone to 
this everyday situation, is the implicit technology that gives the capacity to play with relations to 
both, the trouser and the body. That the trouser is capable of crawling into and dressing the 
human legs, and that the human legs could walk, dance or defend an attack with them, tells a 
story told by a genealogy of techniques for relation. If the human legs are considered something 
to be assembled with the trouser, it may be because the technology for trousers was flowing in 
the world of activity and then designed some legs to be dressed. It may have been all the other 
way around. In any case, each assembled actual situation of the world is a choreographic play of 
technologies for relation, which expresses a mode of active re- continuation, a mode of re-
appearing under the semblance of a seamlessly uninterrupted continuation. 
 
What expresses the mode of re-continuation is the affective capacity of the elements at play. The 
affective capacity is what Deleuze and Guattari called above the ‘traits of expression’. The 
technological lineage carries a singular operation that by re-continuing it assembles matters to 
take form. For instance, to produce the technical element of a dagger, there are singular 
operations assembling the processes of the melting of iron and of the decarbonation. Once those 
processes constitute the dagger, the dagger expresses its affective quality of hardness, sharpness 
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and undulation. The genealogical process of the constitution of the dagger is expressed in a 
relational field with and for other constituted technical elements. The affective expression is what 
charges, with desire, the relation between the technical elements (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 
448). 
 
Therefore, to attune to the choreography of technologies would mean to become sensitive to the 
affective qualities ghosting matters with an already constituted form. Affect is non-sensuous but 
directly perceived in matter. How do you feel the capacity of the dagger to cut and to rise its 
speed quickly? Not by deduction, but by abduction, philosopher of pragmatism Charles Sanders 
Peirce would say. In any case, before diving into Peirce’s semiology in this Sunset-ing Saturday 
afternoon, we can acknowledge that to be sensitive to the non-sensuous affect of the technology 
of matter, the body needs to be intuited as a taking form of techniques as well. 
 
The affective quality of the dagger (cutting, and fast) immanently tells its technological story (its 
genealogy) to the technology of the body: the mode in which the body knows how to bleed, 
coagulate and circulate. The technological world-matter tells its genealogical story through an 
immanent re-activation of the expressive affect between matters. To intuit the techniques of the 
world-matter equals feeling the techniques immanent to the composition of the body. It is an 
intuition that undoes the body as a single technique. The body, through its affective capacity, 
touches the limits of experience of its multiple genealogies. The genealogies are a story of the 
many techniques operating to actualize a world-matter into feelings: that which can melt slowly, 
that which can crawl in no time, that which can press, etc. 
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Interval 4: Choreographic Intuition. 
 
 
In every past interval there was an explicit and sometimes implicit critique of the European 
modern theories of knowledge based in sense perception. Whitehead proposed not to assume that 
the data given to sense perception was the ultimate data to build up a theory of knowledge but 
that instead, there should be a turn towards unclear and unconscious forms of perception. With 
concepts such as ‘extensive continuum’, ‘potential’ and ‘subjective form’ Whitehead avoided the 
error of introspection. He avoided internalizing experience as something of and for the ‘human 
subject’. Instead, he proposed a ‘subjective form’ of experience that gets to concretize its 
potential with a dynamic form and affective tone, across the usual divides of knower/known, and 
subject/object structures of experience. In short, his concepts are always ‘relational’: what 
operates in between more-than one element. 
 
In this interval the aim is to further conceptualize perception as something emergent and 
relational by adding another critique to modern theories of perception, this time by way of 
Deleuze and Guattari. The critique touches the divide between ‘form’ and ‘matter’ and proposes 
a new angle to think the relation between these two concepts, which is the concept of the 
‘intermediary’. What is remarkable about the intermediary is that Deleuze and Guattari describe 
it as a ‘corporeality’. The ‘intermediary’ as a form of process of relation, considered as a 
‘corporeality’, allows an understanding of the body as something spread beyond the internality of 
the human subject or the stable materiality of a thing. ‘Corporeality’ is a form of processual 
relation that can be thought as choreographic. Thus, in this interval the search is for an 
intensification of the concept of the choreographic, which was already suggested in the interval 
3D. The intensification may drag the choreographic beyond the introspection of the human, 
beginning to suggest the techniques to grasp this particular take on choreography as something 
corporeal and intermediary. 
 
Deleuze and Guattari develop the critique of the division of form and matter and introduce the 
concept of the intermediary corporeality by way of Husserl and Simondon. With Husserl, they 
uncouple the modern philosophical idea that the metric and formal ‘essence’ — as something 
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eternal and immutable — pertains to form, and ‘existence’ — as something mutable and 
perishable — to matter. For Deleuze and Guattari ‘form’ becomes the manner in which the 
technological genealogy in potential effects its relational patterns with and through ‘matter’. 
‘Matter’ with and through ‘potential’ is full of movements enticed by the forms of process 
passing between each other. The movements are mutually inclusive forms of process in which 
matter limits the potential genealogies of relation. Thus, it is a double movement going back and 
forth from form to matter, without stopping in any end. The movement of the technological 
lineage effects a call to assemble by the limitation of the actual matters. Deleuze and Guattari 
call this passage a matter-movement. 
 
 So how are we to define this matter-movement, this matter-energy, this matter-flow, this 
matter in variation that enters assemblages and leaves them? It is a destratified, 
deterritorialized matter. It seems to us that Husserl brought thought a decisive step 
forward when he discovered a region of vague and material essences (in other words, 
essences that are vagabond, anexact and yet rigorous distinguishing them from fixed, 
metric and formal, essences. We have seen that these vague essences are as distinct from 
formed things as they are from formal essences. They relate to a corporeality (materiality) 
that is not to be confused either with an intelligible, formal essentiality or a sensible, 
formed and perceived, thinghood (…) (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 449-50). 
 
It is important to stress that for Deleuze and Guattari the double movement between the potential 
patterns of relation and their taking shape into concreteness relates to a vague ‘anexact’ essence, 
which is also a corporeality. Moreover, this vague corporeal essence is a movement that is 
‘anexact’, because it is contained neither in a pure general potential nor in a concrete property 
given to a thing. Here is where Deleuze and Guattari connect the ‘corporeality with the 
‘intermediary’: the vague corporeal essence is ‘inter’, in that it escapes a single location. It can 
be thought of as the excess of ‘essence-corporeality’, in between each single particular thought 
and felt perception. It is the more-than individual in excess of the parts: 
 
Husserl had a tendency to make the vague essence as a kind of intermediary between the 
essence and the sensible, between the thing and the concept, a little like a Kantian schema 
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(…) But it is only “intermediary” to the extent that what is intermediary is autonomous, 
initially stretching itself between things, and between thoughts, to establish a whole new 
relation between thoughts and things, a vague identity between the two (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987, 450). 
 
The excess between form and matter, thought and feeling, potential and concrete, is not a 
byproduct coming out of the distinction of any of these binary terms. The vague corporeal 
essence is an autonomous movement that passes — in its own terms — through the play of form 
and matter. Now, this is where the ‘choreographic’ connects with the movement of the 
intermediary. If the ‘intermediary’ is articulated as an autonomous matrixial metaphysical entity 
in excess of its parts, then it can be thought as the singular manner in which movement organizes 
itself. It is an autonomous and collective movement made of passages. The movement 
choreographs itself with and away (in excess) of what can be perceived individually: with only 
that idea, with only that body sense, with only that feeling. It is like a choreographic spread in 
excess of the individual. It is minor, spreading everywhere but hidden (anexact) from 
overarching views. It spreads through the portions of what is usually considered a totalitarian 
thought-perception. 
 
Deleuze and Guattari continue the critique of the theories of perception based in the separation of 
form and matter. With the work of Simondon, they offer some clues about what could be that 
other alternative mode to think and perceive through the ‘intermediary’: in excess of binaries and 
beyond the clear and conscious. They will call this alternative mode of perception simply, 
‘intuition’. 
 
In short, what Simondon criticizes the hylomorphic model for is taking form and matter 
to be two terms defined separately, like the ends of two half chains whose connections 
can no longer be seen (…) The critique of the hylomorphic schema is based on “the 
existence, between form and matter, of a zone of medium and intermediary dimension,” 
of energetic, molecular dimension — a space unto itself that deploys its materiality 
through matter, a number unto itself that propels its traits through form. We always get 
back to this definition: the machinic phylum is materiality (…) it is matter in movement, 
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in flux, in variation, matter as a conveyor of singularities and traits of expression. This 
has obvious consequences: namely, this matter-flow can only be followed (…) To follow 
the flow of matter is to itinerate, to ambulate. It is intuition in action (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987, 451-2). 
 
The matter flow can only be followed, it can only be thought and perceived by becoming a 
movement, moving with it. This movement is of a molecular intermediary dimension, grasping 
the imperceptible processes spread that activate the event of perception. The molecular agitates 
the process for perception, making it graspable, as something vague. 
 
Deleuze and Guattari exemplify intuition in action with the figure of the artisan. The artisan 
follows the fibres of the wood while working it by hand. The artisan does not follow the wood 
itself, but the movement of the wood, through its fibres. It is less about what the wood feels and 
looks like, but about the movement it capacitates. Those movements are what tell something 
about the molecular dimension, where the choreographic spread agitates the passages towards 
form-matter taking. The artisan intuits not the wood but the vague corporeal essence that is in 
excess of her body, and the wood is what capacitates a concrete relation between these two 
matters and indexes the more-than of those two elements: the capacity to curve, to friction, to 
displace, to gravitate; across the human body, the wood, and the environment. 
 
This mode of intuition is a movement with the technological genealogy of matter. Following the 
vague corporeal essence of the artisan, playing the role of a philosopher of the intermediary 
becomes herself an intermediary that is in excess of its constitutive technological systems. It is in 
this sense that what is followed is not a human individual category of the artisan-philosopher (an 
introjection: an error of introspection), because this would mean to climb up again towards the 
categorical thought that imposes a law on the form of variation. Instead, what is followed is 
something vague, it is a perception of ‘inter’: that which confuses blood gravity with the rhythm 
of a murmured thought, which listens to the figure of bleeding, not of the skin, but as an event-
action of the world. Hence, intuition would be of a portioned spread, choreographing itself as 
something autonomous and at the same time inseparable, from matter and thought and feeling. 
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To intuit with the vague corporeal essence would be like moving with the relational techniques, 
capacitating the event of perception in which the philosopher is immersed. To intuit would mean 
to be moved by techniques, and to philosophize the intermediary (relation) would demand a 
technical approach. Not, however, in the sense of approaching intuition with an already known 
technique. Instead, approaching intuition as a taking shape of technique. One technique that is 
moved by the patterned relation of the ‘technological lineage (active memory of relations), 
simultaneously generates a surplus technique to follow that very process more intensively. 
Paradoxically, to follow the movement of the intermediary is to emerge at the end of the process 
with a technique that permitted following the movements better, or more intensively. In this 
improvement, more of the resonance of the ‘inter’ passages can be grasped, as they are cresting 
into what usually feels like one individual event of perception. 
 
For instance, to become a philosopher of the somatic feel of the interval means to read and write 
about process philosophy in search of a technique. The search is not done as if looking from 
above the books, but as being propelled by the movements of the concepts, so that their 
movements are felt through the corporeality they can infuse into the room. The movement of 
corporeality effected by the concepts are the ones that carry the affective force of the 
technological lineage that created them. The room is also full of techniques, like the technique to 
energize legs with speed by the play enticed by Aikido trousers. The combination of these 
techniques operating through the materiality of the book, the room and the body are what 
propose the choreography of corporeality that is intuited as the inter-zones of experiences.  The 
inter-intuitions of speed, density, ablations and conjunctions begin to give shape to a technique 
of philosophy as a manner of corporeal feeling. Remembering that corporeality is not of a self-
identical body, but again, of the inter and exteroceptive experiences, active in the environment. 
To philosophize corporeality is becoming a technique of the environment: the potential 
techniques enacting qualities. 
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Interval 5: Friday Night. 
 
 
Now is a real Friday night. The intensity of the interval brought this day forward. The interval 
intensifies its pulse of continuation and expands a zone of qualitative perception for the thick of 
night to enter. Philosophy has become a mode of play with qualities. The darkness of night is not 
just any darkness, but one that has been welcomed by the technique of the interval. The silence is 
not just any silence, but a proprioceptive listening that stretches the atmosphere of the room. In 
this room, there will be a birthday party tomorrow. Today’s interval is intensified enough 
through the long playful conceptualizations, so the quality of the Saturday birthday party can 
populate this Friday atmosphere without pushing it towards another day. Something of 
tomorrow’s birthday party is vital for today’s quality. When the intervals carry their intensity 
with enough force, they allow for an ample range of contrasts to shape the dynamic form of the 
quality of a day. The room wishes this Friday night to stay forever, especially if tomorrow there 
will be a strawberry cake. 
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Interval 6: The Concept and the Plane of Immanence. 
 
 
So far all the past intervals’ sections dealt with concepts from process and affect philosophy that 
helped to articulate what a perception of the interval was. The writing of the intervals has opened 
a field of study to search for a philosophy that, as a somatic technique, is capable of registering 
the festive quality of experience. The population of concepts pulled the research into the interval 
towards a high level of abstraction with few specific examples. For instance, how can a body 
dance the interval? What does a choreography of the interval look like? What are the voices of 
other dance performance theorists around the same topics? 
 
With this practice of writing, the study of ‘concepts’ is taken very seriously. Exploring concepts 
is not an exercise of an analytic mind in which the effects culminate in a couple surprising 
discourses around the philosophy of movement. To explore concepts is to plunge into movement, 
into its emerging choreography, with the belief that they activate and are activated by a mode of 
relational movement, with specific operations. As was mentioned in the interval 2C, through the 
example of William James, the qualities of movement of the event are situated with global 
activities such as “obstruction, striving, strain or release.” (James 2003, 87). As was added in the 
interval 3D, through Deleuze and Guattari, these effects of movements of the events are 
expressed through affective qualities such as “resistance, hardness, weight.” (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1983, 450). So, when concepts are circulated around, dug, and launched through the 
practice of writing a qualitative global movement, an event-affect couple occurs (an assemblage 
of technological lineages expressing themselves), such as gluing and glowing the ever-changing 
atmosphere of the day. 
 
Moreover, it was mentioned in the past interval 4 that “matter and form” are not binary terms 
separated in a hierarchical scale in which formal thought ‘re-presents’ inert matter. Form and 
matter are animated by the autonomous relation of the “intermediary”. This co-host operation of 
the intermediary transforms any separated ‘idea of matter’ as an impossibility. In this way, any 
idea that occurs while not being concretely besides a matter, will carry the mixed qualities and 
forces of it. For instance, the idea of metal, without the physical presence of a piece of metal, 
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carries (the qualities) and vectors (the forces) towards the materiality of metal, immersing 
thought with a vague sense of matter. The thought of metal spreads with the relational affects of 
metal, it moves with the assembled expressions of metal, even when the concrete metal is 
nowhere to be found. William James will say that “thing and thought, indicate a practical 
distinction, which is of the utmost importance, but which is merely of a functional order, in no 
way of an ontological order, as classical dualism conceives of it...” He goes on saying that 
“things and thoughts are not fundamentally heterogeneous, but are made of the same stuff (…) 
the stuff of experience in general.” (James 2003, 122). 
 
What is at stake in this particular interval today, is to articulate the connection of the research on 
abstract concepts with a pragmatics of movement: to speak about the way concepts eventuate 
affective movements, even if only in the form of expression through writing. Through this non 
binary perspective, the writing of these intervals should be approached as modes of intuiting 
corporeality: the autonomous intermediary catching the many interactions at the mix of thoughts 
and matters, just to mention some entangled entities. Thus, there will be no later state in this 
research in which a human body will go to dance at the studio. The research on movement is the 
event of writing through the technique not of ballet, not of release, not of yoga, but the technique 
of process and affect conceptualization. Again, this is the technique in the making of a 
philosophy that is felt as the somatic quality of the interval. 
 
Now, to further grasp how this research on movement, through concepts, is finding its immanent 
technique while writing, we turn again to this Tuesday dawn. It brings the hissing light, slow 
clumsy sounds, and the very concept of “concept”, as well as the “plane of immanence” into the 
mix, by way of Deleuze and Guattari. 
 
According to Deleuze and Guattari the concept “speaks the event, not the essence or the thing 
(…) It is like a bird as event.” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 21). They clarify that the components 
of the concept don’t have a relationship of comprehension or extension, but they are variables 
according to their zone of neighbourhood. “The concept of a bird is found not in its genus or 
species but in the composition of its postures, colors and songs …” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 
20). The concept is the movement, moving between its components, tracing the differences 
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between its components of posture, colour and song, but without occupying an extensive time 
and space. The concept is intensive in that moves between the neighbourhoods of the 
components: by that very movement it expresses the event as that singular mode of assembling 
its components. It expresses a mode of inseparability of the heterogeneous features assembled. It 
is also intensive because it is in a state of survey [survol] “in relation to its components, 
endlessly traversing them according to an order without distances.” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 
20). The state of survey is guaranteed by the infinite speed of the concept and the concept is 
infinite in that acts thinking are not held in time nor extensive containment: it is always open to 
variation. At the same time, the concept is finite in its consistency, gained through the singular 
movement along the components that assemble: “It is infinite through its survey or its speed but 
finite through its movement that traces the contours of its components” (Deleuze and Guattari 
1994, 21). The concept is an act of thinking of the event: a dynamic gesturing, which the act of 
thought delimits a perimeter around, going through heterogeneous elements while gaining 
consistency. The process is like that of lightning assembling in clouds. Back to the example of 
the bird, a concept is what in thought links an inseparable relation along the speed of the flapping 
wings, the intense quality of colour and the tone of the singing. 
 
Complementary with the concept of the “concept”, the “plane of immanence” is the ground 
through which the concepts move, “its earth or deterritorialization, the foundation on which it 
{philosophy} creates its concepts.” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 41). The plane of immanence is 
the line of drift of the thought of lightning, where conceptual thought has even less 
determination. The conceptual thought has less determination because, through the plane, the 
concept relates less to other concepts, but instead to non-conceptual understandings (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1994, 40). The plane is the reverberation of the lightning going through heterogeneous 
elements, and this indeterminate reverberation is the earth. The earth, understood as the plane 
which grounds philosophy, is besides the non-conceptual or the limit of the concept: adding to 
the concept formation, but not conceptual itself. Similar to Whitehead’s ‘negative prehension’, 
which adds the subjective form to the positively formed feeling, but not an objective data. It adds 
more of a dynamic ground that does not take form as an act of thought. 
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Hence, “concepts” are thoughts of the event and the “plane of immanence”, going through the 
limits of thoughts: the infinite speeds that are more-than intensive and that give a limit horizon to 
thoughts. The plane of immanence is the earth that, as a limit for the concepts, envelops them. 
 
{The}…elements of the plane are diagrammatic features, whereas concepts are intensive 
features. The former are movements of the infinite, whereas the latter are intensive 
ordinates of these movements, like original sections or differential positions: finite 
movements in which the infinite is now only speed and each of which constitutes a 
surface or a volume, an irregular contour making a halt in the degree of proliferation (…) 
The former are intuitions, and the latter intensions. The grandiose Leibnizian or 
Bergsonian perspective that every philosophy depends upon an intuition that its concepts 
constantly develop through slight differences of intensity is justified if intuition is thought 
of as the envelopment of infinite movements of thought that constantly pass through a 
plane of immanence (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 39-40). 
 
After this paragraph, shaking the imperceptible absolute movement of this Thursday, —long ago 
away from its dawn and now, welcomed by the sunset—the connection can be made between the 
“concept” and a choreographic intuition of the diagrammatic features of the “plane”. The 
choreographic intuition speculates the infinite horizon of movement, which is thinking. The 
intuition is of an earth, but an earth that speculates with what matter means (and what it means to 
matter), escaping a conventional take on stable and inert materiality, and launching matter to the 
indeterminate ‘essence-matter’ couple, mentioned the past interval 4. It is an intuition of the 
movements at the limit of thought and feeling. Like the intuition that the artisan gained by 
following the fibres of the wood (interval 4), the intuition of the plane needs to be followed 
through the movements assembled by the concept. In this case, when the artisan thinks and feels 
the movement of the wood fibres, she finds a horizon at the edge of movement. As if the 
movement of the fibre would diminish its momentum to feel the zone of neighbourhood with the 
incipiency of other movements beside the wood, the arm, and the chisel. She thinks and feels 




Hence, the movement through concepts is a speculation that stirs the vague resonances, 
murmurs, and a-perceptions that intuit the earth as nascent processes. Whatever is felt 
corporeally by the lightning thought of the event is an intuition of the earth, of that which is 
immanently re-emerging: the diagrams of the world of activity. The earth is a re-emerging 
speculation of what can be known as the ground to think, live and move. 
 
If the plane of immanence is pre-philosophic: “if philosophy begins with concept creation the 
plane of immanence should be considered pre-philosophic.” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 40), so 
a choreographic intuition would be pre-philosophic as well. Thus, to intuit the earth 
choreographically would be to grasp the infinite movements of processes and to apprehend them 
as nascent thoughts, as feral pre-philosophies. Not ruling out the possibility of determining or 
constructing anything, but intuiting the singular and qualitative infinite movements - their 
diagrammatic indeterminate choreographies - as indeterminate concepts, as experiences already 
full of a complexity, though unformed, shakes what it means to think and feel, what it means to 
matter. 
 
To intuit choreographically would not consist in rejecting what is already constructed in order to 
look for a tabula rasa, but to re-plug into the complexity of the world activity: an atmosphere of 
thought disseminating by way of disintegration what was supposed to be the lateral zone of the 
body. It would produce a sound movement, tickling, while the window keeps advancing to posit 
luminosity on its frame, the greenness of the vegetal world sustaining itself by way of looping its 
recurrence despite the enormity of architectural and physiological noises. 
 
Choreographic pre-feral intuition plugs to the plane of immanence to intuit what philosophy can 
do as a way of dance. It thrives on sustaining the coupling of the incipiency of philosophy and 
movement. How can we humans follow infinite movements as if we were amateur 
choreographers to continue to talk, think, and indicate the problems already brought by their very 
movement? How to become a choreographer philosopher of the earth? 
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Interval 7: Ontopower. 
 
 
Today’s interval has the quality of a Monday morning. The concepts continue to get free on the 
diagrammatic plane of the world. They became something else than a trophy inside of the human 
mind when the brain works hard. They became an improvisatory play with modes of feeling as 
generations of the earth. The concepts’ festive quality has never been more potentiated like 
today. But the snore of the dog echoing through the room tunes in the body towards another 
quality. The redness of the can of Coca-Cola resisting, with tenacity, the grey tones of January’s 
Winter in Montreal indexes a situation that is too much for a Friday quality to be welcomed in. 
There is an overall feeling that today’s interval needs to play more intensively with the concepts 
populating the intervals in order to get away with a Friday festive quality in the deep of Montreal 
Winter. In addition, a realization appears with this Monday morning: a realization that also bogs 
down the quality towards a Monday rather than Friday. The realization that each written interval 
opens to more or less the same group of thoughts. In principle, each written interval seems to be 
talking about the same phenomenon one time after the other. There is no escape from this 
realization. It is inherent to the interval to host complex activities and hence, to be prone towards 
confusion. It is inherent to the interval to choreograph the complexity of its activities according 
to the way in which the entries and exits from the intervals happen. Today’s realization is that the 
intervals need to be entered and exited many times and through many angles. In this way, each 
visit to the intervals moves with a different choreography of questions. Each entrance and exit 
moves with a slightly different diagrammatic plane of the earth and the concepts that bring us to 
intuition. Each visit to the intervals comes up with a different but inter-related concept. Through 
the intervals, each movement is through the diagrammatic plane of the earth – the plane that 
today shows its effects as a Winterish Monday morning – carrying the intuition of a different 
concept, of a different manner to be affected by the plane. That’s why some days the interval 
gives earth to the concept of the ‘extensive continuum’, at other times to the concept of the 
‘intermediary’ and another day to the ‘ecology of qualities’. The concepts are modes of moving 
with the diagram of the earth activated by each singular interval. 
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Today’s interval gives earth to the concept of ‘non-sensuous perception’: a conceptual movement 
that has been diagramming the plane of thoughts-feeling of every past interval. Today, non-
sensuous perception is called again (interval 2B) in order to stress the connection between two of 
the most important recurrent operations along the intervals. These are the operations of 
‘continuation’ and the operation of the ‘concepts’ occurring in the diagrammatic plane, as was 
just mentioned in interval 6. Therefore, the aim of this Wednesday interval is to understand more 
about the interrelation between the operation of ‘concepts’, in the midst of the intervals of 
perception, and how they effect a mode of continuation of the actualized experiences. In short, 
the aim is to understand that each interval is operated by a ‘concept’ that shapes how experience 
gets to be actualized, one time after the other, continuously so to speak. Let’s remember that 
‘concepts’ were defined not as ideas inside of a mind, but as a ‘movement moving’ and keeping 
the differential quality of each component taking part in the same event (i.e. the composition of 
sounds, colours, and gestures composing the concept of bird (interval 5)). In interval 2B, it was 
said that the active ‘memory of relations’ is responsible for generating the continuation from one 
act to the next in a non-serial fashion. The concept of ‘relation’ relates to a force of time, a mode 
of continuation, rather than to a concrete element or sense-perception. ‘Relation’ expresses the 
patterns of the force of time, capacitating certain acts of experience to reemerge. Relation is the 
manner in which a Friday quality has become, through infinitesimal conceptual passages, this 
silent Monday morning. 
 
The importance of Whitehead’s non-sensuous perception is that it allows a registering of the 
continuation from one actualization of experience to the next. This mode of perception registers 
the force of time of the active memory of relations. It registers the force of anticipation running 
through and beyond the concrete sense data perceived. Non-sensuous perception moves with the 
force of continuation immanent to each interval of perception. It is what is immanent to each 
interval and what is carried by an antecedent act and the anticipation of others intervals. In short, 
non-sensuous perception indicates something about the force of continuation of the immanent 
interval and of the other past and future ones. 
 
Whitehead introduces the concept of ‘non-sensuous perception’ in order to challenge, one more 
time, the modern theories of knowledge based in sense perception. In Adventure of Ideas he 
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explains the assumptions made by those modern theories of knowledge regarding the ‘structures 
of experience’, giving the data to their foundations. The assumptions are 1) that factors of 
experience lent themselves for clear cut and distinct discrimination and 2) that experience is 
directly observed by sense perception, by the “mediation of our bodily sense-organs, such as 
eyes, palates, noses and ears and the diffused bodily organization furnishing touches, aches, and 
other bodily sensations...”, with the subsequent supposition that “all percepta are bare sense, in 
patterned connections, given in the immediate present” (Whitehead 1967, 177-8). Whitehead 
does not want to limit the data given by the structures of experience as something only registered 
in the immediate perception of the here and now, by means of a clear and distinct category of 
discernment. Non-sensuous perception has the function to register experiences that go beyond 
that limited mode of philosophizing structures of experience. 
 
In human experience, the most compelling example of non-sensuous perception is our 
knowledge of our immediate past. I am not referring to our memories of a day past, or of 
an hour past, or of a minute past. (…) our immediate past is constituted by that occasion, 
or by that group of fused occasions, which enters into experience devoid of any 
perceptible medium intervening between it and the present immediate fact. Roughly 
speaking, it is the portion of our past lying between a tenth of a second and half a second 
ago. It is gone and yet it is here (Whitehead 1967, 182). 
 
Whitehead describes two situations to exemplify how non-sensuous perception functions as a 
force of time in the making, unlimited to the sensuous limits of perception. First, is the example 
of the speaker pronouncing the phrase “United Fruit Company” and the other of the man 
transferring anger from one occasion of experience to the other. In the first example the speaker 
utters the word ‘United’ with the non-sensuous anticipation of an immediate future of the sensum 
of ‘Fruit’ and at the moment he utters the word ‘Fruit’ he does it with the non-sensuous 
perception of the immediate past of the word ‘United’. With this example Whitehead shows the 
infinitesimal momentum that gives shape to the event of pronunciation of a verbal sentence.  He 
shows the force of time taking shape in the incipient, and then completed, interval of perception 
of the event of speech. For the sentence ‘United Fruit Company’ to be completed, a transfer of at 
least two separated elements, like ‘United’ and ‘Fruit’ needs to anticipate each other and come 
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together as one singular act of perception. In short, the relational force of time taking shape 
envelops a multiplicity of individual elements.  The relational force perceives the relation of the 
two elements and brings them together as one single event. In addition, Whitehead says that “this 
is an instance of direct intuitive observation, which is incapable of reduction to the sensationalist 
formula. Such observations have not the clear cut sharp-cut precision of sense-perception” 
(Whitehead 1967, 182-3). The infinitesimal generation of this event of speech is an intuitive and 
complex operation that does not separate its elements in a clear and distinct way. The term 
‘United’ and the term ‘Fruit’ get glued together without much of a rational decision. By the time 
the word Fruit is pronounced, the sense perception of the word ‘United’ is not anymore in the 
moment of the here and now: the present is filled by the force of anticipation in its dawning 
phase. Non-sensuous perception is a force of time that escapes the containment of its elements, 
evading their fixation in a precise time. It is a drifting force in excess of the sum of elements that 
it relates. 
 
Whitehead describes the similar operation of ‘relational drifting’ through the example of the 
angered man. The angered man embodies the past as a datum in the present by transferring the 
emotion of anger in the present from a cause that is in the past. The anger is a non-sensuous 
perception because it does not indicate the cause or the moment of its production (a quarrel?), 
but indexes the continuation from one act or phase of experience to the next. The sensation of 
anger does not say much about the self-identity of the emotion and the subject that contains it, 
but mostly traces the movement from the past to the future.  Non-sensuous perception indexes 
the force of continuation at each infinitesimal moment of time taking the shape of an affective 
event (anger). Whitehead adds that “this continuation is the continuity of nature” and “thus non-
sensuous perception is one aspect of the continuity of nature” (Whitehead 1967, 183-4). 
 
The continuation of nature is the life operation that gives the capacity for patterns of experience - 
of events that already took shape and perished- to reanimate actual or present events. At the 
infinitesimal interval, right where the act is in an incipient phase, is where the continuation of 
nature makes its entry. At each infra phase of brewing experience, the continuation of nature 
contributes to the potential of relational patterns. The continuation of nature contributes a mode 
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of gluing the elements, a style of relating what is in transfer: this verbal event (choreographing 
words), that affective event (choreographing the transition of an emotion). 
 
Now, Brian Massumi brings an understanding of how the infinitesimal interval in which the 
continuity of nature ingresses can be colonized. The force of continuation immanent to the 
interval can be colonized, in the sense of being modulated for certain choreographic outcome to 
emerge. Most importantly, the shaping of the interval is effectuated by what Massumi describes 
as the operative logic of a concept. In the book Ontopower: War, Powers, and the State of 
Perception, Massumi researches at length what he calls the ‘infra-colonization’ by Neoliberal 
power on the potential force of the continuation of nature (naturing nature). Through the book he 
gives account of the pre-emptive power that capacitates bodies to continue to perceive a world 
situation from one moment to the other. The main protagonist using this technical power is the 
military complex of the United States, working side by side with Neoliberal politics. The 
operative logic designs a technique to modulate the relation between past and future. It has an 
impact on what in intervals 3C, D and 4 were called technological lineages. The ‘technological 
lineage’ is another name for the ‘memory of relations’ or the ‘force of time’. It is a concept that 
highlights the fact that the continuation of processes depends upon a mix of natural and artificial 
technologies, which attune the modes of experience to re-continue to actualize. In short, there is 
nothing pure or organic in the memory of relations. Under the umbrella of ‘Ontopower’ the 
operative logics of the concepts are techniques that create the modes of relation of the soldier’s 
body with the plane of the earth. The operation is a technique into the interval and from this 
infinitesimal interval, the technique shifts the plane of the earth, which in this case is the 
battlefield. 
 
The enemy has blinked. Its lines of action are in potentiating suspense. Its perception-
action is in the bare-active interval where multiple alternate action-lines are co-present in 
pressing futurity. The mission of the full-spectrum war machine is to compress its own 
operation into that interval to the greatest extent possible: to contract its battlespace into a 
smaller-than-smallest adversarial interval of perception. Hit them where they potentiate. 
What comes out of the enemy bare-active interval will then be different than it otherwise 
would have. You have productively preempted (Massumi 2015b, 148). 
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In the context of this Wednesday interval - which is slowly reaching its dawn - the analysis will 
not centre on the military capture of the pre-emptive force, but again, articulate this force as 
‘conceptual’. This last analysis appears through the last chapter of Massumi’s book, called ‘A 
Retrospective Introduction’.  What is remarkable is that the operative logic of the concept 
generates a type of body or a somatic diagram, in the sense that it re-shapes what the plane of the 
earth (whether a battlefield, a financial market or the everyday) is. The concept re-shapes a body 
with its ground because in the case of the soldier, the techniques applied in the interval of 
perception have an effect in the way that the body-battleground is diagrammed: as an 
experiential environment that sorts out its elements in a singular style. It shapes the way in which 
future actions paths can be created – the preemptive win of a fight before it even begins.  
 
Conceptual persuasion in this connection cannot mean a persuasive use of concepts that 
we personally deploy, mediating between our subjective intentions and the world “out 
there”. It can only mean a persuasive force exerted directly by the conceptual, in the 
interval. It asserts that there is an abstract force of history immanent to its in-the-making. 
The analysis of this book orbit around this concept of a strangely effective force 
immanently inflecting events, abstractly energizing their verging onto self-completion. 
The deceptively mundane name given to such forces in this book is “operative logics” 
(Massumi 2015b, 209). 
 
The effective force immanently inflecting events is a type of somatic choreography. It abstractly, 
or non-sensuously, effects the type of somatic affectabilities diagramming the plane of the earth 
to be experienced. In the case of the soldier, the conceptual operation composes the affective 
capacity of his body at once with the future path of actions trespassing the battleground. The 
battleground becomes a somatic diagram that folds and undoes the limits of the physiological 
body into a cartography of future paths of potential acts. The somatic affectability is the capacity 
to relate with the patterns of the force of time (non-sensuous), allowing certain continuations of 
experience through time, rather than others. This is to say that this immanent force, by impinging 
a type of somatic affectability, can in turn be registered by a mode of somatic attunement.  
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This is why Foucault asserts the need for an effective history that is a “history of the 
present: (Foucault 1979, 31). “Effective history…shortens its vision to the things nearest 
it – the body, the nervous system…energies (Foucault 1977b, 155). Only an immanent 
critique can effectively “observe” what is energetically not taking place, coeval with a 
moment’s effective self-completion: in the interval of history’s in-the-making (Massumi 
2015b, 208). 
 
A philosophy to somatically feel the interval is one that deals with the conceptual operations, 
effecting a mode of affectability. It is a philosophy that feels how modes of affectability are 
forced to continue to actualize certain types of experiences over others. Paradoxically, this 
philosophy of the somatic feelings registers, works and researches that which is not possible to 
be sensed: the non-sensuous force of time. The philosophy of the interval deals with the complex 
forces at the limit of sense perception that carry forward actual and conscious sensory perception 
data. This philosophy is an intuition of what is at the limit of sense perception and conscious 
thought. Though again, it is not the after the fact intuition of lived experience, but rather an 
immanent re-conceptualization of those operative logics that re-energize the events at each 
imperceptible interval. 
 
The philosophy of the somatic feel of the interval does not separate the ‘conceptual’ and the 
‘somatics’ operations. To conceptualize is to be at once in the immanent plane of feeling: the 
plane in which non-sensuous forces have multiple techniques that open the plane of experience 
for certain mode of livings. To somatically improvise with the non-sensuous forces also accounts 
for a hands-on work on the conceptual operative logics, infra-colonizing the modes of somatic 
affectability in the smaller-than-smallest intervals.  
 
The conceptual work of writing the intervals is in itself a somatic experimentation. The writing 
of the intervals emerges from a mode of transforming somatic diagrams that feels with the 
conceptual operations colonizing the marginal modes of living. To move with the 
transformations of the somatic affectabilities is to give words to the concepts operating the 
incipient choreography of such a journey. To go through a writing journey from a winter 
Monday morning to night is a strategic play to escape the sad affects, those that limit the 
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capacities for living.  The sad affects are not only effectuated by meteorological conditions, but 
by those conditions for life continuation that give less elbow room to a certain mode of living. 
 
There is one last reminder to be expressed before this Monday interval comes to an end. 
Somatics methodologies following Neoliberal logics of perceptions, those that generate a mode 
of somatic composition, which do not engage with an immanent critique of the interval, need to 
be approached with caution. Every time that a somatic technique is publicized for the attainment 
of ‘wellness’ — based in ‘internalism’ and ‘individualism’—, the alarm of a Neoliberal capture 
on the somatic and operative logics of the concept need to be rung.  Somatic conceptualization 
should always be referred to the immanent forces of the interval. Those immanent forces that are 
extremely infra-politicized, beyond the sensuous or clear and distinct (conscious) thought, so that 













Architecture 1: Architectures of Experience. 
 
 
You know those moments in which you walk in a city, and the city has an important magnitude 
in the way you perceive it—let’s say the city is New York, in which the vertical planes, its 
heights, and the rhythm to produce appetites to consume, are notorious—and even despite (and 
because of) the magnitude of the city, another architecture of experience trespasses you? 
 
Well, this writing is about those moments intersecting an actual action such as the vigorous walk 
through a city. A walk composed by the qualities of heights and exhilarating rhythms, together 
with the transversal accompaniments that feel like an immaterial pulverization of perception, 
eyes, ears, touch and proprioception. This transversal accompaniment, in turn, is what proposes 
an alternative hold to more-than-one experiential architecture in an everyday moment. 
 
This writing is about the plunge that un-couples a mode of urban experience, at least duplicating 
it, if not multiplying it, like a perceptual dissemination. A perceptual dissemination breaking 
open that one simple unidirectional perception in action of the walk with the tendency to look up, 
and along the rush to get more of those immaterial appetites impregnating the air. 
 
Step, step, step, the neck stretches to catch the vertex of that tall building, and the visceral feeling 
of a leather jacket exhibited in the just-passed display window, when all of a sudden, a plunge 
happens, without a logical sense of continuation linked to the just expressed facts. At the very 
moment of the plunge, what is experienced is not yet more than one architecture of experience, 
but mostly a swarming of small orientations that soon will draw the space with multilayered 
planes. 
 
The small orientations beginning to populate the actual urban environment are experienced 
affectively. Tiny orientations of memories, desires and actions other than the ones just 
happening, appear first like abstract movements that fold, knot, stick and rebound. The ghosting 
of color patterns of another city, more pastel green, red and purple (was it Montreal?) begin to 
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mismatch in counterpoint the actual walk, the feeling of a memory delineating the imperceptible 
desire to revisit an author’s book sticks out from the bolder desire for a leather jacket, and the 
reminder to later call a friend living abroad, neither in New York or Montreal (maybe Berlin), 
makes itself almost present.  
 
That’s what affect does. Affect registers not the content or the container of an experience, call it 
a new memory, desire or action, but the immediate trace, drawing towards a form of experience. 
It is not that experiences do not exist because they don’t have a stable container or form. Those 
overlapping transits which are commonly pushed towards the background of a foregrounded 
clear and distinct experience are already qualified as experiences by affect. Affect registers 
brewings of experience. It is a felt-beginning-tendency, or a feeling in transit.  
 
Threshold. The concept of affect mobilized here is adapted from Spinoza (1632-1677) 
via Deleuze (1925-1975). Spinoza speaks of the body in terms of its capacity for 
affecting or being affected. These are not two different capacities—they always go 
together. When you affect something, you are opening yourself up to being affected in 
turn, and in a slightly different way than you might have been the moment before. You 
have stepped over a threshold. Affect is this passing of a threshold, seen from the point of 
view of the change in capacity (Massumi 2015a, 103). 
 
More specifically, the felt affects are signs of the micro orientations without content, towards 
form (maybe without ever reaching it). They are affective signs of the potential for the 
appearance of an architecture of experience. They are signs indicating the un-contained 
tendencies brewing, out of focus at the background of the fore. 
 
What is exciting about them is that they index to a plunge that breaks the continuity of 
experience, thus offering alternative paths for continuation of what was just going on; it is also 
exciting that the affective signs are more than one series of chained perceptions—such as the 
series step, step, neck, visceral feeling—and thus they offer a multiple mode of perception, 
which in turn demand a way of living that is more than individual, possibly tending to collective 
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groupings and attending to the complexity of the plural tendencies from which experience takes 
form. 
 
Affective signs then, carry in their function an excitement for multiplicity. They act in more than 
one way: they begin to make felt, they detach from the actual urban experience, and they transit 
towards other planes by way of assembling (in the sense of bringing together) micro orientations. 
 
Because affective signs function by pulling on more than one line of orientation at the same time, 
they have a diagrammatic function. They are diagrams that orient movement at the edge of 
perception, because their containers are still on the go. They are like multiple choreographies of 
perceptions in the making, because they are moving towards a contained feeling, thought, 
perception, but they are still uncontained and thus register at the limit of the forms already taken. 
 
Now, if you jump into your car to drive through New York you have the chance to understand 
better what the diagrammatic functions of the affective signs are, through the words of Felix 
Guattari: 
 
It is only when there is another kind of process, another kind of usage – which I would 
call the “molecular usage of multiplicities” that there is an act, there is an event, a 
transformation. And this register is what Gilles Deleuze and I call a ‘diagrammatic 
function’, which is to say we oppose representation to diagrammatic expression. To 
understand it better, take for example a simple form of cybernetic enslavement. When 
you drive a car you are generally enslaved – in the cybernetic sense – to the functioning 
of the car, your reflexes, your perception. The signals you receive from the road allow 
you to function without thinking, without having a representation of what you should be 
doing (Guattari 2015, 38). 
 
Felix Guattari invites us to think the diagrammatic function of the affective signs as something 
that does not function with a representative model of interpretation. As much as the diagram 
functions at the limit of conscious perception (what is brewing in the background), it also 
functions at the limit of conscious choice. In this sense, there is not a time to mediate 
 88 
consciously, and to sort out the activities that are driving the form of the architecture of 
experience. The architecture-ing of experiences are operating the formation of time, so that the 
human consciousness receives this formation as a given, like something besides, under, all 
around but paradoxically, beyond it. In other words, the plunge of the diagram of affective signs 
is an unconscious activity, but one that animates very concrete actions. 
 
A diagrammatic formation of architectures of experience allows us to think that quotidian and 
alternative experience takes form through multiple more-than-perceptive and more-than 
conscious operations. These operations are more environmental than individual. Guattari uses the 
world ‘assemblage’ (agencement in French) to show how the agency to form a plane of living is 
made of micro agencies that pass through wider and more multiple planes than the human 
conscious mind (Guattari 2013, 18). The concept of ‘assemblage’ is better than ‘the 
environment’, because it encompasses activities that are not limited to the conventional entities 
called ‘natural’, or ‘artificial’. The concept of the assemblage also points to the fact that activities 
are never pure, they are always mixed; for instance, the oxygen of Manhattan is partially 
assembled through the technologies of the buildings (window glasses materials, pavement, 
electricity for AC equipment, and the lung cells and proprioceptive rhythm of humans and 
animals). To think with assemblages is to feel modes of relations, if relations are thought more as 
uncontained stickings, foldings and ejectings, than lines drawn from point a to point b.  
 
Now to complicate our train of thought, let’s think that any actual and emergent architecture of 
experience is perceived as a fully perceptual form because of the assemblages of multiple micro 
orientations. In other words, as much as an emergent architectural form of experience allow us to 
register the micro orientations as affective signs, any actual series of actions perceived as fully 
formed—such as the walking series of step, step, neck pull up with the visceral feeling for a 
leather jacket—is made by already contained multiple micro orientations. 
 
This is to say that there is actually no difference in the ontological formation of any architecture 
of experience, the ones that are most regularly foregrounded and the ones pushed to the 
background. As seen in the example of the car drive, such a quotidian and banal action—as much 
 89 
as the action of window shopping through the streets of New York—are composed by a 
“molecular usage of multiplicities”, that assembles. 
 
Therefore, if any architecture of experience whatsoever, takes form through a ‘molecular usage 
of multiplicities’, what is important to register is which architectures persist in their coming 
together and which don’t. 
 
The type of register for alternative architectures of experience would be a sort of contrast to the 
rhythms that compose assemblages everywhere. It is a register emphasizing the architectural 
experiences pushed to the background from the experiences commonly foregrounded, which are 
those experiences usually poking appetites towards coffees, shoes and museums. In other words, 
this is a kind of register that parts water between hegemonic and dominant modes of assembling. 
 
Since the appetites or desires are not of us humans, but belong to an assembled production, 
maybe the most difficult task for this type of registering is how to, unconsciously and more than 
perceptibly, know or intuit the shreds of living that are exploitative and alienating and the ones 
that are not. How to know that the assemblage is drifting towards another propensity (to use an 
alternative word for appetite or desire) which counterpoints an exploitative model?  
 
That last question can be too difficult to answer and indeed its very unresolvable characteristic is 
what transforms the question in a refrain that searches for propositions here and there, one time 
after the other. It is this sort of question that makes the research of a technique to register 
architectures of experience necessary. 
 
Felix Guattari’s overall conceptual frame of Schizoanalysis is in itself a question-refrain that 
generates propositions for alternative modes of living and experiencing other than the 
Capitalistic, which are based in exploitation and alienation. The notion of the assemblage, among 
many others, allows him to uncouple the (un)conscious from the function to represent the Ego 
and the unity of a person, exactly with the purpose of showing that the idea of a totalizing (or 
totalitarian) consciousness “participates in a founding myth of capitalist subjectivity”. What he 
wanted to show is that “in fact, there are only diversified processes of conscientialization, 
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resulting from the deterritorialization of existential Territories that are themselves multiple and 
tangled” (Guattari 2013, 26). 
 
The deterritorialization of existential territories happens through a shift of the assemblages 
composing the modes of experiencing. Something shifts, a point of pressure occurs, and by 
themselves, the assemblages, at an unconscious and imperceptible level, work out a 
transformation. Guattari is interested in showing how every concrete situation is enmeshed with 
potentializing processes. Put differently, every situation foregrounds and backgrounds processes 
with the power to shift the assemblages, potentially. 
 
In the following long paragraph, Guattari explains how the fluid characteristic of the assemblage 
—versus a fixed notion of the subject—allows for the creation of a new existential territory. 
 
A singer loses her mother. The following week, she also loses two octaves in her 
tessitura; she starts going out of tune; her abilities to interpret suddenly seem to become 
useless. This woman’s singing was established on the basis of several Assemblages, 
certain of which exceeded the limit of the person. 
(…) 
An a-signifying index – the restriction of vocal performance—marks the stopping of 
something, without, as the context reveals, preventing something else from occurring. 
(…) 
Every transferential induction (…) which would allow guilt of an Oedipal origin to be 
supposed to exist behind this symptomatic manifestation, could have devastating effects, 
or, at least, bring us back to the depressive tableau that is ‘normally’ expected in similar 
circumstances by a psychoanalyst. Is it not preferable to ask oneself about the material 
qualities of this component of expression, which perhaps allowed the singer to avoid 
other damage? Wouldn’t the fact of having a component as luxurious as singing have 
allowed an alarm to be sounded and to induce the bifurcation of the Assemblage? (…) 
Everything in this domain is, I repeat, a question of the threshold of consistency, of the 




It seems that the ‘meta-modelling’ is the immanent capacity for the assemblages to reorganize 
their planes, whereas the ‘a-signifying index’ is the constrain or the point of pressure—which 
without conscious interpretation—agitates the planes in search of a surplus, instead of fixing the 
planes in a state of lack, of gyring around what is missing. The ‘a-signifying index’ recomposes 
the modules of the puzzle, so that there is never an empty place, but always a return to the 
fullness of complexity from where a new form of living the assemblages can be found. 
 
There are incorporeal or immaterial processes running and activating themselves, a whole 
incorporeal universe giving form to actual experience, and with them there are trigger points 
which moreover seem to be related with an aesthetic activity, as exemplified by the case of the 
singer. Both the ‘meta-modelling’ (the relational activity of the assemblages) and the a-
signifying index’ (the constrains that plunge a reorientation of the assemblages) have an artistic 
quality, or a play with artistic qualities. This means that what is artistic about processes 
transcend the figure of the subject, there is a force of processes artistically playing, and they have 
something to do with an alternative way for therapeutics. This particular type of alternative 
therapeutics is understood through Guattari’s vocabulary, as that which generates new existential 
territories, territories which are not limited to concrete and quantifiable facts, but enmeshed with 
incorporeal universes of value (Guattari 2013, 25). 
 
The reflection of the last paragraph underlines the fact that there is a plane of experience full of 
aesthetic and therapeutic processes that accompany everyday pedestrian modes of living (and 
here the adjective ‘pedestrian’ points to the most banal and everywhere contexts of living, not 
only the walks in cities). Then, there is a question to keep repeating. This question has the power 
of a refrain to keep searching for propositional answers. The question is: what are the 
unconscious and imperceptible modes to register—if not to tap—on that plane, to enrich from 
there, aesthetic practices with the power to produce new existential territories and therefore to 
include a therapeutic power alternative to the predominant modes to relate to the world based in 
the centrality, hierarchy and separation of the subject from it? But also how to avoid discarding 
entirely the everyday serial rhythms of Capitalism that propose appetites for coffee, museum and 
shoes? And instead affirm them as a plane where a plunge can happen to overlap and double 
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other architectures of experience? How to affirm the plunge and transit across assembled 
architectures of experience, instead of the pure and radical eradication of one or the other? 
 
Maybe a more modest question to continue is: how can affective signs be registered for the 
artfulness of entangled assembled processes to generate new existential territories? Territories 
that are more enmeshed, hyper-complicated and collective? 
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Architecture 2: Feelings. 
 
 
If everyday and everywhere experiences are reservoirs for potential plunges towards multiple 
planes for living, and moreover, such multiple activities happen at non-conscious and non-
sensible levels of human perception, what kind of modes can, not only register these plunges 
towards multiplicity, but also activate them? Which body capacity can be unconsciously and 
insensibly ready to follow a plunge towards multiplicity, in order to listen to the echoes that can 
intensify through their artful quality, a future dance, photograph, or collective gathering? 
 
It may be too early to come up with an already finished technique to register and to activate the 
more-than-perceptible multiple activities. What can be done at this moment is to search through 
the materials of Whitehead’s process philosophy, to find a concept of ‘feeling’ that can give 
account to the more-than-perceptible angles of experience. 
 
Perhaps the philosophical research on the concept of feeling will operate as a gesture to plunge 
into the manners in which the complexity of the more-than-perceptible permeates the everyday. 
The very research process could begin to lend a quality of activation to the way we feel the 
‘artfulness of the alter-therapeutic’. The quality of activation can later be relayed in the form of a 
technique for living, at the margins of dominant and hegemonic powerful manners to assemble 
life patterns. In other words, the very philosophical research can be experienced as a mode of 
becoming more sensitive to the actual doings of the more-than-felt, in order to compose a 
conceptual but physically more-than-felt plane to register the signs for alter-living: the affective 
signs. So, let’s leave the architectures of speculation around the walk of a city, and get immersed 
in Alfred North Whitehead’s rich and complex take on the concept of feeling.  
 
The concept of feeling is of utmost importance for Whitehead’s philosophy of organism, because 
it allows him to find an alternative perspective on what he calls the ‘traditional philosophies’ of 
knowledge. The traditional philosophers of knowledge include Descartes, Hume, Kant and 
Locke. All of these philosophers fixed their theories of knowledge in the conceptual side of 
perception, which they categorize as a conscious perception.   
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Traditional philosophy in its account of conscious perception has exclusively fixed 
attention on its pure conceptual side; and thereby has made difficulties for itself in the 
theory of knowledge (Whitehead 1978, 243). 
 
With this philosophical gesture, these philosophers separated the various elements of experience, 
in order to explain the concrete facts as those elements “that are built out up of universals” 
(Whitehead 1978, 20). In Whitehead’s vocabulary, they separated the conceptual and physical 
side of experience, and gave to the conceptual side the power to abstract itself from the physical 
side and to organize experience through universal categories. For Whitehead, the conceptual side 
and the physical side of an experience can’t be separated. 
 
Moreover, when Whitehead talks about the conceptual side of experience, he is not referring to 
the concept residing inside of the mind of the human being. At the processual level of 
experience, the conceptual is a mode of feeling that is inseparable from physical feelings. The 
conceptual and the physical are modes of feeling the data of experience. 
 
For Whitehead consciousness is the peak of a process that emerges out of the coming-into-
relation of conceptual and physical feelings. Consciousness is folded in the intricacy of the 
feelings of experience and emerges out and with it. The paradox is that by itself, consciousness 
does not say much about the richness of the germinal phases of experience from where it 
emerges. It is for this reason that Whitehead’s philosophy of the organism articulates a theory of 
feelings from where this richness can be analyzed. 
 
Furthermore, when a feeling becomes conscious, is when it includes an ‘abstract element’. 
Consciousness of feeling happens through the inclusion of abstraction in the feelings of 
experience, and the type of feeling that feels abstraction is the conceptual one. For Whitehead, 
this is an important point, because he is showing that what his alternative theory of knowledge 
should analyze is: the folding of abstraction into the concrete facts of experience. As we will see 
further down in the text, Whitehead is not giving ‘abstraction’ the role of being a separated 
transcendental realm whose function is to organize in ‘clear and distinct’ ways the chaos of 
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experience. Instead Whitehead is giving ‘abstraction’ the power to bring change in the midst of 
the concrete experience. What the philosophy of organism analyses is the “emergence of the 
more abstract things from the most concrete things” (Whitehead 1978, 20). 
 
Here we maintain the doctrine that, in the analysis of the origination of any conscious 
feeling, some component physical feelings are to be found; and conversely, whenever 
there is consciousness, there is some component of conceptual functioning. For the 
abstract element in the concrete fact is exactly what provokes our consciousness. The 
consciousness is what arises in some process of synthesis of physical and mental 
operations (Whitehead 1978, 242). 
 
We need to talk more about what a ‘feeling’ (physical and conceptual) is and does together with 
what Whitehead call its subjective form. But for the moment, let’s look at another important 
point that Whitehead is stating by coupling the ‘consciousness of feeling’ with a conceptual 
operation that feels an ‘abstract element’. This is the point about the ‘abstract element’ being 
itself, the potential for a feeling to be defined in this or that manner. It is the element that in the 
process of formation of feelings, ensures how the feeling will define its dynamic form (or the 
subjective form). 
 
Now, further on in the text about the theory of feelings, Whitehead adds an extra remark about 
the function of this ‘abstract element’. Strictly speaking for Whitehead, a feeling has the capacity 
to become conscious only when the process of generation can feel a becoming of feelings 
‘differently’ from the actual feelings initially at play. The capacity for the feelings to feel a 
difference in the process of formation is facilitated by the very ingression of the ‘abstract 
element’. Whitehead calls this operation folded with the ‘abstract element’ (an ‘eternal object’) a 
‘propositional feeling’. A propositional feeling is a ‘lure for feeling’ - a process of feeling taking 
shape towards something that has not yet been felt (we will read more about this concept in 
architecture 3). 
 
“It will be found later that this doctrine implies that there is no consciousness apart from 
propositions as one element in the objective datum” (Whitehead 1978, 243). 
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Whitehead adds that the propositional feeling reaches consciousness by means of its ‘alliances’. 
We will see in the southern architecture 2B that what Whitehead means by ‘alliances’ is that the 
process of feeling needs to shape a nexus of relations, with the multiplicity of feeling taking 
form. 
 
A pure conceptual feeling in its first mode of origination never involves consciousness. In 
this respect a pure mental feeling, conceptual or propositional, is analogous to a pure 
physical feeling. A primary feeling of either type, or a propositional feeling, can enrich 
its subjective form with consciousness only by means of its alliances (Whitehead 1978, 
242). 
 
With the concept of alliances, Whitehead is making a reference to a modified Platonic theory of 
reminiscence, which he calls ‘recollection’. Different from Plato, Whitehead is not recalling 
universal modes of feelings but as we will see later, is recalling the earlier phases of feeling in 
formation. To be remarked is that: 
 
1)  these early phases are at the level of the nexus of feelings—the level of how feeling 
relates to ‘other’ feelings—they can be energized by a potential that shapes the process of 
relations taking form into something novel. 
2) And, as was mentioned previously, novelty emerges from the manner in which a process 
anticipates something different from what is advancing. 
 
Therefore, it can be said that at the ‘early phases’, feelings feel their limits. Limits named 
‘otherness’. Otherness surrounding them. If feelings end up proposing a different combination to 
feel these limits, then something ‘novel’ — or more-than what is expected to be felt — is 
created. 
 
At the ‘early phases’, feelings feel their limits, limits which name is ‘otherness’, and if they end 
proposing something ‘novel’, or more-than what is expected to be felt, then they become 
conscious. This means that human consciousness of feelings is of something ‘other’, not of our 
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own identical patterns for perception, but of the momentum towards something that begins to be 
more-than-felt. To feel is to choreograph a felt relation with alterity. 
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Architecture 2B: Re-Enaction. 
 
 
This architecture continues the thoughts on feelings of the architecture 2. The aim is to articulate 
the early phases of feeling in emergence, together with what was called in architecture 2 the 
activities of ‘recollection’. So that the dynamic of recollection of the early phases of feeling 
formation can be understood as generative operations of experience that are ‘more-than-human’, 
‘out of determinate time and space’ and as portal for the ‘ingression of change’. 
 
What is being analyzed in this architecture 2B, is a theory of feeling that shows the complexity 
of autonomous doings occurring before something is consciously perceived and, in addition, that 
signals toward the amount of creativity and indeterminacy that is in reserve at that emerging 
phase.  So that a mode to register feelings in formation could become a technique to tap into the 
creativity of processes (the artfulness of experience), a technique which in turn, could feed the 
‘alter-therapeutics’ permeating each architecture-ing of experience.  
 
So, let’s see how the activity of re-enaction (or recollection) happens through the indivisible 
physical and conceptual feelings. Let’s remember that re-enaction is not a Platonic 
reminiscence—in the sense that is not a human subjective memory process— but a phase of 
emerging experience without determinate time and space yet, in which dynamic operations for 
feelings happens. We can think that the phase of recollection is a phase of qualitative 
improvisation: when the water begins to change the orientation of its movement by the intuition 
of a rock, when the tree leafs begin to twist the clapping wings of the bird. By being at the edge 
of the actual time and space and affecting how the actual takes shape, the process of recollection 
can be understood through the analogy of a suspension of movement: when in a given event 
nothing is determined in advance, but is full of micro movements negotiating their actual 
displacements. 
 
Having in mind that for Whitehead the physical and conceptual feelings are inseparable, let’s 
begin by describing the rich activities happening only at the level of the ‘physical feelings’. This 
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division of activities is only made at a philosophical level. One more time, the goal is to have an 
intuition of the different movement operations encapsulated at the emerging phase of feelings. 
 
A ‘simple physical feeling’ entertained in one subject is a feeling for which the initial 
datum is another single actual entity, and the objective datum is another feeling 
entertained by the latter actual entity (Whitehead 1978, 236). 
 
So, for a physical feeling to happen at least two actual entities are needed, one actual entity in 
accordance to the situation will become the subject of the feeling and the other the initial datum 
of the feeling. At the same time, a physical feeling comes with a second feeling, which is the 
feeling felt by the other actual entity that is not a subject and which, thus, takes the perspective of 
being the objective datum. This second feeling turns the ‘initial datum’ into an ‘objectification’, 
and it configures the perspective in which the feeling relates. The perspective in which the 
feelings relate is what Whitehead calls the ‘subject’, or more appropriately, the ‘subjective form’ 
since it is something dynamic.  
 
Therefore, for feelings to happen there has to be a boomerang-like movement between at least 
two entities. This is to say that feelings happen always through a movement across what 
Whitehead call a ‘nexus’ that relates entities. For instance, a cell can’t feel itself if not by taking 
or being taking into account by another cell. On the other hand, the physical feeling functions as 
a boomerang not only between two entities, but immanent to its own generative process: it sorts 
out a perspective from the initial datum. This is what Whitehead calls re-enaction. A physical 
feeling is a re-enaction from the cause to the effect. It boomerangs from the initial datum as a 
cause, back from the immanent effect and generates an objective perspective. Whitehead calls 
this vector character of feeling that resolves into a perspective operation, not only re-enaction but 
also ‘reproduction or conformation of feelings’. (More about this soon). 
 
In order to give a sense of the complexity of relations of a simple feeling dynamic formation, we 
have to have in mind another Whiteheadean concept, that of ‘prehensions’. Prehensions are the 
primitive mode of taking into account. There are positive and negative prehensions and each of 
them influences the movement of emergence of feelings differently. We can think that the 
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positive prehensions are the ones that follow a boomerang-like movement between the entities: 
that elasticize their perspective of subject and object. Whereas the negative prehensions add 
something only to the subjective form, but do not feel the datum of the objective perspective. 
 
It adds to the emotional complex, though not to the objective data. The emotional 
complex is the subjective form of the final satisfaction (Whitehead 1978, 41). 
 
Strictly speaking, the prehensions (the bond between each entity in the universe) are positive 
when the bond is ‘felt’, and are negative when the bond is positively excluded—and thus do not 
link to the subject and object perspective, it remains unfelt—but the exclusion of the felt bond 
adds an emotional tone to the dynamic process. Both types of prehensions are sensitive to each 
other. Feelings that do become actual, carry the emotional tone of the bond of expressions that 
did not actualize: 
 
“…there is a mutual sensitivity of the subjective forms of prehensions, so that they are 
not indifferent to each other …” (Whitehead 1978, 42). 
 
The way we can think how a negative prehension adds something to the feeling, is like a 
proximal resonance. Imagine the topological distance between cells that did not come to take 
into account each other into feeling. Imagine how the gap between their non-relation, functions 
as an echo chamber for other cells beside them. Think that gap as what makes possible for a 
resonance influencing the way in which cells feel each other. 
 
Another example is given by Erin Manning. Her description allows us to continue to envision the 
activities that made up a ‘recollection’, as an autonomy choreography of feelings, since Manning 
describes ‘negative prehensions’ like choreographic cues: 
 
They propel tendencies that may or may not reach the surface of their articulated 
expression in the field of the actual. They float at the threshold of perception, they field 
surroundings, landing narrowly and widely, affecting, imaging, dimensionalizing (…) 
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Active virtually and actually, cues move movement, and, in doing so, they catalyze 
event-time (Manning 2013, 107). 
 
We can see now how the quality of reenaction inherent to feeling’s formation through 
prehensions, involves and generates ‘time’, or what more precisely Erin Manning calls ‘event 
time’. As a feeling feels more than one actual entity, as a field of resonance, it transfers the 
immediate past to the immediate present. But what is that element or operation that makes 
‘event-time’? This is to say that, without getting into the specific details about the difference 
between ‘metric’ and ‘event time’, the following question to be asked is: what is the processual 
operation of prehensions and feelings that snowball towards a change of the actual conditions? 
 
For Whitehead, strictly speaking, a process of ‘re-enaction’ does not snowball towards change. 
Whitehead also uses the categories of ‘reproduction’ or ‘conformation of feeling’ as synonyms 
of ‘re-enaction’. These terms refer to the generation of feelings conforming to the inherent 
anticipation of the data playing out from the antecedent phases of the subjective form. A 
reproduction, or conformation of feeling, is the process of feeling formation that repeats its 
antecedent-anticipation pattern of feeling along the process of its subjective form (its arcing 
process of feeling formation). A ‘conformation of feeling’ is a lesser deviation from the incipient 
impulse of emergence towards a resolution that could had brought more contrast. 
 
The definition of ‘conceptual feeling’ is what begins to answer the question about the processual 
feeling that snowballs towards change. The conceptual feeling is a feeling of an eternal object, 
and an eternal object is “the potentiality for ingression into the becoming of actual entities 
(Whitehead 1978, 23)”. The eternal object is what was called in the northern architecture 2, the 
ingression of the ‘abstract element’.  
 
“A conceptual feeling is feeling an eternal object in the primary metaphysical character 
of being an ‘object’, that is to say, feeling its capacity for being a realized determinant 
process” (Whitehead 1978, 239) 
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The conceptual feeling is what defines —in the sense of setting the cues for the choreography — 
the formation of feelings through the means of potentiality. Potentiality ingresses adding 
something more-than the nexuses of actual feelings at their emerging phase, they pierce the 
resonance and boomerang-like dynamic of re-enaction with something more-than-actual. The 
ingression of the more-than-actual, defines the initial phase in which physical and conceptual 
feeling mix together with a more contrastive—in the sense of more different—dynamic qualities 
of relations, than what the elements at play suggested at the initial phase. 
 
Conceptual feelings of eternal objects are what make ingress the previously mentioned ‘event-
time’. The time in excess of metric causation. If we have in mind that Whitehead also calls the 
‘physical and conceptual feelings’, the ‘physical and mental poles’ of experience, the next 
paragraph helps us to understand how the mixture of both poles is what gives time a more-than-
metric quality, a paradoxical halo of (in)-definiteness. 
 
Every actual entity is ‘in time’ so far as its physical pole is concerned, and is ‘out of time’ 
so far as its mental pole is concerned. It is the union of two worlds, namely the temporal 
world and the world of autonomous valuation. The integration of each simple physical 
feeling with its conceptual counterpart produces in a subsequent phase a physical feeling 
whose subjective form of re-enaction has gained or lost subjectivity intensity, according 
to the valuation up, or valuation down, in the conceptual feeling (Whitehead 1978, 48). 
 
The choreography of re-enaction, travelling as a boomerang resonance of prehensions— some of 
which are felt (positively) and other contributing an emotional tone (negatively)—valuates its 
process immanently.  The operation of valuation can be understood as a gesture of 
accompaniment of the physical feelings, with something more than carries their process of 
formation — up and down — with more or less potential to advance the processual phases with 
contrast. 
 
The processual phases of feelings do not stop with ‘conceptual valuation’, but continue operating 
immanently and immediately, as if the processual phases were orchestrating various 
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articulations, following each other, as a growing bindweed. The following operations are those of 
‘conceptual reversion’ and ‘transmutation’. 
 
Thus the first phase of the mental pole is conceptual reproduction, and the second phase 
is a phase of conceptual reversion. In this second phase the proximate novelties are 
conceptually felt. This is the process by which the subsequent enrichment of subjective 
forms, both in qualitative pattern, and in intensity through contrast, is made possible by 
the positive conceptual prehension of relevant alternatives. There is a conceptual contrast 
of physical incompatibles (…) (Whitehead 1978, 249). 
 
This immediate operation, folded in the first phase of ‘conceptual valuation’, generates 
conceptual feelings that add an alternative to the just accompanying conceptual feelings, linked 
to the potential of the eternal object. We can also think conceptual reversion as a boomerang-like 
movement, from which the conceptual feelings —again those that ingress the more-than-actual 
—gain more momentum. It is a movement that elasticizes feelings, and kicks the ingression of 
potentials with even more force, so that a new — more than physical — quality suffuses the 
process. As if the mental pole of the process would redouble itself. As if the water intuiting the 
hit of the rock will complicate the force of its current to the point that the impact with the rock 
will or will not happen, but something new in the event will definitely be added. Maybe that new 
thing will be the jump of a fish out of the water, due to the gained momentum from the 
turbulence. 
 
In respect to ‘transmutation of feelings’, what this operation does is to transmute the datum of 
the reverted conceptual feeling—accompanying the physical feelings—into a nexus of relations. 
This nexus of relation contains, not only the conceptual and physical feeling, but most 
importantly, the initial nexus of the prehended actual entities from where the feelings were 
emerging. In this sense, the operation of transmutation is giving a nexus shaped by the relational 
resonances of physical and conceptual feelings. We can say that what is offered is a shape of the 
transitions between feelings, the manner in which they choreograph their tendencies. In other 
words, what is felt with this operation is less the multiplicity of feelings but the quality of their 
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differences, moving through their transitions. Whitehead calls the process of a transmutation a 
‘contrast’. 
 
When one and the same conceptual feeling is derived impartially by a prehending subject 
from its analogous simple physical feelings of various actual entities, then in a 
subsequent phase of integration—of these physical feelings together with the derivative 
conceptual feeling—the prehending subject may transmute the datum of this conceptual 
feeling into a contrast with the nexus of those prehended actual entities, or some part of 
that nexus; so that the nexus (or its part), thus qualified, is the objective datum of a 
feeling entertained by this prehending subject (Whitehead 1978, 251). 
 
At this corner of architecture 2B is where we can feel all the collected concepts so far in order to 
get a glimpse of what this specifically at stake in this architecture. This architecture focus in the 
initial phase of feelings origination, to show the complex dynamic choreography happening at 
each processual moment in which a feeling could be later actually felt. But most importantly, the 
aim of this architecture is to show that the feelings originate from an antecedent moment that is 
already anticipating a future. Put differently, the emergence of feeling has a vector character that 
pulls towards the future. The pull towards the future is the ‘anticipation’ of feelings already 
immanently folded in the ‘antecedent’ phases of re-enaction. At each phase of feeling 
formations, that are still out of determinate (metric) time and location, there is already a 
choreography of time in the making about to define how an experience will come to be felt, with 
its own event-time.  Whitehead calls this characteristic of feeling a ‘subjective intensity’: 
 
The subjective aim, whereby there is origination of conceptual feeling, is at intensity of 
feeling in the immediate subject, and in the relevant future. This double aim—at the 
immediate present and the relevant future is less divided than appears on the surface. For 
the determination of the relevant future, and the anticipatory feeling respecting provision 
for its grade of intensity, are elements affecting the immediate complex of feeling. 
(Whitehead 1978, 27). 
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For Whitehead there is a rich dynamic of processual feelings incipiently distributing 
cartographies for the future.  The complex generation of world feelings is what distributes modes 
of human perception, even if the human is not aware of it. Most importantly, as we had said, 
conscious feelings are only possible out of propositional feelings (architecture 2), which were 
shortly explained as ‘lure for feelings’, this is to say, as a pull from the future towards something 
that has not been felt. 
 
This is to say again, that to be conscious of a feeling means to reach towards novelty (an alien 
‘mental pole’ of experience). To get to feel a feeling consciously, is not to feel the identity of the 
event of perception —how the elements have been set to play out the emergence of this or that 
perception without change—but it is to feel an excess of feeling, that which does not feel like 
anything. This excess of feeling is what Whitehead named in the last quote above as the 
‘subjective aim’ of the process: the intensity of feeling.  
 
Coming back to our topic on architectures of experience, what can be said now after the 
recollection of these Whiteheadean concepts, is that a mode of intuition of the choreography of 
‘feelings’, ‘time’ and ‘location’ shaping, equals to a mode of becoming sensitive to the abstract 
elements of experience. Again, abstract not as a transcendence element separated from the 
concrete, but as the excess that creeps with each fold of the concrete. 
 
The plunge towards the architecture-ing of experiences is a concrete plunge to the abstract flux 
of feelings. What is registered in the plunge, is registered with an affirmative sensitivity towards 
the autonomous doings of feelings. This is a mode of affirmation that registers the actual 
physical feelings and the potential intensity of conceptual feelings. It is an affirmative sensitivity 
towards the unknown of feelings: their other angles. It is an affirmative sensitivity that like a 
boomerang returns (a re-enaction) to the immediate moment in which feelings are sorting out 
their creative advance along a future anticipation. It is a felt register of the a-temporal, non-local 
and more—than—felt, which re-shapes what is about to be felt. And since feelings are a 
continuous a-temporal, non-local and more than sensible topology of the ‘creative advance’, they 
are where the ‘alter-therapeutic artfulness of experience’ can be tapped. This choreography of 
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feelings re-ingresses the movement of generation of feeling usually backgrounded in typical 
human perception. Thus, this choreography undoes typical perception. 
 
The felt register of the autonomous choreography of feelings can be called the register of an 
ecology of intensities (subjective aims). The intensity would be that extra tension in the 
atmosphere palpable along the contours of what seems just simple concrete facts. Let’s come 
back to the example of the felt relations between the stone, the water and the fish. The stone and 
water prehended each other, the subjective form of their feelings reached a mentality for a 
turbulence to happen which resolved the anticipation of the water and the stone bump. The water 
and stone subjective form of relation proposed a futurity that the fish carried on to jump out of 
the water (maybe to eat an insect?). In the meantime, a kid with the legs in the water, standing 
beside the stone, was so absorbed throwing pebbles that he missed the jump of the fish. But he 
felt something: an intensive shift in the ecology of the landscape. He did not see the fish, much 
less he knew anything about the dramatic resolution between the feelings of the stone and water. 
But beyond the concrete tranquility suggested by the affective atmosphere of his background, he 
caught up a shift. He may have thought that a snake was moving along the crack of the rocks, or 
that a fairy was playing a trick to him. In any case, it does not matter the narrative imposed over 
the ecology of intensity. What matters is the intuition that something is autonomously going on, 
playfully, distributing innumerable shifts all along the intermingling ecological planes. 
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Architecture 3: Propositions. 
 
 
If the ‘architecture 2’—the one that is a little bit more south-east than this architecture—was a 
conceptual study that allowed one read about the autonomous complexity of the production 
feelings, and ended up expressing the mutable character of them—which radically speaking, 
qualifies what it means to feel as always partially unknown—then, this ‘architecture 3’ is about 
the registering not of feelings, but of the ‘propositions’ for feelings. 
 
The focus of the study of the two other architectures (1 and 2), was the immanent emergence of 
feelings (what were called affective diagrams in architecture 1). For architecture 3, the focus is 
on how to register the ‘propositions’ for feelings distributed in the everyday, for a plunge of 
complex feelings to immanently emerge. The focus is less to be in the midst of the plunge, but to 
be attentive to its call. 
 
We can be walking through an alleyway in Montréal, and a plunge may not happen at all; what 
may happen is the register of a proposition for a plunge to come. There is a double momentum of 
the legs using the muscular force to advance the crunchy gravity of the ice spreading through the 
ground, at the same time, the cold wind does not indicate itself through the movement of the 
nonexistent leaves and the quiet snow, rather, it makes itself present as an overall atmospheric 
quality of shrinkage. 
 
Then the tapping sound of a wooden door, a hanging internet cable, the rustling of a green plastic 
bag, some barking, and the overall direction of the alley-way twisted sideways. A proposition 
was stored across the angles of those activities. A vital seed for a future funny plunge. Before 
proceeding to explain how and where the proposition was stored, let’s hear some thoughts on the 
concept of proposition, one more time, by Alfred North Whitehead. 
 
Whitehead says that propositions are the “tales that perhaps may be told about particular entities 
(Whitehead 1978, 256)”. We have to understand that the tale is a tale of feeling, not necessarily a 
verbal sentence. They “are neither actual entities, nor eternal object, nor feelings (Whitehead 
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1978, 256)”. “A proposition enters into experience as the entity forming the datum of a complex 
feeling derived from the integration of a physical feeling with a conceptual feeling (Whitehead 
1978, 256)”. The main contribution of a proposition is to indicate the conceptual feeling carrying 
the determination of the eternal object to a particular set of actual entities, physically felt. Since 
the eternal object has an absolute ‘general’ characteristic concerning the mode in which actual 
entities are determined (more about this general characteristic below), the proposition of the 
conceptual feeling selects particular actualities for the novelty of physical feelings to come. The 
particular actual entities physically felt are the ‘logical subjects’ of the proposition. And again, 
the ‘logical subjects’ are not to be confused with a verbal thought. The ‘logical subjects’ are a 
selected-out distribution of felt actualities, energized by the conceptual feeling, which is the 
feeling that brings a force of determination that is more-than-actual, out of time, but immediate 
and immanent to the act of time making. 
 
The force of the more-than-actual brought by the conceptual feeling is a ‘predicative pattern’. 
We can say that, in a way, there is a mutual call from actual entities to eternal objects. The 
immediate sorting-out of a series of actual facts produces a reorientation for an eternal object to 
tweak the actual with its definiteness. By juxtaposition, the ‘predicative pattern’ is a mode of the 
eternal object (the potential) that accompanies the selected out actual entities or ‘logical 
subjects’. 
 
Whitehead explains that when “the datum of the conceptual feeling reappears as the predicate of 
the proposition” (…) the eternal object suffers the elimination of its absolute generality of 
reference (Whitehead 1978, 258)”. And most remarkably, he says that there is also an 
elimination of the datum of the physical feeling: “for the peculiar objectification of the actual 
entities, really effected in the physical feeling, is eliminated, except in so far as it is required for 
the service of the indication. The objectification remains only to indicate that definiteness which 
the logical subjects must have in order to be hypothetical food for that predicate (Whitehead 
1978, 258)”. 
 
This last quote is tricky. For the context of this writing, I understand it to mean that under the 
perspective of a proposition, the physical feeling does not relate to its own actual entity, but 
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orients towards the propositional feeling, towards pure potentiality. And due to the very turning 
of the physical feelings towards ‘pure potentiality’, potentiality becomes less general and 
undetermined. 
 
Before continuing unpacking the implications of the last quote it is important to know some 
more about what it means for pure potentiality to be general and undetermined. This will allow 
to shine light into the unpredictable feature of the eternal objects. Pure potentiality is the 
characteristic of the eternal object to refer “to the purely general any among undetermined actual 
entities. In itself, an eternal object evades any selection among actualities or epochs” (Whitehead 
1978, 256). Pure potentiality is the general indeterminacy of the eternal object, because its 
ingression to the actual can’t be explained by the history of the actual condition. The ingression 
of the eternal object can’t be explained because its reason to ingress at a certain time and location 
exceeds the given conditions set by the actual elements. This is way, strictly speaking, the eternal 
objects are ‘pure potentials’, because they can return at any time and location, as an excess of 
what is given. 
 
Now, when the selected out actual entities become ‘logical subjects’ of a proposition, they do 
limit the general abstract potential of the eternal object. ‘Logical subjects’ are what become food 
to predicate something about the conditions of the actual, which then limits the general scope of 
ingression of the potential. By becoming a logical subject that can predicate something of the 
eternal object, the actual entity gyres less around the physical feelings and more towards the pure 
potential that in turn, gets limited. What the proposition does, is to re-orient the physical feelings 
from the feeling of the actual entities among themselves, towards the excessive quality of the 
eternal object. The actual entity feels the capacity to call, assemble, bring into a patchwork, the 
feelings of other actual entities. 
 
In resume, the proposition—by selecting out the possibility for divergence to specific indexed 
actual entities—transfers a quality of abstraction to the actualities from the abstract eternal 
objects, while also transferring a quality of concrete possibility to the eternal objects. 
Simultaneously, the abstracted actual entities make the concrete mutual relatedness of the 
environment more intensively felt. As if each quantum of possibility which abstracts from 
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actuality pulls with it the ripple effect of an advancing concrete realized environment, 
surrounding that particular zone of abstraction. 
 
At the level of human perception, the encounter with the proposition is felt as a paradoxical 
mixture of an excess of realized surrounding actuality, which folds a rift that feels like nothing… 
yet. The alley-way gives sky blue iron back stairs, rounded windows, square light reflections, 
bricks, snow slopes, a fully intensive not felt like nothing fold, a brown cat, a voice and a set of 
not locked swinging rear doors. 
 
The propositions are a quantum of possibilities, with a degree of abstraction masked in the actual 
by the folded intensive environment of concreteness around it, which in turn lends anchor to its 
otherwise too abstract levity. The proposition is where the feeling is more unknown, because it is 
only an indication for a change that is in bud, to come. It is an actual call to feel for the future. It 
is a datum for feeling, not yet a feeling: “a proposition has neither the particularity of a feeling, 
nor the reality of a nexus. It is a datum for feeling, awaiting a subject feeling it” (Whitehead 
1978, 259). 
 
Another relevant aspect of a proposition is that, by remaining folded in the concrete world as 
something more-than actual, it can be activated later by other actual entities with similar logical 
subjects (similar pattern of selection of actualities). Processes set up some logical subjects as 
predicative patterns. And propositions can return later after their processes have satisfied their 
processual arc because of the predicative patterns. 
 
Any subject with any physical feeling which includes in its objective datum the requisite 
logical subjects can in a supervening phase entertain a propositional feeling with that 
proposition as a datum. It has only to originate a conceptual feeling with the requisite 
predicative pattern as its datum, and then to integrate the two feelings into the required 
propositional feeling (Whitehead 1978, 259). 
 
The supervening phase of a proposition can happen immediately, at the very moment of feelings 
feeling their way into actualization. But it can also happen much later. The creative advance of 
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the world composes actualities that will later be ready to resonate to the call of the proposition. 
The logical subjects—the group of the actual entities—would later attune to the predicative 
pattern of the potential. In other words, the elimination of the absolute generality of the eternal 
object, together with the indication of the rippled abstraction into the actual (again, the ‘logical 
subject-predicative pattern’ relation) could be relayed across processes. Processes which 
happened not now and not here, but at another time, and somewhere else. There is no chicken 
and egg narrative here. Sometimes the actual world is ready to catch up with a potential 
presence. Sometimes the potential presence is ready to call an actual world into form. 
 
Evidently new propositions come into being with the creative advance of the world. For 
every proposition involves its logical subjects; and it cannot be the proposition which it 
is, unless those logical subjects are the actual entities which they are. Thus, no actual 
entity can feel a proposition, if its actual world does not include the logical subjects of 
that proposition (Whitehead 1978, 259). 
 
The fact that propositions are like potential choreographic indexes is to be emphasized. Indexes 
that are vector-like—like a dance—living in potential and ready to activate something. However, 
they are also called by an actual world in creation. Their activation is a surplus of the world: 
‘actual’ and ‘potential’. One of the world poles can call the other. No chicken and egg. The 
proposition is a choreographic gesture that meets where the pure indetermination of the eternal 
objects (potential) and the stubborn determination of actual facts meet halfway. A proposition is 
a relational gesture which choreographs the shape of the actual and the potential. 
 
Regarding the study of the architectures of experience, what can be said at this point is that any 
processes started at any plunge of the everyday, never exhausts themselves. Even if the planes of 
the everyday find themselves in a frictional match, and no plunge into an architecture of 
experience happens, something of the processes could prepare a ‘supervening’ mutual 
propositional call of the actual and the potential. There is a choreographic excess ready for 
propositions to activate the composition of feelings. Feelings that re-compose an actual and 
potential world. An actual and potential world that re-compose modes of feelings. Again. No 
egg. No chicken. 
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What this complex philosophical vocabulary is trying to say is that ‘propositions’ are seeds for 
feelings that remain at the middle (or in the midst or in the mix), on the ever actual and potential 
creative advance of the world. They are autonomous choreographic vectors loose in the jungle of 
the world creative advance, ready to lure actual and potential ‘predicative pattern-logical subject’ 
relations through feelings. So that feelings are re-continued to generate, differentially, with the 
novelty of a new eventful world. So that feelings are always lured to the limit of their 
complexity, there where they don’t know themselves what it means and what it feels like to feel. 
So that feelings are not considered as the creative element of the creative advance of the world, 
but they are thought as the non-created, that lures for more autonomous creativity. 
  
 113 
Architecture 4: Ecological Intensity. 
 
 
The world within experience is identical with the world beyond experience, the occasion 
of experience is within the world and the world is within the occasion. The categories 
have to elucidate this paradox of connectedness of things: the many things, the one world 
without and within (Whitehead 1968, 228). 
 
Four people have been camping for over three days. This afternoon there is an intensive shift in 
the ecology of experiences of the camping event. The campfire lightens its flames with a 
descendent curve, as if knowing that no more wood will feed it. Besides the circular group of 
rock delimiting the campfire there is a pair of shoes drying. The shoes are tending somewhere 
else, as if they were already rolling away from the fire. A dog moves between the improvised 
benches around the fire with an uncertain cadence, its ears are attentive and slightly depressed. 
Its point of orientations had begun to rotate their constellation, imperceptibly. The dog’s favorite 
bush, slope, the tree with noisy squirrels began to be somewhere else. The people continue with 
their seamlessly habitual rituals. They prepare coffee and share some bread. Their movements, 
however, are slower than the previous days, elasticized by a sense of suspension of what is about 
to come. 
 
That an ecology of intensity depends on a dynamic of antecedent and anticipation (re-enaction), 
means that the feelings that feel it are feelings of continuity. Continuity is the passage between 
the antecedent initial data towards the pull of anticipation. As we will soon see, continuity is the 
prehension of the force of the future immanent to the past of the felt occasion of experience. 
 
Whitehead speaks of the immanence of the future in the past, as a way to demonstrate the 
transient characteristic of the world folded in the concrete. He explains that this transient 
characteristic goes way back to the Sophist, “where Plato states that ‘not-being’ is a form of 
‘being’” (Whitehead 1967, 222). The paradox of something transient (not being) in the concrete 
(being), is what Whitehead also calls the ingression of something ‘other’ in the ‘self-identity’ of 
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an occasion of experience. What Whitehead is after, is the analysis of the ‘interconnectedness’ of 
entities, both transient and concrete. 
 
Therefore, Whitehead introduces the argument of the interconnectedness of the ‘future with the 
past’ as a way to demonstrate the interconnection of the ‘transient with the concrete’. His 
argument avoids explaining the connection through philosophies that makes a ‘clear and distinct’ 
separation of the data used as evidence (philosophies that assume a type of non-interconnection 
or dualism); as we have already mentioned, philosophies like the ones of Descartes, Hume, 
Locke and Kant (Whitehead 1967, 224). 
 
For Whitehead, all kinds of experiences permeate the actual and concrete, with transient 
presences which are not in existence actually, but that add to the overall affective arcing tone of 
the experience (subjective form). He famously said that in order to classify the various 
components of experience “nothing can be omitted, experience drunk and experience sober, 
experience sleeping and experience waking, experience drowsy and experience wide-awake…” 
(Whitehead 1967, 226). 
 
This is to say that a philosophy that speaks of the characteristic of interconnectedness of 
experience, is a philosophy that registers the ingression (at the transient and actual level) of 
various components of experience. These various components complicate the ground of 
experience — as if experience were a glass labyrinth with many unlimited angles. The 
complication is simplified or synthesized at the conscious perception of the human, in order to be 
digested. 
 
We can think that Whitehead is proposing to register actual and present situations of experience 
as a dynamic mosaic composed of many occasions of trespassing experiences. The experiences 
trespassing the actual are adding variation, not only through the difference of their actual 
existence (that campfire, those shoes, that dog), but also through the difference of their non-
actual existence (the city pulling the campfire, the media providing the data to search for a route 
home, the daydreaming thoughts about staying at the lake for couple of days more). 
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Again, what is remarkable in Whitehead’s proposition is that the argument of the ingression of 
the future in the past, is itself an ‘interconnected’ argument which includes the interrelation of 
the many occasions of experience at their transient and concrete level. His proposition is a 
radical heterogeneous take on an ecology of time and species of experiences, in the processual 
making. 
 
Now, going back to the specific argument by Whitehead of the interconnectedness of the future 
and the past, he would ask us to analyze such interconnectedness avoiding long-range time-spans 
of centuries or decades. He would ask us to concentrate in the direct observation of “time-spans 
of the order of the magnitude of a second, or even a fraction of a second” (Whitehead 1967, 
192). Therefore, a philosophy based in the processual generation of feelings should analyze (as 
to be intuitive) the short span of continuity of an occasion of experience. 
 
The process of continuity occurs all the time, and should be felt as a technique to access the 
register of the various components of experience. We can think that Whitehead is proposing a 
philosophical technique to feel the manyness of the various components through their entryways 
and passageways, texturing an overall arch of experience, like the campfire. (More about this 
soon). 
 
This is the account of the creative urge of the universe as it functions on each single 
individual occasion. In this sense, the future is immanent in each present occasion, with 
its particular relations to the present settled in various degrees of dominance. But no 
future individual occasion is in existence. The anticipatory propositions all concern the 
constitution of the present occasion and the necessities inherent in it. This constitution 
necessitates that there be a future, and necessitates a quote of contribution of re-enaction 
in the primary phase of future occasions (Whitehead 1967, 193). 
 
The feelings in the camping-event are registering an intensive shift in the ecology, because the 
interconnectedness—the antecedent/anticipation urge— of the many occasions of experience, are 
smashing themselves towards the necessity of the future: that of going back to the city. Each 
occasion of experience—that of the campfire, that of the shoes, that of the dog and people—are 
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smashing in the sense of snowballing their transitions towards a novel arc. The non-existent 
ingression of the idea of the city is thickening the membranes of the present occasions of 
experiences. Their individual choreography of re-enaction and anticipation is intensifying their 
mode of continuing being what they are being (their activity continuing to go on), because of the 
ingression of the city. The city (Montreal), and the time of departure of the camping (5PM); both 
function as elements of the future, they are elements of abstraction inflecting the concrete things 
composing the ground of the camping. 
 
The city is not making ingress into the actual alone. The telephone data use is also intensified in 
the search for a route, in the messages sent for people expecting the arrival, in the photos shared 
on Social Media. The phones make ingress a potentiality for arms to reach towards them, for 
thought to organize as digital passages, and they make ingress as an affective presence shaping 
the texture of the lake and trees around the campfire. 
 
Moreover, at the level of human perception, the feeling of the shift of the ecology is something 
global and happens more or less around certain moments. However, it can’t be parsed out into 
one specific mode of feeling or at an exact time: was the shift due to that person stopping to 
throw wood on the fire? Was the shift happening at the exact time that the dog changed its 
strolling course? Was it felt through the skin or the eyes? 
 
The shifts in the ecology are feelings of a global apprehension (prehensions) of multiple 
orchestration of experiences, continuing their transitions. The formula for this global and 
complicated feeling will be something like this: feelings + movements (transitions) + multiple 
interconnected occasions. 
 
Moreover, the feel of continuity is ecological, in that it affirms the ingression of many 
landscapes of experience in the actual; though is not only the manyness of the landscapes, but 
their many entryways for passages and transitions. This is to say that a philosophy of feeling is 
one with a philosophy of interconnectedness: understood as the co-habitation of diverse planes of 
experiences, and their open entryways. 
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Through this philosophy of feeling, there should be a way to analyze the entryways of universes 
of experience that are more than actual; again, in that they add something to the actual that 
influences the affective texture, without being concretely in it, but transiently with it. The 
philosophy of feeling should find a way to analyze experience with an openness to the mixture of 
choreographic compositions of the daydreaming universes, the echoes of a playful pseudo 
theoretical interaction, the leaking of the digital world and the fatigue of a dance routine. Is it 
possible to do philosophy through feeling the transitions between universes of experience 
happening simultaneously? Is it possible to get the one global feeling that launches the 
immediate process of philosophizing through the nuanced feelings composed by the many 
universes cohabiting the actual situation? Could philosophy be practiced as a technique to 
become transformed by the entryways and passages of the complicated various components of 
experience? Can a philosopher become a traveler through entryways and passageways? 
 
A shift in the ecology of intensity reads like this: when the fire diminished its flames and the dog 
couldn’t find its bush, the abstract presence of the phone was mutually included around the 
flames and the short legs of the dog were already in a disjunctive contact with the pavement of 
the city streets. 
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Architecture 5: Euclidean and Topological Spaces. 
 
 
It may be a little bit late to talk about this, but, since ‘time’ is not what is really at stake in these 
architectures, it is important to highlight that what matters for the readers is the creation of their 
own ‘virtual spaces’ in which to accommodate the scrambled information being set up along the 
pages. Simply put, the research on the ‘architectures of experience’ takes one step forward to the 
spatialized plane in which movement, perception and feeling take form. The ‘architectures of 
experience’ research something different to the ‘intervals’. If the ‘interval’ focuses in the micro-
forces in which movement is perceived as an emerging ecology, at the sensory limit of human 
experience; then the study on the ‘architectures of experience’ shifts the focus from the cut itself 
towards the ecological plane holding activities around the cut. In this sense, the plunge to the 
architectures of experience is not to find the micro cut, but to feel the horizon surrounding it, 
through feelings and their propositions. 
 
The horizon surrounding the cut is an architecture of feelings as speculations: feelings of 
actualities incessantly in a process of becoming—or in a process of ever advancing 
concrescence—while mutually including each other. In this sense, the study of the surrounding 
horizon, even if is more spatialized than the study on the cut, still follows the qualitative 
formations of ecologies of experience. Lastly, this spatial study refers to what was called in 
previous architectures the ‘ecological intensity’ or the ‘choreographic excess’ that indexed a 
proposition folded along the layers of the actual. 
 
Then, at this point, is that the architecture of experience takes a step towards the complex 
activities passing and holding a space that is between an Euclidean and a topological space. 
Whereas the Euclidean space is the quantitative space ready to be measured, the topological 
space is a qualitative space in the making. The conceptualization of these spaces comes from the 
research done by philosopher Brian Massumi in his chapter ‘Strange Horizon’ from the book 
Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation. In this chapter, Massumi articulates the 
definition of the ‘space of experience’ as “physically a topological hyperspace of 
transformation”. (Massumi 2002, 184). He articulates the definition of the ‘space of experience’, 
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as transformative, by using the example of the habitual orientation of the body in an architectural 
setting (a building, the metro, the street). He argues that body orientation happens, not through 
an Euclidean perception of the space, one that follows visual static indexes or a cognitive map 
stored in the head. Instead, body orientation is a process of habits accumulated proprioceptively, 
across the body. Where proprioception is “a self-referential sense, in that what it most directly 
registers are displacements of the body relative to each other” (Massumi 2002, 179). This 
proprioceptive perception is “a qualitative space of variation referenced only to its own 
movement, running on autopilot” (Massumi 2002, 183). 
 
The argument Massumi conveys is that body orientation depends more in the proprioceptive 
experience of movement, “the referencing of movement to its own variation (…) than the 
exoreferential visual-clue system (Massumi 2002, 180)”. To explain orientation, one of the 
examples Massumi uses is to make your way to the fridge with your eyes closed. He says that the 
map of your visual cues will begin to fade but that nevertheless you will find your way to the 
fridge intuitively —especially if you begin to get hungry, he clarifies—using the memory of 
habits stored proprioceptively, as a lived experiential cartography enacted step by step. “The way 
we orient is more like a tropism (tendency plus habit) than a cognition (visual form plus 
configuration)” (Massumi 2002, 180). 
 
Hence, the space of experience is the result of two different dimensions of experience mutually 
including each other. On the one hand, it is the result of a system based on Euclidean 
perception— “Cartesian intuition of space as a triple-axis, coordinate box that contains things” 
(Massumi 2002, 185). On the other hand, it is based on topological perception: “synesthetic” 
“self-referential” “and self-varyingly monadic (Massumi 2002, 182)”. What is remarkable is that 
Massumi explores the passing from one side of perception to the other, without separating the 
topological from the Euclidean space and without studying merely the potentials actualized in 
the topological, but always across the Euclidean. He considers both theories of space as mutually 
inclusive. Though the strong point of his argument tilts the balance towards a higher valuation of 
topological perception, since the study of the passages between the Euclidean and topological, 
can’t be done with Euclidean theoretical frames, only with topological ones. 
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That folding of the Euclidean and non-Euclidean into and out of each other is itself 
understandable only in topological terms. This hinge-dimension between quantitative and 
qualitative space is itself a topological figure-to the second degree, since topology 
already figures in it (Massumi 2002, 184). 
 
Massumi challenges the usual understanding of the Euclidean perception of space. He does this 
by introducing the topological figures for orientation: based in rhythm and fused sensations that 
don’t belong to any specific body sense. He overlaps the qualitative side of experience taking 
shape, taking shape not in the prefigured Euclidean space, but shaping with and through 
Euclidean space. Thus, even if the two dimensions of experience mutually include each other, 
ontogenetically speaking, topological perception is prior to Euclidean, since is the perception that 
generates the passages from one to the other, from quality to quantity and all the way around. 
 
Moreover, the very back and forth passages from topological to Euclidean perception generate 
spaces in between. To move out of one stable quantitative space to a fluid qualitative one is to 
generate a differential space. At that differential space generated, the elements included can’t be 
there without undergoing a transformation in themselves. When you walk in the darkness of your 
apartment towards your fridge, your movement habits transform due to darkness: the edges of 
the body soften in readiness to absorb a bump, the fridge transforms its rectangular materiality 
into an attracting diagram of vectors, due to the call of the visceral appetite, and time slows down 
to elasticize the walls of the room for a more careful journey. 
 
The dimension of becoming—which is the ecology of mutual perceptual passages tending to an 
Euclidean and Topological dwelling—is a differential space, in that it makes it necessary for the 
activities at stake to be recalibrated, and to function only by leaving behind some habits that 
cannot continue to function without another. 
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Architecture 5B: Mentality. 
 
 
With this ‘architecture of experience’ —across a low hill from the architecture 5A— the aim is 
to articulate the ‘differential space’ generated by the interlacing of topological and Euclidean 
perceptual activities as a ‘mentality’. The activity of ‘mentality’ will be linked specifically with 
the synesthetic function of the diagram, soon to be redefined via Massumean vocabulary as the 
‘biogram’. In such a way that the generation of a differential shaping space could be understood 
as a diagram itself, in order to avoid categorizing a diagrammatic experience as something 
happening only at the level of the human body, and belonging only to a topological perception. 
Instead, the aim is to directly register the diagram as the mixing taking shape of a differential 
space— in the sense that moves activities towards a more-than-feeling itself, across the nexus 
towards others, across qualitative and quantitative experiences and across the topological and 
Euclidean. 
 
Finally, today’s architecture wants to give to this newly concept of ‘mentality’ a flair of desire, 
via the theoretical frame shared by Felix Guattari and Gilles Deleuze. The interest is to bring 
together process philosophy and Guattari’s theoretical frame of schizoanalysis, into a simple 
vocabulary of the everyday. The vocabulary is simple, because uses few words to carry the 
complexity indexed by both disciplines. In a way, the simple vocabulary tells of the trans-
disciplinary flirtations between philosophy and schyzoanalysis. Not in the sense that these 
disciplines pre-assume or pre-exist the plane of lived experience. But, in the sense that the 
richness and inventiveness of the plane of experience can be registered, accompanied and luckily 
tweaked, with the help of the concepts lent by those disciplines.  
 
Previous to the articulation of the concept of ‘mentality’ that will bring the study towards the 
discipline of schizoanalysis, let’s follow the connection Brian Massumi does between the 
‘diagram’ and its ‘synesthetic’ function. When Massumi argues for a “space of experience” that 
is “literally, physically a topological hyperspace of transformation (Massumi 2002, 184)”; he is 
gesturing toward the bodily experience of orientation as a proprioceptive memory working in 
tandem with Euclidean visual cues. Now, this proprioceptive quality of memory is what defines 
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the experience of the diagram as a type of synesthetic perception, not reduced to clinical 
synesthetes, but that includes ‘regular’ perceivers.  
 
The hinging of the proprioceptive on the visual in the movement of orientation is 
synesthetic interfusion. It is not the only one. Each side, for example, enters into its own 
synesthetic fusion with the tactile: a determinate, positioned sight is a potential touch; the 
tropism of proprioceptive twisting and turning is assisted by past and potential bumps and 
the tactile feedback of our feet. There are many other synesthetic conjunctions, involving 
all the senses in various combinations, including smell and hearing (Massumi 2002, 186). 
 
The diagrams are a fusion of Euclidean visual cues with the topological proprioceptive sense 
memory of the bodies. In a sense, the fusion transpires in each sense data ingression of the event 
of perception. A visual cue fuses with a potential touch, which in turn fuses with the potential 
twist of the arms, head and hearing. It is through this interpretation of the diagrams that this 
architecture 5B understands sense data as more than the individual body, more than topological 
and Euclidean and across the usual divides of the inside and outside. Each sense activity 
becomes with another in an indeterminate relation which does not yet sort out the resolution of 
the overall arc of the action. This is the ontogenetic moment in which inside, outside, sensible, 
insensible, movement and position become indeterminate.  
 
That the space of becoming goes beyond dual divides is one of the reasons why Massumi 
changes the name of the diagram to the biogram. He says that they are less maps than 
cartographies. And that they are not maps inside of the head of the synesthete. Instead, they are 
cartographies of the peri-personal space between the eyes and objects of the world. 
 
This liminal non-place has been characterized as “peri-personal”. It lies at the border of 
what we think of as internal, personal space and external, public space. (…) They are 
event-perceptions combining senses, tenses and dimensions on a single surface (Massumi 
2002, 187). 
 
Although the biograms have a life of their own, since they are activated beyond voluntary 
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decision, Massumi says that clinical synesthestes have trained themselves to consciously elicit 
them so that biograms perform on signal. Biograms are “involuntary and elicited (Massumi 
2002, 189)”. What is remarkable in this ‘involuntary and elicited’ feature in relation to the study 
of the ‘architecture of experience’, is to think that the surplus of the space is not only registered 
when they involuntary emerge out of an everyday experience, but that experience can be re-
elicited across other contexts. There is something to learn about the moment in which these 
spaces of interfusion emerge, because the quality of the fusion can be reiterated to intensify the 
creative process of a choreographic project, or the teaching process of a theoretical text. To 
resume, there is a pedagogical dimension of the biogram to be explored in performing arts and 
theoretical praxis. 
 
Now with the intention of slowly approaching the concept of ‘mentality’, let’s continue with a 
question by Massumi to certain aspect of the biogram:  
 
 Is it so far-fetched to call the unseen out of which biograms arc ‘other’s people minds’? 
Not particular other people’s mind, of course. The other of them all: another of particular 
mindedness from which everyone’s individuated perceptions, memories and cognitions 
emerge and to which they return in a twisting rhythm of appearance and dissolve: a 
shared incipiency that is also a destiny. What is the other of mindedness? (…) Simply 
matter. (…)  It is the hinge-plane not only between senses, tenses, and dimensions of 
space and time, but between matter and mindedness: the involuntary and the elicited (…) 
It is to catch the becoming-minded of the movements of matter in the act (Massumi 2002, 
190). 
 
To experience a biogram is to experience the ontogenetic force of matter taking form through the 
determination (anticipation) of the antecedent processes of formation—that which Whitehead 
calls the feeling of the eternal object. And let’s remember that Whitehead also calls the feeling of 
the eternal object the mental pole of the physical experience (Whitehead 1978, 45). Massumi is 
saying with Whitehead that the biogram is the ‘minded’ incipient movement of emergence 
among the conjunctions of ‘matters’. The mindedness is ‘unseen’ because it is the more-than of 
senses, memories and cognitions. In this context the mind is the more-than-actual ontogenetic 
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force that ingresses the event and defines the choreographic composition of individual senses, 
memories and cognitions. One more time, the ‘biogram’ is the hinge-plane, or the entryway 
where the passages between mind and matter can be registered. The biogram is an entryway into 
the dynamic arcs of mind-matter-mind. 
 
We can say then, that the biogrammatic event of experience, is a multiple touch of matters at the 
limit of a minded dynamic which animates it. At the limit means at the junction of many matters, 
at the hyphens in which multiple zones of experience overlap into each other. The mattered 
limits are what allow the registration of the force of mindedness, which is more than actual and 
thus, at the limit of perceptibility. Hence, across those junctive limits is where the dynamic of 
mentality makes palpable its forces of ingressions toward form. 
 
The mattered touch, the palpable, is of course, synesthetic: inseparable from the incipiency of a 
leg curving and the growing stretch into dimensionality of the horizon. The synesthetic touch is 
an immanent flight through all the mattered junctions—compressing, overlapping, expanding 
rejecting—which comes to be expressed as a dynamic that, at the level of the human body, is 
easier to understand as a proprioceptive expression. 
 
The architecture of experience, now qualified as biogrammatic, and then characterized as a 
mixing of activities to become through feelings more than themselves, reads like this: an intense 
light is drawing the oval horizon that carries many propulsive habits that reappear at each step 
taken by legs. In the meantime, last night is re-evoked as a vague figure around the arms that 
flies towards next week’s nightmare. Something finds a solution. Many other things remain 
irresolvable. Something about the cadence of the hand and pencil to be enacted back at home, in 
a few minutes.  Something about the thickness of the atmosphere to be reproduced at the dance 
studio. A belief in irrational thoughts with the consistency to undo the traditional way to perform 
philosophy by means of ‘clear and distinct’ categories. A research-creation practice that is a 
biogrammatic space of experience; one that remixes qualities of lived experience— differential, 
multiple or collective—to problematize and resolve aesthetic doings beyond the here and now, 
ready to be relayed across strange horizons. 
 125 
Architecture 5C: Desire. 
 
 
At the surface of this architecture 5C, the word desire begins to gain tone beside the previously 
discussed concept of mentality. Through the writings on the previous architecture of experience, 
the ‘biogrammatic space of experience’ became a hyperspace that remixed qualities of life 
surrounding the actualized moment to resolve aesthetic tendencies—to conclude an arc of 
intensity —and to re problematize them, in the sense to re-pattern them for later. On these 
previous architectures of experiences, the aesthetic tendencies were understood as qualitative 
patterns (rhythms, shapes, intensities) registered at the intersection of Euclidean and topological 
perception. 
 
It was said that the biogram’s aesthetic tendencies could be relayed through different experiential 
contexts without being limited and determined to any one of them, because they preserved a 
dynamic of passage-ing in excess of their arrival into content. It was also added that biograms 
could be relayed involuntarily, as bursting accidents, or by eliciting them, through techniques; 
and that the contexts in which they operate could be as varied as those of a dance project, the 
preparation of an art theory class, or the explanation of an everyday event to a partner. Moreover, 
it was thought that the activities across the biogrammatic space of experience gained multiple 
functions (walking was not only moving a leg, but also softening the room due to a potential 
bump of a wall, while orchestrating a rhythm between tactility and listening), since each activity 
reached towards the feeling not of themselves, but others. Lastly, what was concluded through 
architectures 1, 2, 3 and 4 was that to feel the aesthetic tendencies of the biogram, was to carry 
the feeling towards something other than self-identity (other than feeling the same), and it was 
added that the study of the felt experience beyond self-identity would be pursued with the help of 
concepts of process philosophy and schizoanalysis, because both disciplines orient their feeling 
to what becomes, rather than to what already is. 
 
Considering the conceptual landscape just mentioned, the dynamics to follow during this 
architectural plane are those that continue to hyphen the concept of ‘mentality’ and ‘desire’. The 
first sentence that can reach the two concepts together, in order to take the sideways step from 
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‘mentality’ to ‘desire’ is again written by Brian Massumi, this time from the book What Animals 
Teach Us About Politics: 
 
For Whitehead, mentality is an ultimate factor of nature, co-constituting the given, defining it in 
terms of the origination of novelty (“a flash of novelty among appetitions”) and the “growth of 
intensity” (Whitehead 1978, 184). He uses “appetition” as a synonymous for the mental pole. To 
which he also gives the technical term “conceptual prehension”: “The basic operations of 
mentality are ‘conceptual prehensions’ (Massumi 2014, 103). 
 
Mentality is the flash of novelty that arises out of the perceptual activities surrounding the 
biogrammatic space of experience. Here I take ‘perceptual’ to mean as taking into account, 
prehending and/or feeling. Mentality is the dynamic of past tendencies for seeing, touching, 
listening, smelling that proprioceptively fuse each other into a synesthetic relation with matter, 
for a novel tone and dynamic rhythm of orchestration to assemble. In the overfull mix of 
biogrammatic experience, mentality is the desire for a novel pattern not of one thing, body, 
sensation or idea, but of an immanent flight which can transversally shift something in all of 
them. Mentality is a general desire for novelty immanent to the plane of experience. Novelty to 
feel besides and beyond one’s own actuality. To fly the feelings, so that the feelings feel more 
than the actual subjective form generating them, but also the nexuses around and beyond them.  
 
The second quote by Massumi directly links mentality with desire, by way of Deleuze and 
Guattari: 
 
“An inventiveness immanent to the topology of experience, one with its lived qualities 
(…) For this immanent inventiveness, some give the name “desire”” (Massumi 2014, 18). 
 
Massumi goes on to explain that desire, for Deleuze and Guattari, is an “immanent, self-driving 
principle, productive of the real” (…) “If desire is productive, it can be productive only in the 
real world and can produce only reality” (Massumi 2014, 103). Desire is not only the surplus, 
capable of being registered synesthetically and proprioceptively through a biogrammatic 
experience. Desire is what produces the everyday reality, even the one in which matter seems to 
be static and repetitive (Euclidean). Therefore, to register biogrammatically this self-driving 
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principle is not to diverge from everyday reality, but to plunge into its force of creation. Through 
this conceptualization, it can be further added that desire functions as the very force that 
energizes the passages from Euclidean to topological spaces of experience.  Desire produces 
reality and the capacities to transit either way, one stable Euclidean labyrinth, or a hallucinogenic 
topological puzzle. 
 
The generative force of desire is further conceptualized by Deleuze and Guattari through the 
concept of ‘desiring machines’. The latter concept allows them to give consistency to the force of 
desire and at the same time move it outside of the fixed categories of subject and object. The 
‘desiring machines’ allow Deleuze and Guattari to register desire as a more-than human force, 
constituting reality and trespassing the planes of life. Hence, machinic desire distributes the 
production and the force of desire in the plane of life experience, out there, in which what is 
commonly understood as subject and object, get folded. 
 
For Gilles Deleuze and me desire is everything that exists before the opposition between 
subject and object, before representation and production. It’s everything whereby the 
world and affects constitute us outside of ourselves in spite of ourselves. It’s everything 
that overflows from us. That’s why we define it as flow (Guattari 2007, 142). 
 
Deleuze and Guattari have a different notion of desire to the one given by psychoanalysis with 
Freud and Lacan. The logic of desire is not construed between production and acquisition. 
Desire is not on the side of acquisition, which puts it in the side of an ideal, a primary lack of a 
real object that needs to be acquired. Nor is desire on the side of the production of fantasies that 
are in counterpoint to the primary lack of a real object (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 26-7). As it 
was mentioned before, for Deleuze and Guattari desire produces the real, the real is its end 
product. What Deleuze and Guattari are after is an immanent logic of desire, in which desire 
becomes the production of production, which records and consumes its production all in the 
same arcing movement. Through this logic they conceptualize desire without divide between 
nature and industry, and moreover between nature and human. 
 
 128 
That desire is production of production immanent to its own recording (or registering) and 
consumption, is what makes it an ontogenetic force which is natural and artificial. This is 
because, at the level of being a force of processual production, desire does not distinguish its 
doing in a discrete product of nature (like a tree) or technology (like a laptop); its mixed patterns 
of doings are what operate at the junctures of the effects of a tree and a laptop, without ever 
ending in a final categorization of an entity. The consumption is of an enjoyment, but not 
necessarily of a human subject. This notion of enjoyment has parallélisme with Whitehead’s 
concept of subjective aim. When an occasion of experience prehends (as taking into account 
entities), feels and satisfies its process, it enjoys itself. The arc of experience runs through its 
nexus of prehended relations and registers, producing prehensions which positively transform 
into feelings. Feelings then feel themselves (physically) and the eternal objects (mentally). The 
arc of experience consumes itself into a satisfaction of the process. 
 
For Deleuze, Guattari and Whitehead, production of desire consumes its enjoyment in partial and 
diverse arcs, which do not necessarily involve human consciousness and voluntary decision. 
Enjoyment is of processes that are partial and connected, in lines of connection that are much 
more molecular than the human perspective, in that they fold the commonly agreed category of 
the human but at the same time surpasses it. 
 
Here is where the concept of the desiring machines allows us to understand how the processual 
arcs of enjoyment happen as distributions. Paradoxically they are arcs of production that enjoy 
themselves by becoming part of something else than one self-identical discrete thing. 
 
A machine may be defined as a system of interruptions or breaks (…) Every machine, in 
the first place is related to a continual material flow (hyle) that cuts into. (…) The 
machine produces an interruption of the flow insofar as it is connected to another 
machine that supposedly produces its flow (…) in relationship to a third machine that 
(…) produces a continuous, infinite flux: for example, the anus-machine and the flow of 




But what is there to be found in this particular architecture 5C, at the site of the biogrammatic 
architecture of experience, with the activities of mentality and desire? What is the relevant 
gesture to attend, given the fact that the ontogenetic force of the production of desire is always 
attached from break machine to break machine, in an ecology of artificial and natural processes 
that undo the attachment of desire to the human subject? What can the breaks and connections 
between arcs of enjoying matters - at scales beyond conscious human will - say about the 
architectures of experience? 
 
Transversal desires. Transversal enjoyments. It is along the transversal passages, which are those 
that are not ‘structural’ but ‘machinic’ (immanent and instant connections of connections), that 
the coupling between process philosophy and schizoanalysis gives us another variation on the 
point of view of what an ‘alter-therapeutic’ activity could be. At the transversal passages is 
where the common sense of the ‘mind’—as that which is the human center of control, whether 
consciously or unconsciously— is shattered and distributed as minded matters of the world.  
Along those transversal passages is where a concept of intensive and distributed matter gets to 
qualify the body as a site of schizoanalytic speculation, since it is understood as inseparable from 
the animation of mindedness. Each play with the minded matter adds to an alter-therapeutic 
gesture: one that liberates novel modes of improvisation around the categories for living 
(unknown feelings, memories of potentials, intermittent subject and object positionalities). 
 
This is the take on the concept of the transversal by Deleuze and Guattari. By using the example 
of Marcel Proust In Search of Lost Time, they show how the narrator of the novel has to move 
with transverse communications. This is because the narrator is not able to take a unity of points 
of view, —due to an incapacity to rest in the perception of a total or partial experience— has to 
move with transverse communications. The narrator who is travelling in a train “traces from one 
window to the other, “in order to draw together, in order to reweave intermittent and opposite 
fragments”. This drawing together, this reweaving is what Joyce called re-embodying” (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1983, 47). 
 
When the biogram re doubles the architectural planes of experience passing between Euclidean 
and topological logics of organization, the body opens to a synesthetic perception in which 
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reweaves fragments of body senses and perceptual data through dynamic linkages. The plunge, 
in-between, planes allows the unitary body to become more than itself. It becomes an 
embodiment not of its self-identity—based in its Ego or in its visual anatomical image—but an 
embodiment of desiring machines connecting and interrupting each other through disparate sense 
data. Biogrammatic experience is a becoming which is linked to sense data. It is a becoming 
dynamic of perception in and out of actuality in which the linkages do not have to cut and return 
themselves to the interiority of a subject, but they can relink from one portion of perceptual data 
to the next. 
 
Here is where the new definition of desire as mentality comes in handy. Because the body 
becoming embodiment is stretched out of its self-identity (out of its structures of containment), 
lured by the partial enjoyments operating across the interrupting desiring machines. Desire as 
mentality invites us to think the concept of embodiment as the elastic line between points of 
attraction and repulsion of the junctions of experience. Embodiment as a line of flight that 
embroiders the lures of partial desires distributed along planes. Again, not to stop the transversal 
flight to be able to say “I”, but to keep moving transversely along the mattered junctions that call 
with and as desire. 
 
To understand embodiment as a minded capacity to move as a line of flight, gives the possibility 
to think embodiment as a technique to move in an alternative way, in which feelings are 
assembled by dominant and totalitarian modes, by assembling of feelings that block away the 
messy multiplicity of the emergent feelings.  Embodiment can be thought as an intensification of 
the capacity to improvise along the margins of totalitarian machines of identity (containment) 
production.  This mode to think embodiment is an alter-therapeutics. 
 
Finally, we can say as well that the study of architectures of experience is a speculation on how 
the pull of desire is a force of giving more intense modes of living transversally, 
improvisationally free. 
 
“Movements are not ‘effected’ by a ‘cause’: that would be the old concept of soul again! – they 
are the will itself, but not wholly and completely! (Nietzsche 2003, 57). 
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Architecture 5D: Schizoanalysis and Schizo-somatics. 
 
 
This architecture channels many of the thought pulses running across the planes of architectures 
5, 5B and 5C, and at the same time thinks again the concept of feeling (as was done in the 
architectures 2 and 3 via the use of Whiteheadean vocabulary), but this time in close connection 
with the aforementioned concept of ‘transversality’ (as embodiment at-and-of the junctures of 
the planes) by Guattari. At the crossroad of Whitehead’s ‘theory of feelings’ and Guattari’s 
concept of ‘transversality’, is where the strong overlaps between process philosophy and 
schizoanalysis happen. And at that crossroad is where the power of the ‘artful-alter therapeutic’ 
can be continued to be conceptualized. Therefore, the aim of this architecture is to reinforce the 
links between process ‘philosophy’ and ‘schizoanalysis’ via further introduction of the latter. 
 
In Schizoanalytic Cartographies, the first definition of schizoanalysis given by Guattari is: “the 
analysis of the impact of Assemblages of enunciation on semiotic and subjective productions in a 
given problematic context” (Guattari 2013, 18). The concept of the Assemblage allows Guattari 
to expand the field of psychoanalysis beyond the frames that were concentrated to interpret the 
Unconscious through verbal expressions, such as it was the case of Freud and Lacan—and 
perhaps most importantly, beyond the concept of transference. In words of Guattari, the 
assemblage is useful “to avoid, as far as possible, getting bogged down in the concept of the 
‘unconscious’” (Guattari 2013, 18). This is important since for Guattari there are assemblages 
that do not include components of the semiotic of signification, and others that neither have 
subjective nor conscious components. 
 
One graphic image of the Assemblage given by Guattari is the following: 
 
I once said, I no longer remember where, that we wanted to construct a science in which 
dishcloths and napkins could no longer even be encompassed under the general rubric of 
lines. A science in which one would be prepared instead to accept with good grace that 
dishcloths are differentiated in singularized becomings and have a cortege of contextual 
repercussions, in which it could just as easily be a question of a landlord drying glasses 
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with a dishcloth as of soldiers launching a cleanup operation [ a ‘coup de torchon’] on a 
pocket of resistance (Guattari 2013, 18). 
 
The assemblage is an image of thought that allows Guattari to register the passages between 
planes of enunciation, displacing the analytic problems from pre-formed subjectivities under the 
influence of a system of signification. It needs to be clarified that the enunciation of the 
assemblage cannot be reduced to a verbal expression, instead the enunciation can be understood 
more as the ‘call’ of desire to assemble certain plane with consistency. 
 
In the context of the writing of this architecture, the assemblage enunciates ‘signals’ for partial 
and distributed desires, that keep the immanent flight of embodiment – becoming more than a 
body falling into itself, rather stretching out towards multiple modes of feelings. Therefore, the 
concept of the assemblage allows to register distributed desires through feelings, and thus, 
feelings are understood less as the perception of the interior of the body but as the perception of 
exteroceptive points of intensities. As it was mentioned in other architectures, feelings are peri-
personal, at the juncture of matters, and thinking with the force of their folded — but also 
distributed — mentality. Moreover, thinking-feelings are a call from desire. Desire asks them to 
transit, to register the passage of the transit, but without logically or verbally knowing what is 
exactly the feeling about.  
 
Here is where the connection between desire as a call for feelings to transit passages, can be 
made with the concept of ‘proposition’ by Whitehead. Let’s remember that for Whitehead a 
‘proposition’ was a lure for feeling, one that effected a crossfade of potential abstraction into a 
selected nexus of actualities — which was technically called a ‘transmuted feeling’ (Whitehead 
1978, 251). The next paragraph bridges this concept of ‘proposition’ with what Guattari calls the 
‘a-signifying mutations of the Assemblage. 
 
The presumed analytic effect no longer resides in a derivation of interpretable signifying 
chains, but in an ‘a-signifying’ mutation of a ‘Universe-context’ (…) Thus the 
schizoanalytic undertaking will never limit itself to an interpretation of ‘givens’; it will 
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take a much more fundamental interest in the ‘Giving’, in the Assemblages that promote 
the concatenation of affects of sense and pragmatic effects (Guattari 2013, 19).  
 
That the focus in schizoanalysis is on the ‘giving’ and not limited to the ‘givens’, shifts the focus 
to the ‘propositions’ or the ‘potentials to feel’ at the junctures of an assemblage. This means that 
the register of the ‘potential feeling’ happens at the juncture of the assemblages, or at the nexuses 
of entities. There, an opacity or a swollenness of abstraction folds an actual group of matters, 
pressing some precise potentials for feelings to become a blueprint. 
 
The feel for the transversal propositions speaks of a mode of embodiment which is juncture-like, 
and like a plane porous to the concatenations of affects. A radical mode of thinking would be one 
that thinks ‘embodiment’ and ‘architectures’ as processual feelings that take actual shape as they 
intensify their nexus (as becoming more propositional or more charged by latent abstraction in 
concreteness). This is to say that to become with an architecture-ing of experience would be to 
become an embodied transversality. An embodiment of multi-linear concatenations that is 
always affected by something that is not actually there, but that resonates from somewhere else, 
or some other time. This also means that a practice of schizoanalysis would be inseparable from 
a practice of transversal embodiment, or in another words, from a schizo-somatics practice: one 
that feels the body as taking shape through the junctures of feelings. 
 
The radical thought of transversal embodiment in the making, is of helping to find movements of 
relay between architectures of experience, in the case that one of them would suffer a crisis. In 
this context a crisis of creativity—or a crisis of the creative advance, in Whitehedean terms—is 
understood as the smash of the potential to feel into flat and stable affective arcs that already 
know themselves, or as the unidirectional funneling for processes to become habitual routines for 
interaction (juncture-actions). The study of the feel of the transversal passages is not to register 
the givens of what happens, but the movements of embroidery called by partial desires that allow 
the registration of the relay between the desire machines—the breaks and connections between 
disparate elements—such a generative relay is the ‘giving’. It is the surplus of mentality that is to 
be schizoanalyzed through a radical take on embodiment, a schizo-somatics practice: transversal 
of the more-than actual, linear and known. 
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How are the potentialities for the constitution of new Assemblages to be explored in a 
context that appears totally blocked? How are the relations of production, proliferation 
and the micropolitics of these new Assemblages to be aided in such a case? This is the 
kind of question that schizoanalysis will be led to be posed (Guattari 2013, 20). 
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Architecture 5E: Genetic and Morphological Theories of Actualities. 
 
 
This architecture is close: Northeast from the 5D, it returns to the paradox of thinking the ‘spaces 
of experience’ as the movement of mutual inclusion between Euclidean and topological spaces. 
Now, if we add our newly found concept of embodiment as a transversal flight along junctures of 
planes of experience, we realize that this concept is bound to be thought through a paradox as 
well. Embodiment would have to be thought as a rippling transmission taking shape immanently 
to the planes that are being transversed, but also as a more stable notion of a body, as something 
Euclidean.  Having in mind that we are thinking embodiment as a necessary concept to register 
the sites of the distributed minded matter where schizoanalysis could operate, and that what 
counts is to register the movements of feelings that generate this transversal embodiment. Let’s 
then visit a pair of Whitehedean concepts that will allow us to learn something about the modes 
of embodiment passing through topological and Euclidean spaces.  
 
In the chapter of ‘The Theory of Feelings’ of Process and Reality, Whitehead uses a double 
frame of thought to analyze the such a theory of feelings (Whitehead 1978, 219-35). This double 
frame is the one that allows us to think actualities in an intensive—topological—and extensive—
Euclidean—way.  The two frames are that of the ‘genetic cell-theory’ and the ‘morphological 
cell-theory’ of actualities. 
 
Now let’s see what Whitehead really means with the ‘genetic’ and ‘morphological’ theories of 
actualities. To start with, Whitehead clarifies that the “philosophy of organism is a cell theory of 
actuality. Each ultimate unit of fact is a cell-complex, not analyzable into components with 
equivalent completeness of actuality” (Whitehead 1978, 219). For Whitehead the cell is not 
something necessarily small, but is a thought-image that refers to the multiple activities included 
in the formation of the unit of fact of actuality. Most importantly, the cell unit formation cannot 
be analyzed through analogous (equivalent) processes, but only through the manner in which that 
singular process is immanently coming to be. Finally, Whitehead is saying that the cell-complex 
cannot be analyzed into ‘complete’ components of actualities. In other words, whether through a 
genetic or morphological perspective, the actualities can never be reduced to a closed totality. 
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They are never ‘totally’ completed processes. We will see that even after a process into a unit of 
an actual formation has finished, it remains open to make ingress into other processes. 
 
Whitehead explains that, in the genetic cell-theory of actuality, the cell appropriates “for the 
foundation of its own existence, the various elements of the universe out of which it arises” 
(Whitehead 1978, 219). What it appropriates are other already constituted actualities and the 
eternal objects. Remember here that the eternal objects inflect a definition to the actual entity, 
but they remain as something more-than actual. The genetic perspective analyzes the actual 
entity that is working itself towards form but did not complete its process towards it, it did not 
reach its satisfaction yet. Here satisfaction should not be misunderstood with the human 
satisfaction of a pleasure. For Whitehead ‘satisfaction’ is a concept that tells of the urge for the 
process of feelings to reach a unit of subjective form. ‘Satisfaction’ is the conclusion of the 
appetite into a unit of feeling through the composition of the many elements in the mix. 
 
“An actual entity is a process in the course of which many operations with incomplete 
subjective unity terminate in a completed unity of operation, termed the ‘satisfaction’” 
(Whitehead 1978, 219). 
 
The genetic theory lays out conceptual tools to follow the incomplete processes towards form 
taking. Again, they are processes open to other components—such as other already constituted 
actualities—but singular to the unique manner in which the various component dynamics are 
pacing their journey towards the satisfaction of their creative urge. The genetic theory of 
actualities understands the components of the process as immanently singular (with this specific 
tone) and at the same time relational (porous to the inclusion of constituted actualities that add 
something to that specific tone). 
 
On the other hand, the morphological theory of actuality analyses processes of formation already 
culminated and thus, evaporated, that are used for the process of formation of other actualities 
rather than its own. These already-satisfied processes become ‘objects’ for the ‘superjects’ 
(subjects as projectiles) processes that are immanently becoming. The morphological theory is a 
transcendent perspective, in which actual entities function for the processes of another. 
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Its own process, which is its own internal existence, has evaporated, worn out and 
satisfied; but its effects are all to be described in terms of its ‘satisfaction’. The ‘effects’ 
of an actual entity are its intervention in concrescent processes other than its own. Any 
entity, thus intervening in processes transcending itself, is said to be functioning as an 
‘object’ (Whitehead 1978, 220). 
 
At this point we can say that the main difference between a ‘genetic’ and ‘morphologic’ 
perspective is that the mutual inclusion of other actual entities in formation are more or less 
intimate to the arcing dynamic. The morphologic perspective would place the actualities as less 
intimate to the carried momentum of generation, since their momentum has already perished. 
The morphologic perspective has a different ‘timing’ in becoming for another actuality: less 
dynamic. The morphologic perspective allows to think a culminated object as an ‘objectile’, this 
is to say as a perspective or a point of elasticized reference for a feelings process on its way 
towards form. 
 
In this way, the objective perspective of a settled process operates as a resonance box for further 
generation. Thus, when we use traditional notions of a body, such as a notion that understands it 
as the containment of five senses and an ego, we use them as points of reference to go 
somewhere else. When we stand in a space and we cannot avoid perceiving it with an Euclidean 
grid containing rigid bodies and strong egos inside of minds in the body, we are just being 
bogged down by habits that are always about to turn somewhere else, creatively. 
 
Now, through the architectures of experience we have been thinking the processes of experience 
as modes of spatializing ecologies of feelings, we thus must also think the process of experience 
that are spatialized with Whitehead. 
 
The actual entity as described by the morphology of its satisfaction is the actual entity 
‘spatialized’, to use Bergson’s term. The actual entity, thus spatialized, is a given 
individual fact actuated by its own ‘substantial form’” (Whitehead 1978, 220). 
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We can use this last paragraph that reinforces the concept of space and objects as satisfied 
processes of feelings to re-think their inclusion on processes of feelings on the way. And, as we 
will see, we must rethink space and objects without forming a ‘totalitarian or completed 
perspective’: one in which the stable perished categories take control. 
 
A final note on ‘feelings’ is that, for Whitehead, the subject of feeling is causa sui: the cause of 
the feeling depends in the mutual inclusion of the ecology of elements adding to it, including the 
‘objects’ that are the perspectives of already satisfied and perished process, and that still remain 
as patterned nexuses for new feelings. This is to say that through a morphological perspective of 
the space and body—when feelings add to processes that are perished—they don’t form a 
totality.  Feelings don’t function as a final cause that depends on a pre-established harmony. 
 
Through the genetic and morphologic analysis of actualities, Whitehead gives us an ecological 
perspective that mutually includes all the ‘partial’ interconnected elements to form a feeling with 
the concept of subjective form, as a ‘whole’. 
 
The partial nature of feeling, other than the complete satisfaction, is manifest by the 
impossibility of understanding its generation without recourse to the whole subject (PR 
221). 
 
The subjective form boomerangs the feelings in the making with the past perished categories, but 
includes them under the logic of partial processes, or what Whitehead calls the logic of 
‘contemporary independence’ (Whitehead 1967, 195-6). Past patterns for feelings add something 
to the immanent generative process, and they do it with the quality of ‘junctures and breaks’ 
(using Guattarian vocabulary), or as nexuses. Moreover, these past feelings are by nature, as 
transitional as the feeling on the generative route towards form, even if their creative urge has 
already perished. 
 
Remember that in architecture 2B, we saw how the category of ‘transmutation of feelings’ 
offered a new nexus (and not only a new feeling), shaped by the initial nexus of the physical and 
conceptual feelings, propelling the generation of further feelings. This allows us to think how the 
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openness of the subjective form includes the potential to re-shape novel nexuses like ‘junctures 
and breaks’ out of already formed actualities, into its own processual whole—whether to be 
satisfied in this singular subjective form, or another yet to come. In short, the subjective form 
offered by Whitehead is a transversal whole. It knots every process (past, present and on the 
way) that is local and a-local, temporal and a-temporal. 
 
Then again, to feel the transversal embodiment (the schizo-somatics) in which schizoanalysis 
could operate means not to throw the baby out with the bathwater. But every time the risk to 
think-feel in a totalitarian manner surrounds us, we have to remember the technique to embody 
the genetic and morphologic, so that inside the totality making the movements of experience 
rigid, we could register the transversal wholes swallowing the totalitarian forces in return. We 
need to remember the ways to become schizo-bodies: to remember the movements that revert 
totalities, shattering them as food for multiplicities for transversal w/holes.  
 
The ‘genetic’ and ‘morphologic’ are two philosophical techniques to schizoanalyze the situations 
in which the nexuses feeling us are completed and closed in patterns of relations, which surely 
orient capacities for living towards hegemonic organizations, and away from minor modes of 
feelings. The schizoanalytic technique given by the process philosophy of Whitehead is a felt 
reminder of the transversal w/holes, which are the global but not total, sited but a-local, felt but 
‘amodal’ (as a full impact of intense feeling indiscernible in one extensive body sense mode), 
movements that are always undoing totalitarian and selective patterns for feelings. The 
transversal w/holes are the creative advance that artfully phagocyte totalities, breaking and re-
connecting total elements into an immanent transversal schizzed w/hole: a subjective form. 
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Architecture 6: Mexico. 
 
 
Mexico City keeps singular architectures of experience in its boulevards. They curve 
imperceptibly, pulling the corpulent trees towards the walkway. The pace of the walk with the 
rear vision of the trees slices the fall of light. Colors inhabit the spaces with force, but they are 
placated by the thick geometries of low buildings. The curvilinear geometrical plane strongly 
calls the rear vision of the body, and if despite that pull, one continues to look forwards, one can 
observe that the plane gets divided infinitely by frame inside frame. Red, green and blue are 
drawn by wide sidewalk lines and again by the perspectival spaces inside of spaces of a tree, a 
car, a lamp and a window. 
 
The sidewalk is quite uneven, with tiny slopes and holes, in such a way that the steps are ready to 
negotiate the surface of contact. This fact does something to the rhythm of the visual planes, it 
grounds the visual slicing with impartial weight distributions. When the body walks, it does so 
through a rich thickness of perceptual activities. What the population of tree leaves emphasize 
are the ground planes. The emphasis comes through the contrast of textural patches extended 
through the ground, and the irregular insertion of many directional slopes. 
 
If the body wanted to rest, it would find many spaces to contain it. It could lay on a park bench, 
as well as in an ample waste-basket risen from the ground, or even on the threshold of a house. 
Embodied by one of this containments, one can get more of one regular cadence while still 
listening to the murmurs of the polyrhythms arced by the many architectures around. 
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Architecture 7: Affective Signs. 
 
 
Flying in an airplane also qualifies as an architecture of experience. Through the windows on 
each side, the cloudy and mountainous landscape moves slowly backwards. The gravitational 
force with its force and speed pulling forwards and, moving along the circular shape of the 
airplane cabin, seems to be out of time with the downtempo passing movement of clouds, stars 
and mountains. 
 
Simultaneously, the force not only disseminates vectors moving forwards—like vectors being 
circularly drawn towards the tip of a pencil which is the airplane nose—but also pulls the rows of 
seats backwards. There are vectors of forces moving along the rounded cabin towards the 
airplane nose and towards the airplane tail. These double forces produce an effect of suspension 
to the numerous packed passengers’ bodies. 
 
A triplication of feeling is then produced by the pulling forces: forwards, backwards and 
suspended feelings. A middle line slices the axis of the body at a distance from the spine. The 
middle line shifts along the peripersonal space of the ‘cabined body’. If attention could fall and 
follow the movement of the peripersonal line pulled now forwards and now backwards, then a 
plunging into a variation of architectures of experience could be registered. Because along the 
movement of the peripersonal line that slices up the limit of the body is where the affective signs 
populate. These are signs given by the force of movement and their function is to entice more 
movement propositions. They are signs that, as soon as they are registered, entice a continuation 
of movement: a sliding with the forces effected through the materiality making the signs felt. The 
forces effecting materiality are the ontogenetic forces that were qualified as ‘mentality’ in 
connection with the ‘biogram’ at the architecture 5B. A mentality is a hinge-plane or an 
entryway in which the incipiency of the movements of perception can be felt. Thus, the affective 
signs begin to be registered where the movement animating matters are felt through their 
operations of slicing, distancing and narrowing: bodies, cabins, oxygen and plane. 
 
In today’s architecture of experience of an airplane journey, the concept of the affective sign will 
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be unpacked with the concept of ‘idea’ and other accompanying Spinozean concepts. The aim is 
to explore capacities for affective signs—inseparable from a dynamic perspective—that have not 
yet been thought in the pages of these architectures; and to find these capacities through a 
pragmatic speculation on Spinoza’s philosophy. In short, the aim is to not know much in advance 
about what an affective sign is, but to begin to give form to an idea of it by the close 
conversation with Spinoza, as if dancing with his philosophy will have the effect of allowing a 
choreography to emerge, with a corporeal dynamic which will compose what the capacities of 
the affective sign could be. 
 
For Spinoza “the object of the idea constituting the human Mind is the Body or a certain mode of 
Extension which actually exists, and nothing else” (Spinoza 1985, 457). The idea occurs to the 
Mind because of a body affection. When one body affects the other, an idea is produced by the 
Mind. But what is tricky is that the Mind for Spinoza is not associated with the human brain and 
its cognitive abilities. The Spinozan Mind is similar to the Whiteheadean one. Mind can be 
interpreted as the activity of Matter (as Body) thinking itself. Mind is the mode in which a 
process of matters resolves its coming into existence and perseveres towards its future 
continuations. 
 
Spinoza says that “the idea of the body and the body i.e., the Mind and the Body, are one and the 
same individual, which is conceived now under the attribute of Thought, now under the attribute 
of Extension” (Spinoza 1985, 467). As an encounter of bodies produce an affective quality, this 
affect is an activity of immanent reflection of the very encounter. In other words, the fact that 
affect asks for a mode of being to be registered, is what qualifies it as thought.  Therefore, an 
idea is the activity of Extension becoming Thought, or thought implicated in Extension. Thought 
is the surplus of body commotions transformed into their affectability. Thought is a micro loop 
that immanently registers how bodies are implicated to result in this immediate affective 
encounter. Thought is the immanent reflection of body encounters. 
 
This is the first phase of an idea for Spinoza: just the registering (as thinking) of a mode of 
existent Extension in act, and nothing else (Spinoza 1985, 457).  For Spinoza, at this early phase, 
ideas are ‘inadequate’, they only ‘indicate’ the presence of an external body affecting another. In 
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a second phase, ideas become ‘adequate’ because they ‘express’ another idea as the cause of the 
body affection. 
 
Then, let’s see how Spinoza defines the different phases of the ‘inadequate’ (indicative) and 
‘adequate’ (expressive) ideas with the help of Gilles Deleuze’s book on Spinoza Spinoza: 
Practical Philosophy. 
 
Deleuze says that the ‘inadequate idea’ “represents to our body, the effect of another body on 
ours (Deleuze 1988, 73).”; he adds that they are “the corporeal affections themselves, the traces 
of an external body on our body. (Deleuze 1988, 73-4).” For Deleuze these ‘ideas; are “signs” 
since “they are not explained by our essence or power, but indicate our actual state and our 
incapacity to rid ourselves of a trace; they do not express the essence of the external body but 
indicate the presence of this body and its effect on us” (Deleuze 1988, 74). 
 
According to Deleuze, the ideas are signs of affect when they just merely ‘indicate’ the affection 
of external bodies in a given situation, without knowing the cause of the affection. Here in the 
airplane, when the pulling forces forward and backward slicing up an undefined zone of the body 
limit, indicate themselves through the effects affecting the body, they qualify as signs: as an 
‘indication’ (index) of what is going on at the level of bodies, that’s all. There is no further 
knowledge of the causes of the forces. Just a mere micro registration, or a type of micro reaction. 
 
Deleuze says that ideas are ‘adequate’ when they not only indicate what is happening but also 
express another idea as the cause of what is happening. Adequate ideas are interconnected ideas: 
“They cannot be separated, therefore, from an autonomous connection of ideas in the attribute of 
thought”. They “represent the order and connection of things” (Deleuze 1988, 74). 
 
Adequate ideas are ‘expressions’ of the cause carrying the bodies towards an affective encounter, 
and they are explained by the power of knowing or comprehending. But again, this mode of 
knowing is “not sought in a psychological consciousness but in a logical power that surpasses 
consciousness”. The “material of the idea” is “an epistemological material through which ideas 
refer to other ideas” (Deleuze 1988, 75). It can be said that adequate ideas emerge out of a bodily 
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encounter that this time does not only ask for the register of its extension but also for its 
expression of. In other words, to think adequately is a function of thought to express the 
intensities that bring together the extensive encounter. This is to say that, to comprehend the 
causes of affection is to perceive (to intuit) the intensity of the forces of the extensive encounter 
and to explain them: as to follow their vectors beyond the actual locus of affection towards other 
ideas of other bodies’ affections. In short, adequate ideas represent the cause of the body 
affection, but this cause is not an external and linear cause, but the immanent cause from which 
the affects emerge in relation. As we will see below, the adequate cause refers to the emergent 
‘diagram’. 
 
The way this conceptual panorama is understood in the context of this airplane journey through 
outer space goes as follows: the peripersonal limit of the body registers the immediate force of 
suspension on the first hand as an ‘inadequate idea’, but it also speculates on the diagrammatic 
forces accompanying the locally and singly indicated effect, so that the materially expressed idea 
begins to be expressed (as unfolded) and, becomes thus ‘adequate’. 
 
This is to say that: an adequate idea would be a sign followed to the limit of the local effect. As 
the body is impinged by a sign, the thought of the body unfolds beyond its limit to intuit the 
dynamic forces producing that effect. The body is affected and thinks in return, with the causes 
effecting it, beyond. It thinks beyond of what can be felt and perceived in the actual situation. In 
this context an adequate idea is the transformation of an affective sign into an environmental 
intuition of the generative forces at stake. It is the transformation of an implicated body to an 
expressed as explicated (or untangled) one; or a body becoming an immanent and immediate 
environment. 
 
To understand better how affects becomes signs and diagrammatic expressions of them, we can 
continue thinking with the question posited by Deleuze after developing his explanation of the 
adequate ideas. Deleuze asks: how, at the human level of comprehension can we have adequate 
ideas, since our natural condition determines us to have only inadequate ones? 
 
He answers that the way to acquire adequate ideas for Spinoza, is through the ‘common notions’. 
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A “common notion is the representation of a composition between two or more bodies and a 
unity of this composition. Its meaning is more biological than mathematical; it expresses the 
relations of agreement or composition between existing bodies.” (Deleuze 1988, 54). One of the 
examples presented by Deleuze to demonstrate that common notions are more biological than 
mathematical is the one given by Spinoza concerning the relation between the chyle and lymph, 
as parts of the blood. What Deleuze is pointing at, is that common notions are modes of 
embodiment; they are not ‘abstract ideas’ but ‘general ideas’ of existing bodies. He adds that 
common notions capture relations not in abstraction, but “as they are, that is, as they are 
necessarily embodied in living beings” (Deleuze 1988, 57). 
 
For Deleuze common notions refer to a biological rather than a mathematical or abstract level 
because they are a mode of embodiment, or a mode of thinking extension. Common notions are 
embodied ideas, thought through bodies implicated with an environment of forces. The body 
thinks a common notion that represents the environmental composition of forces effecting the 
airplane cabin, because the body with its cells, tissues, and fluid circulations agrees and thus 
respond to the plastic forces shaping the distribution of gravity. “Common” is an agreement with 
the environment in which the extraterrestrial atmosphere, the airplane and the cellular body can 
embody themselves in a play of infinite but limited folds. This agreement is the first step for 
Spinoza to create a common notion; it is the moment in which the affection of one body over the 
other increases the power capacities to affect and to think. This is a joyful inter-affection. 
 
Deleuze will add that after the affective agreement between body compositions, the body can 
even think the commonness with the bodies that disagree with ours. For instance, the air pressure 
that pushed the tympanum to a point of unbearable pain, or the structure of the seats which 
menace the knee articulations towards poor fluid enough circulation. Here we find a glimpse of 
the ethics implied in the notion of commonness. When Extension thinks the common, it is 
reflecting on the modes in which a body can continue to endure, even around other bodies that 
diminish their capacity. 
 
Since Deleuze says that the first step to form a common notion is to agree with other bodies that 
empower our capacity (give us joy), thereby facilitating the second step towards common notions 
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that are more general and include the bodies that disagree with us (give us sadness). The 
common thought is the thought that allows bodies to find their life capacity despite environments 
that diminish them. The thought of a common notion is a thought that proposes to transform the 
circulation of affects between bodies, in such a way that a less capacious environment becomes a 
more capacious one. The thought of a common notion is a choreographic proposition for the 
affective relations that can be dynamized for a more capacious composition of bodies. 
 
Common notions can be understood as choreographic, particularly so if we attend to how 
Spinoza conceptualizes the body. For Spinoza, a body like the human body should not be limited 
to a ‘single’ organism contained by skin. A body is the sum of multiple dynamics transversing 
and folding it, with and besides numerous other bodies. An ‘Individual Body’ stands for the 
union and composition of many bodies due to a similar manner in their movement and rest, size 
or constraint (Spinoza 1985, 460). The common notions are a mode of embodiment in the midst 
of body encounters, in which the main factor is the way in which the movement of speed and rest 
determine their co-composition. 
 
Thus, common notions are an embodiment of the more-than ‘individual’ body. This is a register 
of the environment of affects’ circulation that mostly agree (but also disagree) with the more-
than ‘individual body’.  Common notions are a choreography of affected thoughts or of the 
affection of extension thinking through its environ-mentality: again a mentality of the circulation 
of affects moving towards a more capacious environment for living. In short, after all this 
theorization around ‘common notions, they should be understood not as a comfortable place to 
be, like common sense or consensus, but as the choreographic feeling always open to the beyond 
of what can be perceived in the here and now and to the affects that challenge the affective 
capacity. They are the (more-than) feeling of a style of environ-mentality, one that has enough 
joyful affective hold to move with the unrest of the unknown. 
 
There is one more aspect that turns affective signs and their adequate expression into a relevant 
technique for more capacious modes of living. This is the aspect of memory or habit concerning 
inadequate ideas. Through the play of memory, the affective signs (although inadequate) can be 




This is Spinoza’s take on affective memory. In the Ethics, while he explains that the movement 
of a body is determined by other bodies in movement ad infinitum, he elaborates the definition of 
three types of bodies characterizing the manners of determination: ‘hard’, ‘soft’ and ‘fluid. 
‘Hard’ are the bodies “which parts apply one to the other through large surfaces”; ‘soft’ are the 
bodies “which parts are applied through small surfaces” and ‘fluid’ are the bodies which parts 
move between themselves” (Spinoza 1985, 460). 
 
The ‘fluid’ body parts in their encounter with other body movements, are what mutate the ‘soft’ 
body surfaces.  The encounter changes the way in which the ‘fluid’ parts reflect their movement 
to each other. And the change of the ‘fluid’ body parts is what conditions a later encounter with 
other bodies. The ‘fluid body parts’ create a ‘memory’ as a result of being the most sensitive to 
the ‘traces’ of other external bodies. Through this memory capacity of the fluid body parts, 
Spinoza goes so far as to say that affects can be reflected (as produced) without the actual 
existence of external bodies. If the movement of existent bodies share a similarity with the fluid 
encounter of other antecedent bodies not in existence, the affects bring into actuality the thought 
of not existing bodies. (Spinoza 1985, 464). At the same time, the affective encounter can be 
registered (as to be inadequately thought) because the body brings with it the past capacity to 
move with an actual pattern. In this sense, past traces of composite movement encounters 
determine a present actual encounter too. This means that each actual body’s encounter stores a 
trace that can be reflected in the future, when a similar manner of movement (and body size and 
constrain) occurs. 
 
After this long journey through such a complicated landscape at each side of the airplane 
window, what can be recapitulated about the affective signs is the following: 
 
The affective sign is a thought of the fluidity of movement composing bodies, that traces 
something of the interconnected order of the situation (something of the adequate idea). The 
interconnected order across bodies’ composition is equal to the concept of and embodied 
‘transversality’ touched upon in past ‘architectural chapters’ (5C, D and E).  The embodied 
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transversal intuition of what is happening, is an intuition that searches for a ‘common notion’; 
that notion that allows us to form ‘adequate ideas’. To search for the common notion in the midst 
of what is happening is to embody an attunement of the forces affecting the power capacities of 
the situation. The attunement is to the movements of body that give more power and capacity 
(joy) for a compositional increase; so that the power will have enough force to include and 
transform in turn the relational forces that decrease such a capacity (sad). 
 
The ethics of the architectures of experience is based in the search of affective signs that 
intensively think (as they express and unfold beyond the local effects) modes of encounter that 
give an increase in the capacity for further interconnected composition. As was mentioned 
before, this ‘thought-affected-movement-idea’ is not contained in a verbal sentence or a 
“psychological consciousness” (Deleuze 1988, 75).  These ideas are thoughts of transitional 
affects, are movement intuitions that remain fluid entities ready to hook up in the future to a 
novel interconnected encounter, and to go through it preserving the life of the bodies passing it, 
and maybe falling into the containment of a clear and distinct conscious thought. And the plunge 
into a future body composition is not just an adaptation into what is happening, but an active 
transformation of the sad affective relations. 
 
Lastly, according to Spinoza the affective signs which are inadequate ideas—since they did not 
yet explain the causes of affection—are not errors of imagination (Spinoza names the affective 
presence of non-existent bodies ‘images’). Imagination in itself does not err, it only misses an 
idea of an existent body. It misses an idea that shows to Mind that, the actual affective idea, does 
not correspond to an existent actual body. In this sense affective signs are the “lowest degree of 
our power of understanding” (Deleuze 1988, 75), and they are at their emerging level 
‘imaginations’, but they carry with them in germ (in imagination and inadequately and 
obscurely) the power to intensify and become a dynamic image (a diagram), a true idea which 
translates the movement of what is going on, into a lived concept. 
 
This is to say that affective signs begin in the imagination of what is happening, in the obscurity 
of confused knowledge, precisely because knowledge can be given shape through the pursuit of 
this obscurity, without a presumed form for it. To begin to know what is happening affectively 
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by the indication of affective signs, is to move with a dance of obscure uncertainty. A dance that 
is about to choreograph a novel thought for what it means pragmatically, to know. 
 
In any case, this architecture begins to fade with the pulling forces changing their vectors one 
more time; this time tilting the many body parts of the extraterrestrial atmosphere and the cabin 
full of packed bodies, towards landing. 
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Architecture 8: Abstract Desire. 
 
 
This architecture of experience is somatic in that it experiments with the ligamentous physiology 
of the body. The ligamentous physiology includes the experience of actual ligaments in bodies, 
as well as the potential processes operating through the actual experience which refers to 
embryological patterns. Body Mind Centering explores the embryological patterns as the kind of 
developmental movements occurring during the first eight weeks of life. These are dynamic 
structures that keep informing adult life after the embryonic stage has been completed (Cohen 
2014). In the context of this architecture, the embryological development is thought as a 
topology of qualitative dynamics adding a surplus of experience, to what is usually understood as 
a simple and functional use of a body ligament: i.e. the ligament flex, rotation and keep the 
different segments of the arm assembled. 
 
The embryological or processual experience of ligaments will sound something like this: the arm 
grows as a whole unit, in the unit a space is created, like an inter-zone, in which cells and fluids 
orbit around and segment the unit while simultaneously linking it to other segments. For 
instance, the whole unit of the arm generates an orbital space which segments and links what 
would be later the shoulder blade; from this inter-zone the units calibrate a distance and generate 
another orbital space for cells and fluids which will segment and link again the unit of the arm, 
this time in that which will become the elbow; and later on more segments and links will become 
orbital and calibrating spaces for what will become the wrist and hand. Through every segment 
along the arm unit, there is a play of polarizing forces which distance themselves, so that the 
joints and ligaments will be created. Each body segment gains the consistency of a unit through 
the polarizing forces simultaneously distancing and linking, along all the other segments of the 
body. 
 
This processual dynamic keeps occurring through adult life. Ligaments are segmented angles of 
relation which transmit information about orientation to bones and muscles through fascia—that 
thin layer of connective tissues covering muscles, organs and other soft structures of the body. 
Ligaments are local angles of experience which inform more traditional structures (like the 
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muscular one) where they are, and this is because the angular zones of ligaments always operate 
conjunctively, transmitting information through fascia with the other angles. 
 
A ligamentous experience is not limited to the body understood as a whole structure, but in this 
particular case, it is felt as a dynamic of environmental segments and conjunctions. A room 
becomes a play of qualitative forces, which polarize distances between different angles while 
calibrating zones of pressure. There is a force of pressure around the ankle which calibrates a 
distance between the lower leg and the foot and which extends across the inter-zone of the 
contour of the plant in front of the desk. That the contour of the plant in front of the desk is 
attended as linked somewhere down in the ankle, means that a segmentation of the room has 
happened, one that registers the differentiation between the elements constituting plant-desk-
ankle: a growing differentiation through interconnection. 
 
That the ankle differentiates through the ligaments and fascia from the desk-plant-floor, means 
that a space is becoming shaped, one that differentiates, segments as it links. The contour of 
greenness, in the sagittal plane, curves the space of experience towards the density of gravity, 
polarizing the whole of the ankle with the ground and the longitudinal plane curving even more. 
Finally, where the space is created through segmentation and interconnection, energy is 
registered. Energy in the form of a change of quality, a shift of the body physiological fluids and 
a shift of the room mode of relation. Or, it can be said that the interconnection of matters 
themselves become a surface where energy become registrable. 
 
This ligamentous introduction of an architecture of experience aims to think the affective signs 
as intensive points in which a kind of energy is tapped and felt through underground 
interconnections beyond conscious perception, and it also aims to think about the unconscious 
investments (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 205) which are indicated by this found energy. 
 
What comes now is the bridge towards process philosophy. This bridge will open a conceptual 
landscape to research these two themes. These are the themes referring to the ‘affective signs’ as 
indices of an abstract subterranean energy and, as indicators of a nonconscious type of 
‘investment’ which in turn, animate the operations that generate spaces for living. 
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In the ‘Introduction to Schizoanalysis’ from their book Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari 
describe the energy specific of the desiring-machines as Libido (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 
320). We have to remember that ‘desiring-machines’ is a concept that values production or 
processes over the products to be consumed in the midst of a Capitalistic context. This concept 
also undoes the distinction between man, machine and nature, since in its philosophical frame: 
“the essence of man becomes one within nature in the form of production or industry” (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1983, 2). Desiring-machines are machines in the strict sense, because they proceed 
by breaks and flows (…) in a generalized schizo-genesis, whose elements are schizzesflows” 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 315). Machines are transversal connections of connections of 
connections, in which flows are interrupted (or schizzed) while connected, along organs, 
technology, etc. 
 
Deleuze and Guattari recognize the discovery of this ‘abstract energy of desire’ in Freud’s 
psychoanalysis, but they reproach its capture under the forms that represent them in the theatrical 
complex of Oedipus. For Deleuze and Guattari the containment of the ‘abstract energy of desire’ 
in the closed context of the family is essential to the advancement of capitalism, which in turn 
discovers the ‘abstract energy of labor’. Together with Michel Foucault, they date the end of the 
classical art period of representation as the moment in which the ‘abstract essence of labor’ and 
the ‘abstract energy of desire’ are discovered (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 329). Hence, they 
make a parallel between the end of representational practices in art and the rise of psychoanalysis 
and capitalism. This point indicates the capacity of artful abstract techniques (as non-
representative: not functioning as re-presenters of something, but functioning as moving with 
something happening) to follow the ‘abstract energy of desire’. In other words, there is a parallel 
to be drawn between techniques shaped to register abstraction— such as somatic and 
choreographic techniques— with the techniques needed to register—through affective signs— 
the abstract subterranean desire energy and its investments. 
 
For Deleuze and Guattari, the sexual energy of the desiring machines is everywhere. They 
exemplify it through cosmic phenomena, as well as the way a bureaucrat fondles his records and 
a businessman causes money to circulate: “desire does not take as its objects persons or things, 
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but the entire surrounding that it traverses, the vibrations and flows of every sort to which it is 
joined, introducing therein breaks and captures” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 322). 
 
Deleuze and Guattari also notice that psychoanalysis makes ‘procreation’ the function of 
‘sexuality’, instead of the other way around. This is to say that psychoanalysis thinks the 
processual force of sexuality as directed to the goal of procreation. Ontologically speaking, 
psychoanalysis thinks first procreation and then the abstract force of sexuality. It thinks the 
‘product’ (of procreation) as ontologically first, instead of the process (of abstract sexual 
energy), which is uncontainable in the figure of man, woman, child. In short, for Deleuze and 
Guattari the abstract force of sexuality can’t be contained in the structural category of the family. 
Additionally, psychoanalysis needs to repress or castrate the abstract essence of desire in order to 
capture the force of desire and bring it forth to consciousness, as procreation. This is an 
anthropomorphic representation of sexual energy, which in capitalistic terms represent the 
surplus value extracted from the desiring machine in the form of ‘private property’. 
 
This is why, for Deleuze and Guattari, the first task of schizonalysis (the alternative to 
psychoanalysis) is to liberate desire from the theatre of representation, in psychoanalysis as well 
as in capitalism: “the discovery of an activity of production in general and without distinction, as 
it appears in capitalism, is the identical discovery of both political economy and psychoanalysis, 
beyond the determinate systems of representation” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 333). 
 
As mentioned above, what is relevant about this abstract energy, is not only that it is not 
contained in anthropomorphic categories, but also that it indicates the unconscious investments 
produced by the desiring-machines. These unconscious investments are not contained in a 
symbolic representation (a representation that stands for what is missing in desire or its the lack). 
These investments are ‘machinic doings’: they are not contained in an anthropomorphic category 
like the ‘human’ or in a specific ‘object’. They are the incessant doings of the flows, connecting, 
segmenting (territorializing) and dissolving (deterritorializing). The doings of the desiring 
machines are more-than human, though they can be re-subjectified in anthropomorphic figures. 
This is to say that desiring-machines have an autonomous doing that generates investments 
despite the human categories imposed upon them. One of the tasks of schizoanalysis is to 
 154 
analyze the ‘indices’ of the investments, in order to check which types of choreography of flows 
of desire are prevalent: whether the flows circulate a cartography of repression—since they 
extract the surplus value of desire’s process to capture it in the subjective category of the 
‘family’ or the objective category of ‘private property’—or whether the flows elude repression, 
producing unfamiliar and non-appropriative ‘schizo choreographic movements’. 
 
Furthermore, Deleuze and Guattari conceptualize an inseparable relation between the social and 
the desiring machines. The social is the ‘molar’ or ‘large aggregate’, in which the molecular or 
imperceptible transversal flows of desiring-machines are transduced into anthropomorphic 
categories; whereas the desiring-machines are the “non-human sex, the molecular machinic 
elements, their arrangements and their syntheses, without which there would be neither a human 
sex specifically determined in the large aggregates, nor a human sexuality capable of investing 
these aggregates” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 324). 
 
Hence, there is a relation of ‘included disjunction’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 374) between the 
flows of desire across molar (social) and molecular elements (desiring machines); and, as 
Deleuze and Guattari further elaborate: “the duality of the poles passes less between the molar 
and the molecular than to the interior of the molar social investments, since in any case the 
molecular formations are such investments” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 373). Following this 
line of thought, we get to see that what matters for schizoanalysis is not to avoid the molar 
functions of desire in favor of an approach solely concentrated in the molecular functions, but to 
schizoanalyze the molar social investments in order to get to the choreography of the modes of 
functioning trespassing both. So that in the end, a social molar aggregate could be exploded by 
the molecular charges in which it is invested. 
 
From the perspective of the molar investments, what needs to be schizo-analyzed are the indices 
given through the objects of love or desire. The person or object to whom love is dedicated 
intervene as a point “of connection, of disjunction, of conjunction of whose libidinal tenor of a 
properly unconscious investment they translate” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 323). As we will 
see below, the love indices found in the molar investments per se, are not enough, but what 
matters are the type of movements carried by the indices, since the movements are what define 
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whether the investment is ‘repressive’ or ‘revolutionary’. Thus, before to get into the love indices 
let’s see how Deleuze and Guattari conceptualize these types of movements of investment. 
 
One of the types of the social molar investment is called the ‘preconscious investment of interest 
or class’ and the other ‘unconscious libidinal investments’. Under the regime of the 
‘preconscious investment of class’, there is the production of a desire for social connections 
which are global, extensive, and which tend towards a single manner of coding desire. Desire is 
associated with a dominant class of the population that extracts its surplus value. Under the 
regime of the ‘unconscious libidinal investments’ there is a desire production that is not 
extensive but imperceptible and which primes the incipient force of desire towards further non-
subjective/objective ‘proliferation’ of desire (non-figurative, more-than human), though it also 
risks priming desire towards its own repression. 
 
In both social investments, the operation of desire can remain or can become repressive. At the 
level of the ‘preconscious investment of class’, the operation of desire can remain repressive if 
the desire’s indices follow the above mentioned trend towards global and totalizing connections. 
This investment’s trend orients towards the formation of more ‘personal’ or individual 
‘subjective’ categories of interest. At the level of the ‘unconscious libidinal investments’, desire 
can become repressive if the revolutionary desire against a dominant class, desires to generate a 
counter interest, but this interest in its germinal form follows the steps towards the formation of a 
new category that nevertheless encloses the subject in a totalitarian way. At this level of 
investment a revolutionary desire, opposing a dominant class, can turn desire against itself (by 
capturing its abstract revolutionary force into a new subjective category) and thus reproduce the 
repressive power operations of the dominant class. Deleuze and Guattari say that a reactionary 
production of desire needs to follow the quality of ‘included disjunction’ inherent to the desiring-
machine (the more-than human autonomous production of desire), and find a way to coexist with 
the desires they revolutionize against, along the social molar aggregate. 
 
The task of schizonalysis is therefore to reach investments of unconscious desire of the 
social field, insofar as they are differentiated from the preconscious investment of 
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interest, and insofar as they are not merely capable of counteracting them, but also of 
coexisting with them in opposite modes (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 383). 
 
Deleuze and Guattari show the danger of a repressive unconscious desire that, in principle, aims 
for the revolution of dominant powers of subjugation, with the example of the ways in which 
categories such as ‘homosexuality’ and ‘heterosexuality’ can get trapped in the categorical web 
of Oedipus. 
 
For example, no “gay liberation movement is possible as long as homosexuality is caught 
up in a relation of exclusive disjunction with heterosexuality, a relation that ascribes them 
both to a common Oedipal and castrating stock, charged with ensuring only their 
differentiation in two noncommunicating series, instead of bringing to light their 
reciprocal inclusion and their transverse communication in the decoded flows of desire 
(included disjunctions, local connections, nomadic conjunctions) (Deleuze and Guattari 
1983,  384). 
 
The ‘unconscious investment’ can be truly revolutionary if its operation of desire follow the 
transverse communication of the decoded flows. We will talk more about the concept of 
‘transverse communication’ below. So far what is important to highlight is that the truly 
revolutionary ‘unconscious investment’ is the one that invests in the ‘schizzes’ or ‘cuts’ inherent 
to the desiring machine. This is a revolutionary unconscious that, through the investment in the 
‘schizzes’, breaks open the Oedipal category of the subject. This type of investment is, again, 
more-than ‘human’ and thus, more-than subjective. It generates a more-than individual subject: a 
‘subject- group’. The ‘subject-group’ is made of partial (as broken open) individuals, which do 
not pre-exist the collective molecular forces that brought them together. And the subject-group is 
durational, because it lasts while that the forces of the desiring-machines hold the consistency of 
the desire agglomerating the group’s parts. 
 
Subject-groups are continually deriving from subjugated groups through the rupture of 
the latter: they mobilize desire, and always cut its flows again further on, overcoming the 
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limit, bringing the social machines back to the elementary forces of desire that form them 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 383). 
 
What Deleuze and Guattari demonstrate through the conceptual analysis of these two types of 
preconscious and unconscious investments, are the dangers entailed in thinking revolution 
through ideological frames of thought. Because at the ideological level of the ‘preconscious 
investment of interest’ one group of a class could be desiring revolution and still at the 
‘unconscious libidinal investments’ the power operations for the development of desire can be 
working towards the formation of further repression, in the germinal form of a new totalitarian 
formation. 
 
Now let’s see how Deleuze and Guattari describes the operation of ‘transverse communication’, 
that moves through the social molar aggregates. Keeping in mind that transverse communication 
‘moves through’ the social by way of disjunction (breaking it open), but that at the same time by 
remaining included (cohabitating with it). As we have seen before, this type of transverse 
movement re-activates the inclusive disjunctive quality proper to the desiring-machine working 
on the plane of the social. Then, returning to the concept of the ‘love indices’, let’s see how to 
schizoanalyze these indices of transverse communication. 
 
Deleuze and Guattari say that in order to schizoanalyse the social molar aggregates through the 
‘love indices’, we need to follow the transverse movements of communication so that all the 
molar “planes are traversed until their molecular line of escape is reached (Deleuze and Guattari 
1983, 350)”, like Marcel Proust In Search of Lost time. What matters is to move with “the word 
of transverse communication where the finally conquered nonhuman sex mingles with the 
flowers a new earth where desire functions according to its molecular elements and flows” 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 350). 
 
Through the transverse movement of communication, the ‘love indices’ escape the extensive 
parts of the total body of the social, towards partial and molecular intensities. Throughout In 
Search of Lost time, the transversal movement that occurs through the jumps across many 
extensive planes, is the operation that produces an opening to the molecular formation of desire: 
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“thus in the kiss where Albertine’s face jumps from one place of consistency to another, in order 
to finally come undone in the nebula of molecules” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 350). 
 
What the intensive indices become are ‘signs of desire’. They are the reverse of the symbolic 
representation—whether the symbol is repressive or revolutionary—and they do not find 
something lacking (they do not find the absence of a loved one), instead they find the positive 
multiplicity of the real loving production of desire (abstract desire). 
 
If the ‘indices of love’ at the ‘molar level’ of signification signal towards a form of desire for that 
particular person, object, or property, at the ‘molecular level’ the ‘signs of desire’ compose a 
signifying chain, that properly speaking does not signify anything in particular.  
 
“At the molecular limit of the molar aggregates, the chain no longer has any function 
other than that of deterritorializing the flows and causing them to pass through the 
signifying wall, thereby undoing the codes” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 361). 
 
This is to say that the signifying chain of the ‘signs of desire’, functions as a transversal line 
made of many signs points or singular points (now that face, then that kiss, then that garden) 
which function is not to represent or to denote one particular thing, but to generate a 
transduction—like a porous membrane—for the molecular flows to pass to the level of the 
molar, in order to decode the individual points of formation or codes. 
 
For if the corresponding chain effectively forms codes, inasmuch as it folds into 
exclusive molar configurations, it undoes the codes by unfolding along a molecular fiber 
that includes all possible figures (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 361). 
 
The movement of the signs of desire goes from the molar formations that were recorded (as 
formed) in the total body of the socius and generates a passage through a molecular fiber that 
undoes the recording of codes. This movement through the molecular does not join flows, 
pushing them to take form in molar objects, persons and landscapes. Instead, it passes them to 
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the side, where they are unrecorded, disjuncted, able to become again potentials: all possible 
figures (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 361). 
 
Now, bringing together the vocabulary of the past architectures of experience with schizoanalytic 
vocabulary, we can say that ‘affective signs’ are ‘signs of desire’. If affective signs are followed, 
they detour attention through the ‘molecular fiber’ that undoes codes through the flows of desire. 
When a movement of experience signals its force of desire, it tells something about the energetic 
investment of desire: how it is circulating, giving feedback to complete forms of thoughts-
feelings or to reverse ones—those which continue passing through un-registrable topologies. 
 
Returning to the ligamentous architecture of experience, somatics modes of moving through the 
world can have a feedback effect on the investments of desire too. Through the segmented link 
of the plant, desk and ankle, an affective sign tells the story of an unconscious investment that is 
more than human, of a non-human sexuality. The reversal of the affective sign, in this moment 
and location, unregisters the disjunctive vectors of the flows of desire. This disjuncted flow can 
reconfigure its unstructured configuration, later again and tell something about others affective 
signs, this time along the place of the left wrist-elbow-shoulder, table, plant and the whole 
garden of the first floor yearning for spring to finally blow. Something of that choreography 
between intensive and extensive movements can ingress a future experience and inflect its mode 
of taking shape. 
 
This is to say that the register of affective signs can tell us something about our human and 
individual unconscious investments: are we by force of habit relating and segmenting, following 
the logic of containments that subtract value energy towards private property and closed group 
enjoyment, or are we intuiting the logic of abstract energies that slips back to the generation of 
spaces which are not configured, with no human identities in mind yet? 
 
One of the challenges to think the affective signs as indices of investments, is that it’s hard to tell 
when an investment could become totalitarian. The only possible choice is to keep releasing the 
flows that are invested in the actual levels of body encounters. This is to say that the actual and 
concrete encounters are relevant. The only possible choice is to keep finding other bodies—there 
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the plant, desk and ankle; a day after, a conversation with two other philosophers about finances; 
and just before this moment, a walk through the streets of Montreal that encountered the bodies 
colored by the purple light of the sunset—so that these bodies acted as surfaces of reflection or 
registration, so that the flows of unconscious investment got feedback from the actual encounter. 
The actual encounter between segmented bodies are surfaces of registration, in that they give 
feedback about the subterranean flows of association. The registration of bodies (as intensive and 
extensive environments) offers the investment of desire, which is trespassed by a rhythm of 
association which is molecular, in the sense of un-registrable, but almost palpable as the ‘surplus 
value’ of the encounter. 
 
Now what is relevant to remark from this simple somatics technique for encounters, is that the 
only way to prevent totalitarian investments is to keep releasing the investments of actual desire 
towards their un-registrable flows. Namely, to believe that from the actual assembled encounter, 
there is a surplus of movement, still and always in a germinal (or embryological) level, which 
keep occurring underway. What is important is to do nothing with that surplus, to value it for 
what it does not do at the moment, so that it can be free and escape with more force, for a 
whiplash to come. That force of escape could prevent a totalitarian becoming (a discriminatory 
subjectivity or any form of rejection towards the world) from ever taking form in a proximal 
actual life. When a next actual life takes form seamlessly without a totalitarian grasp of the 
world, it still brings with it the more-than-actual operations that prevented that totalitarian 
outcome from growing. The more-than actual brings what Whitehead calls the ‘negative 
prehensions’ (Whitehead 1978, 41). Put differently, the more-than-actual operations (negative 
prehensions) will carry with them the antidote of totalitarian becomings, in what otherwise, 
seems to be a seamlessly easy continuation of life. What is released can be relayed to ingress in 
the future as an antidote for dominant becomings. 
 
Paradoxically, the pragmatic of doing nothing with the surplus of abstract desire, is a pragmatic 
that implies a lot of activities are going on, but that those activities are not registered at rational 
and conscious levels. They feel like nothing but they are not just nothing. This pragmatic 
functions as a somatics attunement to the actual movements of conjunctions, by allowing them to 
be released from the conjunction, they become disjuncted, so that new contrasts for intuition can 
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be grown again into conjunction. Intuition grows into modes of actual thinking-feelings (or 
feelings that think with little use of rationality or consciousness). So that future manoeuvres 
across bodies can intuitively find more capacity, or surplus of life, or more doings of abstract 
work, with little actual labor effort done. It is following this frame of thought that somatic 
practices are inseparable from an alternative mode of thinking and feeling. 
 
Lastly, the un-register of affective signs for indices of desire is not just a play of pure 
deterritorialization aiming for the pure destruction of the contained and repressed totalitarian 
figures. This un-register is a plunge to the subterranean desiring-machines, which are already 
planning words, but in levels of perception that are yet uncatchable. 
 
In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari allow art and science to break from causality and infuse 
revolutionary potentialities. In this sense, what counts the most for them is the ‘break’ from the 
causality of the molar aggregates, deterritorializing them. The ‘break’, or the ‘schizz’ has no 
reason, meaning or logical cause, “it came to existence only by means of a desire” (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1983, 413). 
 
This means that the schizz, or the break, is of the desiring machines, and let’s remember that 
desiring machines are conceptualized as connections of connections of connections, through 
breaks and flows. But as Deleuze and Guattari stressed “desire is an exile [but] never an 
individual exile, never a personal desert, but a collective exile and a collective desert” (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1983, 412). What this architecture wants to emphasize is that the technique of the 
‘schizz’ (the schizo-somatics technique) is not for an absolute deterritorialization, but for an 
immersion into the irrational machines. This is an immersion into the dynamic of flows and 
breaks already occurring, already pulsing relations, already undertaking a cartography of 
potential worlds. Worlds which can only become actual if the abstract operations that are 
choreographing them are carefully listened to, so that they become inhabited by a population that 
truly believe in the power of abstract desire and labor, in the power of their creation without 
effort. This is a plunge, again, towards the artful alter-therapeutic potential running underway 
through the abstract desire of the machines. 
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“Undoing the realms of personas and the ego, not on behalf of a pre-oedipal 
undifferentiated, but on behalf of anoedipal lines of singularities, which does not concern 
objects, aims, or sources, but only machinic forms of indices” (Deleuze and Guattari 
1983, 401) [The underline is mine]. 
 
To schizoanalyze does not mean to have a ‘total’ break from the world, but to reinvent what it 
means to have an experience that invents itself with the machinic becoming of the world. This 
machinic experience invents what it means to have an embodied experience, or what in the 
frames of these architectures is called a ‘schizo-somatics’ experience. It is a schizo-somatics 
experience because as we have seen, to schizoanalyze means to follow the ‘indices of love’ 
affectively. Because affect is what makes palpable the shape of the signifying wall—which is 
less a wall but more of a tapestry-like membrane—from where the choreography of flows from 
the molar and the molecular occurs. Again, affect is of the resonance of the membrane’s 
agitation due to the passages from the molar (the actual extensive individual indication) to the 
molecular (the intensive excess of it). Hence, the feeling of the membrane is a distributed feeling 
through many world points or locations. It is a feeling that is not located inside of a body, but it 
is already a passage through extensive points. Moreover, the membrane is a feeling of the 
passage to the intensive excess of all those points. Thus, to feel the membrane at the moment of 
encounter with the ‘indices of love’ means to experiment with a mode of feeling the extensive 
distribution and the intensive passage towards the more-than sensible. To experiment what it 
means to reinvent simultaneous with what it means to feel, and what it means to have a body to 
feel that way. 
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Architecture 9: Diagrammatic Affectability. 
 
 
One of the most complicated features of the affective signs to think about is that they emerge as 
signs of an individual event, and simultaneously they draw links with other events that pop up in 
different places. Moreover, in the midst of the registration of affective signs, even without 
attending to the other events linked with this immanent one, the complicated thing is that these 
signs are not perceived as a single actuality or a single body, but they are perceived as an 
affective arc that resonates through actualities (What was called in the architecture 8 following 
Deleuze and Guattari, a ‘signifying chain’: a membrane-like texture that filters processual 
passages). Lastly, the affective signs are inseparable from an architecture of experience that calls 
forwards the mutation of feelings shaping a body, in other words, they call forwards a mode of 
embodiment. What is special about this mode of embodiment is that is unlimited and transversal. 
It is a dispersed distribution of feelings lured by the thinking physicality of the world. 
 
Due to the amount of brain twisting paradoxes, the aim of this small-scale architecture 9 is to add 
some concepts to move through the paradoxes fluently, and also, to gather up some of the 
characteristics of the ‘affective signs’ encountered in past ‘architectures’. In a way, throughout 
the architectures, a journey can be traced that began with conceptualizing what the ‘architectures 
of experience’ were, and that ended with researching how the ‘affective signs’ operated through 
them.  This ‘architecture 9’ highlights some of the features of the ‘affective signs’ that could 
have been overshadowed by the conceptual focus put in the ‘architectures’. 
 
In a hidden footnote of the book Semblance and Event, Brian Massumi writes about the paradox 
intrinsic to the concept of the ‘subjective form’ by Whitehead in ways that foreshadow answers 
to the modes in which affective signs manifest themselves. For Whitehead, a subjective form of 
experience is a ‘sheer individuality’ which enjoys itself and simultaneously is open to more than 
itself. What is remarkable is that what opens a subjective form of experience to other actualities 
is its capacity for ‘affectability’: the capacity to affect its own subjective form with the more-
than actual. This capacity is what allows for ‘conceptual reversion’, which is the origination of 
the conceptual feelings as an extra something from the physical feelings (what is just being felt 
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through actual entities) (Whitehead 1978, 249). The function of the ‘conceptual reversion’ is to 
‘valuate’ the patterns for nexuses that conform more and less with other past patterns for 
feelings. The degree of conformity between past and present patterns for feelings is that which a 
novel relational pattern (a proposition for feeling) adds to the individual subjective form. 
 
Affectability is the capacity for feelings to open the ‘sheer individual’ subjective form to other 
activities: to the relational patterns of other processes. When affects are theorized as signs, signs 
are perceived as entryways to processes of change (propositional feelings). And the openings are 
transversal, in that they draw resonances with actual and non-actual entities, beyond a linear 
logic of cause and effect. This is why an architecture of experience, as a subjective form, is 
‘causa sui’, and simultaneously open to the resonance of other processes that are (or were) ‘causa 
sui’ of themselves. That’s why the manner in which subjective forms resolve their form taking is 
not based on a final cause (a predestined aim), but in an improvisation with the elements that 
determine their potential. 
 
The only way the inclusion of the more-beyond can belong to the constitution of the 
occasion is in the form of capacities of infolding (and techniques for bequeathing the 
formative activity of the occasion to others – diagrams). The only way capacities can 
infold is if they are at the same time affectabilities (Massumi 2011, 182). 
 
This last quote shows once again that the affective signs are unthinkable without considering 
their diagrammatic quality. The diagrammatic dimension of affect is what opens the individual 
subjective form of experience towards something beyond, towards other relational patterns. With 
Spinoza, we saw that a sign of affect was merely an inadequate idea, a mere registration of 
matter that animates its own mindedness, and that it needed the expression of other affective 
ideas to understand the diagrammatic causes of the initial sign (architecture 7). It was said that 
the adequate ideas were diagrammatic because they expressed the intensive forces of the other 
affects composing the extensive encounter of the inadequate affect. In brief, the adequate ideas 
were diagrammatic because they followed the affective vectors beyond the locus of the actual 
initial affect. The diagrammatic intensive forces followed the interconnection of the affective 
ideas infolding the actual one. 
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The diagram goes beyond the actual. The diagram doesn’t travel in an extensive manner but 
intensively, in that it taps into the patterns of relation (nexuses) giving shape to the actual affect. 
The diagram is what contrasts patterns of relations. The patterns of relation that conform more or 
less with the feelings relations in process of actualizing their form (conceptual valuation). In this 
sense, the diagram is an immanent relation of this singular process taking form, with other 
patterned relations that can be considered as active ‘pastness’. Here, the word ‘pastness’ does not 
refer to a category belonging to metric time: something that happened exactly two days or two 
years ago. This concept of ‘pastness’ refers to the active accompaniment of patterns of relations 
of processes that already took form together with the actualizations generating a present, or 
strictly speaking a ‘presentness’. A match carries the capacity to light a fire in the same manner 
as the active ‘pastness’ in-folds the act. At the moment of lightning fire, the match actualizes the 
‘pastness’ of its nexus of relations with the rough surface of the matchbox. It is a ‘pastness’ for 
and in the act. Whitehead would say that is the continuation of the immediate past in the present. 
 
This is to demonstrate that the diagram does not exist in an empty space from which the actual 
affective encounter shapes a pattern out of nothing. The past patterned nexuses of relations are 
what activate the resolution into a singular dynamic form in the act. In this sense, the patterns of 
relations (nexus) are one with the actual, but they are with the actual at the immanent limit of 
sense perception (more about “nonsensuous perception” below). 
 
The signs of affect (the mere actual affect) are inseparable from the diagram, which is the 
entryway to the pastness of relations. The pastness of relations, in turn, is what enacts the 
affective arc of the subjective form. That’s why the subjective form signals towards the beyond 
of its sheer individuality. Therefore, the actual sign of affect is fanned out through the arc that 
includes its patterns of relations signaling elsewhere than the individual event. To perceptually 
feel the affective signs is to intuit through the diagram the multiplicity of other relations 
resonating with the individual subjective form. Again, the diagram is what keeps the interstices 
open to dimensions of experience alternative to the individual subjective form. And it bears 
repeating that the diagram should not be misunderstood with a stable image, like a map or a 
drawing inside of the head. The diagram is an intuition of a sort of embodiment that opens the 
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containment of what is commonly considered the individual physiological or psychological self. 
The diagram is a transversal thought-feeling of the vectors of relations beyond the focal points of 
conscious perception (nonsensuous perception). 
 
In summary, the first paradox concerning the affective signs let us know that in each architecture 
of experience, there is a singular space of experience selected, and that other spaces elsewhere 
are included in that architecture through the real effects enacted by their patterns of relation, 
patterns of relation which in turn are expressed by the diagrammatic affectability. 
 
The second complication that was noted on the conceptualization of the affective signs, that of 
being registered as an arc across bodies or matters, finds a natural answer through the concept of 
the diagram. Since the diagram operates as the opening for feeling relations in excess of the 
many actualities involved in one event, since they fold nexuses across more-than discrete 
entities. The diagrammatic embodiment is transversal because it is called to feel what can’t be 
felt in the actual occasion of experience, but only grasped beyond sense perception, as an 
intuition that resonates. The body loses its individual ability to feel nexuses that do not feel like 
anything discrete, because the nexuses carry the resonance of patterns that tell about the other 
occasions of experience, not of the time and space of the here and now.  
 
(…) resonance involves a nonsensuous perception by the event under way of its affective 
co-implication with other events—an intuition of their mutual immanence in each other’s 
arising. In Deleuze’s reading of Leibniz, the corresponding concept to the affective 
capacity or resonant infolding is the vinculum (bond) – the “unlocalizable primary link 
that borders the absolute interior” of a monad with its outside; “a supple and adherent 
membrane coextensive with everything inside” that enables the event of experience to 
“recover the other side, not as exterior to the monad, but as the exterior or outside of its 
own interiority (Deleuze 1993, 111) (Massumi 2011, 183). 
 
Massumi moves along the conceptual interconnections between ‘non sensuous perception’, 
‘affect’ and ‘relations’, all the terms introduced thus far in this architecture. He stresses that 
affect is the capacity to resonate with the nonsensuous, which is the force of ‘pastness’ of the 
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nexus of relations arriving in the event of experience from an outside that in fact, is interior—as 
immanent—to it. Nonsensuous perception can be understood as the presence of the nexus of 
relations arriving from other events, a presence at the edge of conscious perception, because the 
relations infold the actual event, but they remain at the limit of actualization themselves. That’s 
why nonsensuous perception is perceived as an affective resonance, as Massumi says, of the co-
implication of the actual event with others. Nonsensuous perception feels like an overall 
atmosphere of the event—like its perceptual tone—carrying the cohabitation with more than one 
time (pastness) and location (other events).  
 
Hence, to intuit a sign of affect is to resonate with the multiple vectors slipping into the 
architecture of experience from elsewhere. Having this nonsensuous resonance in mind is why a 
rich and complicated study on the theory of feelings by Whitehead was done (architecture 2), in 
order to begin to have an intuition of what it means to embody the nonsensuous, and to believe in 
its real effects. And this is why a becoming sensitive to the nonsensuous is also a becoming body 
of the more than physical, a becoming movement, transversally: a schizo-body.  
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Architecture 10: Signs of Power and Signs of Potential. 
 
 
There is something more to be said about the nonsensuous atmosphere of any architecture of 
experience, since the quality of nonsensousness is the entryway towards the artfulness of 
experience (or the creative advance of experience), which is indexed by the affective sign. There 
is something about embodiment resonating with the process of architecturing, being part of the 
same but differential movement. As if an atmospheric mood is a movement of stretching a space 
of experience at the same time as an elasticizing of a body in the shape of a tentacular feeler. The 
perceptual feeling of the affective sign is a movement of process undoing and redoing space, 
body and the patchwork of feelings. All of this as an act. All of this as a performative event. All 
of this as doings immanent to the subjective arc of the experience. But what does it mean for a 
human to perform in the event of a subjective form architecting itself, having in mind that what 
is happening includes a dimension of nonsensousness beyond? It means that the intuition of the 
affective sign is a blurring of the contour of the capacity of the human to feel, to be felt by 
something else, something alien that is more than one thing, but a multiplicity. 
 
In What Animal Teach Us About Politics, Brian Massumi describes the situation of animal play 
of combat, giving us some information to understand the connection between signs of affect and 
the performance of the event. Massumi conceptualizes the concept of ‘pure sign of affect’ in 
conversation with Gregory Bateson who calls this sign ‘pure mood signs’, so … there is 
something moody about these signs: 
 
When we say “pure” in relation to a sign, it can only mean a sign whose sense is 
inseparable from its performance, and thus whose expression is inseparable from its 
content. Pure signs are nondenotative signs that refer to nothing outside their own 
enactment, that are one with the enactment of their meaning. Pure signs are pure events, 
simultaneously reflexive (metacommunicational) and relational (occasioning a mutual 
inclusion of levels, forms, and arenas of activity) (Massumi 2014, 25). 
 
Following this paragraph, it can be said that an affective sign is also inseparable from its 
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performance. It indexes an atmosphere in the process of its own enactment. This is to say that the 
sign emerges out of an enactment and indexes a quality immanent to it. Moreover, what performs 
is the event, not a person, though a person can be included. William James would say that what 
perform is the activity of the event, the “somethings doing” (James 2003, 84). 
 
What a pure sign of affect is, in the context of What Animal Teach Us About Politics, is the 
‘ludic gesture’ (Massumi 2014, 4) of a fight between animals. The performance happens in the 
subjective form of an event: the play of combat between two animals. What the ‘ludic gesture’ 
does is to signal to the other dimension of combat, which is that of the dimension of play ‘as if’ 
the animals were in a real combat. The ludic gesture, as an affective sign, makes doubly felt the 
performative event of play of combat: on one hand with the affect of ‘fear associated with the 
dangerous situation of combat and in the other hand with the arcing affect of a conditional ‘as if’ 
this were a real combat. 
 
The atmospheric mood of the event of play signals to an extra dimension of experience that 
doubles the affect of fear with something else, that is the ‘as if’, which opens the event to the 
creativity of the acting relations between the animals. The atmospheric mood is nonsensuous 
enough to double the feel for fear with something less categorizable in terms of feeling, which is 
the affective arc of play ‘as if’. This is to say that what qualifies the atmospheric mood as an 
entryway to the potential of creativity is its nonsensuous dimension of affectability. Because 
what it is felt nonsensuously are processes transpiring the occasion of combat, bringing the 
outside of it, into the midst of its own limit capacity. Whitehead would say that the nonsensuous 
processes are the influx of the ‘other’ (the double) into the self-identity of the event of 
perception, in this case, the self-identity of the categorical emotion of ‘fear’. 
 
The present moment is constituted by the influx of the other into that self-identity which 
is the continued life of the immediate past within the immediacy of the present 
(Whitehead 1967, 181). 
 
Massumi specifies that the signs that only indicate to the affect of fear are ‘signs of power’. They 
indicate the imperatives of the situation, how a situation of combat habitually organizes the 
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feelings around. There are other signs, those that indicate the manner in which the situation plays 
with a quality that is ‘extra’ from the habitual. These are the ‘signs of potential’, such as the sign 
of the ‘ludic gesture: as if’ (Massumi 2014, 41). 
 
Taking into account this conceptualization, we can say that as a human, when one is attending to 
the affective signs, one needs to enter into a dimension of experience where the activities 
perform themselves and demand our individual agency to plunge into the affective capacity of 
the subjective form of the event, to become an ‘agencement’ (assemblage). 
 
We can say that there are a variety of ways to register the affective signs. The subjective form of 
an architecture of experience is composed by the movement of multiple activities—some more 
actual than others—that include, but are not limited to, a mode of spacing, embodying and 
feeling. Since, in this particular architecture, what most suffuses the conceptual landscape is the 
idea of a nonsensuous atmospheric mood, let’s see what are the modes to register the affective 
signs through this ambiance. 
 
Between a series of slopes in the midst of the forest of the Mont-Royal park, intermittent 
luminous reflections, humid odors and distributed sounds dragging tactility all-around, sum up 
into a relative serene atmosphere. The affective arc is somehow relatable, a tranquil though 
vibrant ambient tone. But there is something extra: there are interstices from which a 
nonsensuous mood permeates and mixes with the tranquil atmosphere. The overlapping of a 
categorical affective mood with another one that feels very present but shakes containment with 
a soft cadence is what enriches the architecture of experience with some kind of potential, with 
something that signals that thinking is being done through the material feelings around. 
 
What is the technique to keep registering the affective signs of potential, so that more mattered 
thinking exceeds the habitual and the local event? So that mattered thinking could be continued 
at the limit of perception? This could be a technique to transversally follow the unknown of the 
atmospheric mood, dancing through the tranquil known quality of it, to slip into that feeling that 
does not know how to feel, while blurring the experience of what it takes to embody.  What is 
relevant is to attend to the atmospheric mood. Wherever you are, don’t think that you are 
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surrounded by inert things. Plug into the space through its atmosphere. To register an atmosphere 
is the first strategy to challenge the limits of the habitual feelings and the separation of the body 
senses. The second strategic step is to actively forget the atmosphere, to free it from the function 
of consciousness to attach it to an individual time and location. 
 
Walk again through the Mont-Royal park. Move through the relative serene atmosphere 
permeated by a nonsensuous mood. Let the felt attention to diversify and change the tone when 
following the interstitial mood, as if the tone of feeling could drip through the plane of attention, 
figuring a kind of nonsensuous texture. Allow that felt-thought to unveil its orientation, let it be a 
choreographic movement. Keep this process for a while. Bring it with you all the way to the 
streets. At one point be okay with forgetting all of it. Something happened. That architecture 
choreographed a mode of affectability that is now ready to work out the entryways of the more 
than actual entities of another event. Allow that process to become a more-than perceptible 
process that keeps at bay the ossification of the entryways of the novel in the events of life. 
Believe in the schizoanalytic effects of the artful movements of experience that are nonsensuous. 
Believe in the modes of embodiment that are schizzed, transversal, that make the body a 
platform for schizosomatics. At each actual step, let the body be a leakage of choreographed 
processes of the beyond. 
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Architecture 11: Renee Gladman. 
 
 
Renee Gladman writes about architectures of experience. Every one of her sentences designs an 
architecture while it’s read. As if the reader will find the architecture together with the writer’s 
thoughts. Her words seamlessly fold the qualities of environments, bodies and daily actions. 
When the noun of the sentence seems to be the color of buildings, a sudden but soft passage 
displaces it towards the moment a word gets caught in a breath. 
 
She explains her novel Houses of Ravicka as: 
 
a layering of multiple concepts of space within 120-page expanse. These spaces took 
shape as time, topography, tones of feelings, signals for events, figures crossing, and 
were like folds convulsing simultaneously through language. To write was to wander 
through these folds, to try to see space as each of these things, always shifting, undoing, 
and to make the texts I built through this seeing vibrate (Gladman 2017, 146). 
 
In the afterword of this novel, Gladman talks about a writer’s block that lasted for almost ten 
years, delaying the publication of the novel from its beginning in 2008 to 2017. The story of 
House of Ravicka follows the life of Jakobi, a ‘Comptroller’ in the city of Ravicka, whose job is 
to take measurements of buildings, keeping track of the subtle changes and movements over 
time. He also supports the topographical alignment between a visible or hard building and its 
invisible counterpart which normally existed in another part of the city. Throughout the story 
Jakobi is looking for the visible building 96 that is aligned at a distance with the invisible 
building number 32, but 96 is nowhere to be found. Hence, Jakobi can’t track invisible building 
32 because its companion in alignment, building 96, has disappeared. 
 
Gladman explains that the writing progression ground to a halt, because she, as her character 
Jakobi, did not know where building 96 was, and did not know how to find it. She returned to the 
book in 2015, with a new relationship to architecture. She transformed this relation with 
architecture by changing the writing of the character’s experience from being around and outside 
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architectures, to the moment in which they learned how to enter them; “no longer running my 
hand along the exteriors or standing outside looking up at the verticality of them, but inside now, 
occupying space that is not visible from the other side of the wall” (Gladman 2017, 149). 
 
What Gladman found was not merely a metaphorical way to describe the inside architecture of 
buildings; she found a technique to move with writing that allowed her to shift her architectural 
experience in order to be capable of being folded by the architecting of sentences.  The technique 
that she found was one that curved the movement of buildings, bodies and words onto one plane.  
 
Apart from the prologue, in the novel itself, she describes with more specificity what the change 
of the relation with architecture consisted of:  
 
What I’m saying is that it began to be clear to me that some hard buildings were 
embodying a material state that was neither exclusively hard nor invisible (…) These 
were the categories I had to negotiate: there were the exclusively hard buildings that were 
migrating; there were the invisible buildings, which mostly stayed where they were 
(though obviously changing their architecture depending on which hard buildings were 
laid against them); and newly added was this mutant strand of buildings that wavered 
between visibility and invisibility. How did I know it wavered if I saw it when it was both 
visible and not? Again, because when it was visible the lines that determined its 
boundaries were not luminous (Gladman 2017, 131). 
 
The change of the relation with architecture was a change in a mode of perception, one that could 
now perceive an architecture of experience that was intermediary between visibility and 
invisibility. It can be said that what became important for Gladman was not so much to indicate 
at a distance, the movement of passages between invisible and visible architectures, but to feel 
the activities reflecting themselves that occur and fabricate the very intermediary space for those 
passages. The mutant architectures became not only passages between two limits of human 




As with the concept of the ‘transversal’ in Deleuze and Guattari (architecture 5C), this 
propositional site implies a mode of embodiment. One which uses the body as a form of 
attunement with a processual space, rather than making the body the central subject of attention. 
A body that is not the main character of the story, but a ghost animated by the architectures 
shaping themselves. And the ghost proceeds to be embodied via the activity of listening to the 
murmur between the two limits modes for experience to be architectured, hardly and invisibly. 
Where murmuring happens is also where the intermediary space recalibrates the contrast that 
elasticizes the distances and proximities between hard and translucent qualities. The qualities 
stretched while shaping the space are what imbue the ghosted body with the capacity to attune to 
reflections, duplications and reverberations. Architecture and bodies get shaped at the instant in 
which qualitative effects determine their topology, or typology. 
 
You’d sit on the rocks to look down over the water, and at certain times of the day the 
surface of the water would reflect images of your thinking. Shapes would emerge from 
my seeing, shapes resembling structures for living: large squares sitting on top of 
rectangles, rectangles cut through with lines, tiny squares in a stack towering but lying 
flat on the water (Gladman 2017, 132). 
 
The qualitative events shaping bodies and, haunting the intermediary architectures in their 
cohabitation—in their inseparable circuits of relation to bring each other into actuality—are for 
Gladman, ‘structures for living’. They are modes of living going on, while architecting, while 
ghosting bodies so that their feelings are haunting the space, rather than being distinct from it. 
The body is inseparable from its taking architectural shape together with the feelings that haunt 
it. To haunt is to irremediably inhabit the space in formation, immediately and immanently. To 
haunt is to ghost the body with the architectural feelings. It is to affirm the irresolvable character 
of the intermediary architectures that live through ghosted feelings. It is to live because of 
ghosts; it is to speculate on modes of living because of them. 
 
First, I left my invisible structure and then I walked. No, first I breathed to descend my 
structure and then I set out to walk. My immediate neighbors did not seem to notice that 
my living differed from theirs in that my flat of rooms existed in a geometric 
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impossibility. My rooms opened and closed depending on how air moved through my 




When I’m at home, everywhere I stand is the center space, a space surrounded by objects, 
and no matter how far I walk in one direction, the room comes and settles itself around 
me, until I breathe and am in another room, the room for sleeping, the room where I draw 
(Gladman 2017, 139). 
 
There is an indistinguishable continuation between a mode of living, acting and architecting with 
this newly found ghosted body. To walk acts the breathing and the generation of a room. Or the 
room begins to ask the body to breathe and walk, to soon shape its hardness towards a half 
translucent architecture. Hard and translucent are elements in incessant murmur that whisper 
feelings to animate ghosted bodies into life. The body can be itself, without being accompanied 
by any ghost, and as it is asked by the room to walk, the feelings ghost it through a dynamic of 
reverberations which is at the same time a distributed structure for living. Or, the sentence can 
begin to be written through the perspective of a hard angle, and as it unfolds into action gets 
ghosted by the pull of translucent feelings and makes it ghostly. 
 
In the book Calamities, the body for Gladman gets a function other than being something to 
ghost between architectures. It gets the function of being a sort of ‘affective sign’ as well (as 
described in architectures 1, 7, 9 and 10). In fact, ‘scarring’ is the name Gladman gives to the 
event that resembles an ‘affective sign’. 
 
The ‘scarring’ is a sign of the interrelation of independent facts in which the body finds in the 
world the beginning of an expression that Gladman denominates act of location. When the body 
finds in the world the beginning of an act occurring in a specific location—which is indeed the 
concept of the ‘event’—and expresses it, the expression functions an emergent conjunction that 
signals the interrelation of the independent facts being expressed. And thus, this is an expression 
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of the event in which the body is involved and expressed by it, not an expression of the body, but 
for the body. 
 
I wanted to express, within the object world, a series of acts of location that needed only 
the body (and the world) in that moment of expression. Yet I also wanted to find the 
variables of the expression as independent facts in the world and, between them, to 
recognize some form of visible scarring that would indicate not only that I found those 
facts but their interrelation as well. The scarring would act like a body (though not mine), 
which one approached with a world that functioned like a name but didn’t have to be the 
name that the body put on for a time then took off to hand back to one. It needed to be a 
name that could be worn by most bodies, because the idea was that you’d find scarring 
everywhere, between every gesture and the space that manifested around it. I was trying 
to see location the way I saw wind blowing the small branches of the city. I tried to have 
it sync up with the incessant sparrowing I heard (Gladman 2016, 69). 
 
Scarring is not just an instant sign of an event (how an actuality of experience emerges in a 
location), but a recurring apparition of the event in other events with similar factual patterns. 
What architectures of experience haunt are not only bodies, but also the events folding those 
bodies. Certain facts like the blowing of the small branches happened and scarred the 
architecture of experience for it to again express the interrelation in other forms, now that 
sparrowing, then the imperceptible agitation of water. 
 
That the body moves in the city while becoming scarred by the recurring interrelations of facts, 
means that a body is not a containment inside itself (maybe the containment understood as the 
limit of the skin or the strength shaping the ego) but a transition of the world’s scars. The scars 
are felt relations of the facts of the world that impinge and entice a body to become something 
else. They are a platform haunting the body so that it becomes a different composition of feelings 
than what it is—feelings understood here through Whitehead, as ‘taking accounts’ of the 
processes of the environment. 
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Therefore, to become a body is to be sensitive to the scarring of the world matters, or to be 
sensitive to the feelings of the relations that recur in time, so that the rumbling of the small 
branches is not something that just happens, or that happened once, but that happens now 
because it revisits the billions of time that it already happened. 
 
An act was everything and location was everywhere, which made the whole thing hard to 
break down, but when you said “acts of location”, you didn’t think all possible things at 
once. Rather, you narrowed in one feeling, a specific event that made a boundary in time. 
(Gladman 2016, 70). 
 
What can be considered an aesthetic walk in the city, that feels the scars of interrelated process 
so that their embodiment invites a process of becoming more sensitive, is also a political gesture. 
The scars are not only a poetic sign of beautifully felt everyday experiences, but also an index of 
the breaks in experience in which the transversal links between disparate facts are most difficult 
to be sensitized, due to an environment in which the embodiment habits generated can’t register 
the transversal. Breaks throughout the facts of experience—those branches, those sparrows, those 
rhythms of thoughts and breathings—are everywhere, but not every place and location hosts a 
platform for environments that asks embodiment to feel the link along the breaks. In such a way 
that the rumbling of the small branches does not link to a thought on sparrows which in turn 
shifts a rhythm of breathing-thinking. The aesthetic gesture of becoming sensitive to the scars of 
the breaks that compose the actuality of worlds, is simultaneously a political gesture. It is an 
aesthetic and political gesture because proposes a mode of linking —of grouping or 
populating—what otherwise would be a scattered world on the hands of environmental platforms 
that produces habits to recognize only individual, separated and instant facts. 
 
Renee Gladman’s writer’s block was not only an aesthetic problem, but a political one. The 
impossibility of inhabiting a house of translucent qualities that was beside hard buildings, 
correlated with the impossibility to find techniques to survive a political climate that forced the 
bodies in one habitual pattern of individual living without disclosing the polyvalent relations 
with the houses surrounding it. The political atmosphere used a force upon bodies applied 
through environments without disclosing the plasticity of transmissibility of the very 
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environment. As if the environmental force would hit the body to instantly close the angles from 
which the hit emerged. Or, as if the story told about the body needed to be the story of an 
individual so that the hit could be strongly felt, while the forces choreographing the act of hitting 
were multiple and more than individual, but remained hidden. 
 
But the revelation (…) was not only about finding entry into architecture and developing 
notions for composing interior space; it was, on a profound level, a level on which one 
survives the atrocities of the political and social present, a way for me to put a map as to 
where I am in the world. (…)  I understand where the house n.96 was. It is where I am, 
where many of us probably feel that we are: somewhere where the boundary between 
places has broken. The reason this is not an annihilating recognition is because the place 
where the boundary has broken is also a place of refracting light, of impossible angles, of 
beautiful breathing presences gathering, of music becoming language becoming lines 
becoming dance, the dance of the angles and light of spaces, and all of this changing all 
the time that there is too much to say about it, too much to see to want to stop seeing” 











Schizosomatics: Un-Archived Notes. 
 
 
Purpose: make the body more sensitive to differences, to the interstices of sense perception, 
thoughts, feelings and the desires that are pre-given by a dominant social production. Again. 
Purpose: a frame for politics thought as the resistance of the habitual by way of tapping into the 
continuity of ‘a life’, with its chaos of connections and disconnections. Remember again. 
Purpose: resistance = oscillations. Stepping aside of how physiology organizes sense perception. 
Experiment with it. Again.  Remember one more time. Purpose: philosophy + somatics = to give 
accounts of the interstices of experience. One more time. Experience. Again. Purpose: one and 
many multiplicities: to experience the multiplicity of being one body. To feel all the background 
of what it seems to be ‘one experience’: differentiation, impersonal, event. One more time. 
Again. Purpose. Therapy: finding the qualitative time to be uncompleted. To feel the 
embodiment of the one and the many and to stay with the pole that it is needed at the moment. 
To find a way to move with grace. Again. Therapy? Again. Alter-Therapeutics. One more time. 
Purpose: making the body movement a production machine of the figural (diagrams) that are not 
‘absorbed’ back into the body or into any ‘axiomatic’ (anatomy, ego). Again. Instead, the 
machine just keeps on producing relations between movements without recognizing/reflecting 
about their effective use. Instead. One more time. Schizz the body’s movement productions 
towards pure processual figures (diagrams). Again. One more time. And. Remember. Purpose? 
Play: as certain quality of attention distant from the quality of efficient labor. Jumpiness, 
steadiness, sleepiness. Again? One more time. Purpose? Play.  
 
Prototype. Knots of thought. Mayra Morales (philosopher, choreographer) and myself ask 
invitees to bring an irresolvable problem in their performing, somatic or theoretic practices to 
collectively unknotted it with the participants at Usine C. Knots. Thoughts. Knots. And thoughts. 
Not presentational but processual. Not. Knots. Not as tiny traumas. Vectors. Productive 
processes. Notice the pool of techniques already carried by the participants to unknot the knot. 
Not presentational. Not prepared. Let the participants propose what to do with the knots. Not the 
invitee. What knots happens. What happens knots. What happens happens.  
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Prototype. Somatic warm up for conceptual work. Somatic work out for conceptual warm up. 
Activated with Body Mind Centering techniques by myself together with props, materials and 
dresses by Ramona Benveniste at SenseLab. Cartographies of attention to choreograph oneself 
around the somatic reading of philosophy. Attention as the almost of action. Almost. Warm up. 
Work out. Work. Out. Contact. Concrete and virtual. Zones. Out. Word out. Words. From 
cellular transmission to feelings transmission. Transmission as landscape. There is no body only 
feelings. Transmit. Read. Transmit. Somatics as transmission for reading. Reading as 
transmission for somatics. Forty minutes. Max. Micro practices. Time unfold effects. Effects 
unfold time. After time. After time. After.  
 
Prototype. Cartographies of the immediate. Workshop lead by Christoph Brunner and myself at 
the HZT (Hochschule Tanz Zentrum) BA program ‘Dance, Context, Choreography’. 
Cartographies of the immediate movements. Cartographies of the everyday. Cartographies of the 
everyday carried by somatics practices. Somatics practices carried through the everyday. 
Everyday somatics practices as pedagogies for the performing arts. Missing links. Missing. 
Links. Missing links to break open habitual modes of closing up experience. Links as the force of 
relations to reproduce beyond humans. Links.  Missing. Links missing to release the life of 
experience to go on by its own.  
 
Prototype. Intervals of perception. Feeling the transmission of the room as the landscape 
populated by intervals in sense perception. Writing the feelings into the room. Writing the room 
into the feelings. Writing the concepts as feelings. Feeling the concepts as writings. Philosophy 
as somatics. Somatics as philosophy. Micro practices. Short writing sessions. Interval when the 
room loses momentum to write. Interval. 
 
Prototype. Architectures of experience. Plunging through the transmission of feelings as 
landscapes.  Transmission as landscapes. There is no body only feelings that transmits. There is 
no feeling only feelings that transmits. Landscapes as transmission. Transmission as experience. 
Experience as architectures. Architectures as experiences. Writing the feelings into architectures. 
Writing the architectures into feelings. Writing the transmission. Transmitting the writing. Write 
if it architects. Architect until it writes. Architect.  
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Schizosomatics: Getting (Almost) There. 
 
 
When the ‘micro’ is the activity to find elbow room of the portions of experience then studying 
the immediate movement of experience is equivalent to attuning to what it means to feel the 
micro. The ‘room’ in gaining more ‘elbow’ movement is the ecology of experience that the 
‘micro’ gestures towards. The room has a dance, a physicality and thus a way of carrying its own 
somatics practices. The movements’ doings of the room — the spreading of luminosity and 
levity, through windows and a lamp, crisscrossed by the positing of snow in the garden and 
balcony— are the practices of the room’s somatics. If the human inhabits the room and feels like 
registering the somatics practices going on, then she needs to calibrate a sensitivity to the micro. 
To think-feel the micro elbows for movements of the room, the human is asked by the ecology of 
experience to become micro herself; think-feel the somatic practices with no divide from the 
room and its very needed elbows. Less to think-feel the room and its elbows as being absorbed 
into the human. More like ejecting herself immediately through the elbowing movements of the 
room. More like becoming a part of the ecology of movements of ejecting, or crisscrossing, or 
positing of the room, elbowing. When movement is of the elbowing of the room, there is not a 
stable position to register. Immediately the ejecting, holding, curving become the register 
allowing the elbow room for the portions of experience.  
 
To be in a room through the ‘schizz’ is to register the micro gestures of experience elbowing to 
move more. The ‘schizz’ is the practice that ejects the human from the movements of the 
ecology of experience. That the room has micro gestures that can be registered through the 
‘schizz’ does not mean that the gestures are small. The ‘schizz’ is a practice to eject the stable 
perception of the human body through the activities of the ecology of experience that are 
ongoing. To schizz is to move immediately —almost all at once— through the arcs of the 
activities of the ecology of experience, across its many elements. Thus, to ‘schizz’ is not to fall 
into a small portion of experience, but to be launched through many elements at once, via the 
arcs of activities such as positing, hanging and encompassing. And then again, the ‘schizz’ 
follows immediately the movements of experience while simultaneously registering the elbow 
room cultivated by the ecological doings. In short, to practice the ‘schizz’ is to immediately 
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move with the arcs of experiences and simultaneously become sensitive to the elbow room 
gained by the ecological doings. Elbowing the rooming for more capacious movement to come.  
 
To follow the room through ‘somatics’ is a practice that reminds one that what is happening in 
the ecology of movement is already fully populated by activities.  The arcs of activities pulling 
and rejecting the elements in the room happen through the ‘somatic practices’ of the ecology. 
They are active doings, operating through the physicality of the room and improvising qualitative 
movements in excess of that very physicality. The excessive qualities are the style in which the 
physicality of doings surprise with an unexpected quality: the movement of the room sinks and 
disperses due to the echoing of sounds, although the vertical things standing over the floor seem 
to be pretty quiet.  To follow the room with a somatic sensitivity means as well to follow the arcs 
of activities of the room through feelings. It means to follow through feeling and to consider as 
feelings the very arc of activities moving their elbow rooming; feeling thought as movements in 
excess of their physicality.  
 
Schizosomatics, as a concept and as a practice, slowly took shape out of the compost of 
prototypes of workshops, events and studies accumulated during the last five years. Before it 
took shape, it was the intuition of a thought, a feeling and a doing. This intuition gyred around 
the careful dosification of Body Mind Centering techniques through environments and bodies, 
the transposition of process and affect philosophy into the research of somatics practices and the 
various collaborations with intellectuals and artists to bring into feeling half-baked questions. In 
sum, if it took this long to get to talk about schizosomatics in this thesis, that is due to the fact 
that its coming into conceptual and practical shape was a journey of mostly non-transparent 
processes for language. This journey took its time to be able to follow those non-transparent 
processes and to translate them into a language with a minimum amount of consistency to 
transmit them.  
 
Schizosomatics came into existence through the proposition of visual artist and somatic 
practitioner Csenge Kolzsvári to organize at the SenseLab a series of workshops by inviting 
people working around notions of the body, performing and visual arts. The aim was to activate 
one more time the previous encounters around somatics, performing and visual arts such as the 
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Knots of Thought, Movements of Thought and the Somatic Warm Up for Conceptual Work. 
Since at the time in the SenseLab we have been working on the notion of a schizo-economy (an 
alternative economy based in abundance rather than in scarcity), and the questions of the ‘schizz’ 
have been brought forwards regularly —influenced by the theories of Deleuze and Guattari— the 
most precise way to name the workshops series that came to mind was schizo-somatics. The 
composted experimentations of the past prototypes began to take shape in the curation of the 
workshops, without any of us being directly conscious of it. The intuition that the practices 
shared needed to be carried with a sensitivity to the micro (to the intervals of perception), in 
order to move with the arcs of activities already operating in the ecology of the room (the 
architectures of experience), became one of the propositions for curating the workshops. The 
feeling of somatics activities considered as passageways through and of the ecology of 
experience, beyond the containment of somatics inside the anatomy of the human body, became 
one of the research questions that arose along the series of encounters.  The strongest intuition 
was that the intensive study of process and affect philosophy at the SenseLab needed a ‘somatics 
platform’ to multiply the experiential angles from where to learn. In this sense, schizosomatics 
can be thought as the way in which embodiments calibrate the movement speed of the concepts 
populating an ecology— usually de-accelerating the speed of the conceptual force through 
friction. And in turn, the conceptual movements of the ecology —which are the improvisations 
of the qualities in excess of the givens of the physicality—can be regarded as that which breaks 
open embodiment beyond the human body and ejects it towards the commingling with and 
through the arcs of activities of the ecology.  
 
What comes next is a description of how the composted past half-baked ideas grounded the 
shared experiences during one year of the schizosomatics workshops series at SenseLab. As it is 
mentioned below, the aim of this next section is to articulate the coming together of the 
schizosomatics pragmatics with the schizoanalytic ideas of Felix Guattari that had been 
populating the SenseLab since its beginnings.  
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Schizosomatics: Workshops Series. 
 
 
From Januray to December of 2018 Csenge Kolozsvári and myself organized the schizosomatics 
workshop series at the SenseLab. Every second Wednesday of the month—if not every 
Wednesday—performing artists, theoreticians, visual artists, and poets, among others, were 
invited to activate a session. At the beginning of the series, the participants were given a short 
verbal explanation about what the ‘schizz’ and the ‘somatic’ meant. The ‘schizz’ was explained 
with Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptual frames, as an interruption that operated a passageway 
through the multiplicity of experiential planes—instead of staying in only one plane of 
experience, usually foregrounded as a normal or typical mode of experience. The ‘somatic’ was 
described as the affective swarming of the planes of experience that included the body —and its 
typical containment in a physiological or psychological category—but that was not limited to it. 
These descriptions were meant to launch a collective and practice-based speculation, rather than 
to teach how those concepts should be deployed or felt. The people invited to activate the 
sessions were asked to bring an unfinished practice (a ‘schizzed practice’). By a schizzed 
practice, we were referring to a technique that was not yet complete. One of the examples given 
was that of a meditation practice. Although infinite and presumably unbounded in regard to its 
effects, a meditation practice might be considered a complete technique since the methods to 
lead a meditation practice are mostly known and well settled. Instead what was asked of the 
activators, was to bring a technique-in-process, a technique that would be less than 80 percent 
crafted. If possible, the activators were invited in pairs or in trios, so that the technique would be 
‘schizzed’ by their partial and multiple perspectives. The technique needed to be ‘schizzed’ to 
carry the capacity of moving with the contingencies of the event —the time quality carried by the 
group of participants and the atmosphere and vitality surrounding that particular day— rather 
than imposing the manner to move towards a pre-determined form of learning. To ask for a 
‘schizzed’ technique was to ask the invitee to enter the event through the manners in which the 
event was already doing something, through its multiple activities, even before it started. It can 
be said that the event offered the manner to enter, move and exit the workshop session, rather 
than the invitees or participants. In this way, the ‘schizzed’ technique functioned as a way to 
enter the event with a kind of compass that could orient towards the desires expressed by the 
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trans-individual ecology of experience. The ‘schizzed’ technique operated as a tool to become 
sensitive to the care for the event. This gesture shifted the mode of attunement towards the 
collective, that is, if the collective is understood, again, not only as the group of people but as the 
temporal, spatial and affective qualities of the ecology in excess of the people. Lastly, the 
participants were told that the experimentation of the schizz at SenseLab was part of a larger 
group of study around the schizo-economy (an alter-economy based in abundance and trans-
individuality), the anarchive (techniques to archive seeds of potential, capable of activating 
future and alter-events) and the ‘spazze’ (the material platform to play in order to code the digital 
anarchive).  
 
Now, the aim of this section is to connect some of the procedures employed during the 
schizosomatics session with schizoanalytic concepts by Felix Guattari, in order to enrich some of 
the procedures shared during the schizo sessions. The concepts are not used to categorize the 
schizosomatic experiences. The concepts are vectors that follow the movement-moving between 
the various elements of the procedures, that index the limit of the diagrammatic plane of the 
earth, or plane of experimentation. In short, the concepts are used as a launching platform to 
allow us keep on experimenting with what a schizosomatic practice can be. 
 
As was previously mentioned, for Guattari the schizz is an operation of interruption, or break of 
a flow that disconnects and reconnects the flows from one machine of desire to another. Here 
again, we have to remember that desire is not the intention of the subjective person, but is a 
machinic desire, in the sense that is an abstract force that assembles its consistency through 
connections between several flows: here this social media input, there that meteorological 
condition, and on the other side certain habits incorporated through social groups. Abstract 
machinic desire is the capacity of the montage of the techniques— because of their genealogy of 
relations (interval 3C)—for assembling heterogeneous elements, beyond the containment inside 
individual and concrete components.  
 
Therefore, the schizz is the operation that re-energizes the relay of patterned techniques for 
relation, that give consistency to the production of machinic assemblages. In turn, these machinic 
assemblages produce types of subjectivities. Now, carrying this machinic frame of thought 
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further, Guattari intends to show that subjectivity is not contained inside of the human self. For 
Guattari, subjectivity is a field of transversal relations beyond the subject-object and essence-
materiality divides. Subjectivity creates worlds (existential territories) and modes of perceptions 
(incorporeal universes) that are transversal (as multi-linear and multi-componential) and that, as 
we will later see, can be ‘dominant’ or ‘liberating’. The schizz is what re-energizes the 
relational-transversal field of experience beyond the binary divides, and gets in contact with what 
Guattari conceptualizes as ‘chaosmosis’.  
 
The concept of chaosmosis stands for the processual force of ‘chaos’ and ‘complexity’ enmeshed 
in every production of subjectivity. The traditional idea of the subject contained in its own 
psychosomatic self-identical category is undone in a “massive and immediate ensemble of 
contextual diversity, a fusion of undifferentiated, or rather de-differentiated whole” (Guattari 
1995, 80). At the same time, this experience of de-differentiation is the node of heteropoetic 
(more-than ‘autopoetic’, open to the heterogeneity of relations) processes, that entangles 
existential territories and incorporeal universes, full of virtual potentiality. The opening of the 
contained subject towards the force of chaosmosis operates as a passageway to a field for 
creative processes. 
 
With the concept of ‘chaosmosis’, Guattari is critiquing traditional psychoanalysis. He differs 
from psychoanalysis in that it refers this chaosmotic processes—full of virtual elements in the 
formation of the real—to universal referents such as the Imaginary of neurosis and the Symbolic 
of normality (Guattari 1995, 78). For Guattari, the virtual potential of chaosmosis is immanent to 
the concrete elements of expression of the actual. It is not in a separate and unchangeable 
transcendent universe of reference. It is a mode of experience, capable of registering the 
ontological diverse texture of the enmeshment of virtual (as potential) brewing the real. 
Moreover, Guattari also indicates the production of dominant subjectivities that pathologize 
‘schizophrenic’ processes, against their produced context of the normopathic. In Guattari’s 
words, “there are schizo processes that traverse society and not only through psychopathology, 
but also through invention and all of those situations in which one encounters a rupture with 
dominant forms of signification” (Guattari 2015, 35). 
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When the schizo processes re-plug into to the complex and chaotic forces of chamosis, they re-
energize the function of what Guattari calls ‘partial enunciators’. The ‘partial enunciators’ are 
what enunciate (as in express) nascent subjectivities. Nascent in the sense that they are partial 
expressions distributed along transversal planes, not yet completely enunciated by one 
assemblage of enunciation (more about this soon). What is most remarkable about the partial 
enunciators is that they operate through an aesthetic quality that is inherent to chaosmosis. This 
is to say that there is an aesthetic quality operating not only beyond the individual category of the 
subject, but also beyond the category of the here and now (the actual). The aesthetic quality of 
chaosmosis, carried by the partial enunciators, moves transversally through timelines too. The 
aesthetic quality can modify an experience of the future. The partial enunciator can generate 
what later in this text will be described as an ‘activation contour’. The partial enunciator detaches 
an aesthetic quality forming a dynamic pattern (contour) and, if the future conditions of an event 
are similar —such as the dynamic feeling in which elements come into relation—it can be called 
forth again and infuse (activate) the way in which that future event takes shape. Another 
remarkable feature of the partial enunciator is that it expresses the ‘autonomy’ of the aesthetic 
operation. What the partial enunciator does, it does it beyond the agency of a single entity. In 
French, the word for assemblage is ‘agencement’, which gives a better feeling about the 
autonomy of the partial enunciator. The autonomy of the partial enunciator is an autonomy 
generated by the transversal passage of a multiplicity of entities. Lastly, the autonomous partial 
enunciator is a detachment from an actual composition. It detaches from the actual and carries—
in potential— something of the multiple ontological texture from which emerged.  
 
Guattari describes the function of the partial enunciator through the context of art. He says that 
“there is a transference of subjectivation operating between the author and the contemplator of a 
work of art (Guattari 1995, 14)”. He adds that this operation results “through the device of an 
isolating or separating function, of such a kind that the expressive material becomes formally 
creative (Guattari 1995 14)”. In this example, we can see that the partial enunciator is a fragment 
of content that detaches from the formal determinism of the art material, from the intention of the 
author and the expectation of the public. It becomes a detachment that is in excess of the actual 
elements in constellation (art work, author, consumer) and, at the same time, carries the potential 
for further creativity. One more time, this is to say that the partial enunciator carries an aesthetic 
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force to transform and generate future modes to come in relation. It bears repeating that this 
aesthetic force is not just a simple ‘excess’ overflowing the actual—like a decoration on top of 
the imperatives elements conditioning the present situation— but is a lived index following the 
ontological texture of the autonomous creativity of experience (not of the human, not of the art-
object).  
 
Guattari links the autonomisation of the partial enunciator to aesthetics in order to enlarge the 
psychoanalytic frame that detaches the partial enunciator from the subjective unconscious. 
Guattari wants to go beyond the concept of the unconscious as being a property of the human 
subject. For him, the unconscious is machinic, and the machinic assemblages are traversed by the 
aesthetic movements of chaosmosis. Movements that, as we have seen, are not property of an 
individual entity. Guattari then, borrows from the psychoanalytic theories of Klein and Lacan, 
who call the partial enunciator the ‘transitional object’ or ‘object a’. He affirms the charge of 
potentiality they give to the object at the transition between subjectivity and alterity. But he does 
not agree about the causal and intentional frame in which they present the concept: “they never 
removed it from a causalist, pulsional infrastructure; they never conferred it (…) with a machinic 
creativity of boundless potential” (Guattari 1995, 94). He confers autonomous creativity to the 
‘partial enunciator’ that is not limited to the ‘causal infrastructure and to the superstructure 
representative of the psyche” (Guattari 1995, 95)”. For Guattari, the ‘partial enunciator’ carries 
the alterity towards other modes experience, but the other does not pre-exist as a categorical 
structure that represents experience, instead, the partial enunciator is immanent with alterity.  
 
In sum, the capacity of the partial enunciators to be autonomous—in the sense of detaching from 
the author, consumer, and the artwork, with a potential and multilinear logic beyond cause and 
effect—is the capacity that energizes the production of alternative nascent subjectivities. And 
since these subjectivities are enmeshed with the concrete, but are more than it due to their own 
alter autonomy of detachment, they qualify as subjectivities not only beyond the human subject, 
but also beyond the human body. In this sense these subjectivities are ‘corporeal essences’, 
partially actual and partially potential. They are a ‘corporeal intermediary’ (interval 4) that 
fragments (schizzes) and qualifies as a passageway the individual category of the body (somatic). 
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Hence, these subjectivities operate as tools to experiment with schizosomatics: the body 
immanently enmeshed with alter chaosmotic forces.  
 
Before further elaborating the connection between the production of subjectivity and 
schizosomatics, there is another concept that requires introductions: the concept of the refrain. 
The ‘refrain’, ‘ritornello’, or ‘leitmotif’, is the transverse pattern of the relay (as relational 
repetition) that gives consistency not to one partial enunciator, but to a multiplicity of them. The 
refrain is what carries the partial expressions into an assemblage of enunciation. And the 
assemblage of enunciation is the collective expression that gives birth to a nascent subjectivity. 
Here again, the collective does not equal the sum of human subjects, but stands for the 
multiplicity of activities that pulverize the usual divides between subject-object binaries.  
 
Further on, Guattari extends the examples of the partial enunciators from the art context to 
ethology and to the everyday. Through the example of a bird song sequenced to seduce a sexual 
partner, or to announce the arrival of predators, Guattari affirms the ‘refrain’ as the rhythm of the 
relation between the partial enunciators such as the bird’s feather colors, posture, and the use of 
the environment, like the leaves and branches. And through the example of watching, t.v. he 
demonstrates how the refrain gives consistency to the human subjectivity being carried away, as 
if hypnotized, by the screen’s luminous animation, and the surrounding events of water boiling 
and the distant sound of a telephone. In both examples, the refrain is what knots together the 
partial enunciators generated by the machinic assemblages of the planes of experience. And in 
both examples, the refrain functions, as that which keeps the full chaotic complexity at bay. It is 
what filters and gives shape to the chaotic complexity; forming an assemblage that enunciates the 
subjectivity: the subjectivity of an event of animal seduction and the subjectivity of an event of 
quasi hypnotism.  
 
Furthermore, as we can see with the example of the t.v., every production of subjectivity is not 
necessarily liberating. Guattari is pointing to the fact that the production of subjectivity has been 
colonized by Capitalistic powers, though it does not appear just in this historical moment, it is a 
genealogical relay emerging since Archaic societies (Guattari 1995, 46). That’s why the concepts 
of the ‘partial enunciators’ and of the ‘refrain’ are crucial for Guattari, because they help him to 
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analyze the ways in which subjectivity is alienated or given the autonomy to create itself. 
Guattari aims to entice the autonomy of the partial enunciators—found in art but not limited to it 
(or ‘art’ thought in an expanded sense as the ‘artfulness of experience’)—in order to promote the 
production of mutant subjectivity, one that is not captured by dominant forms of expression.  
 
In “The Machinic Unconscious”, Guattari articulates how the narrator of Marcel Proust’s In 
Search of Lost Time plays with lived semiotic segments until he reaches a subjectivity that 
creates itself. Throughout all the book’s chapters’, the narrator finds the semiotic schizz (the 
partial enunciators) that shuffle the timelines of his memories, as in the first example of the dip 
of the madeleine in the cup of herbal tea, and in the later example of Vinteuil’s music. The 
experimentation with the semiotic schizo segments, accumulated through life, will allow the 
narrator to create a literary machine. This machinic creation will finally happen when throughout 
all these found schizo experiences, the narrator will not only open scattered passages to a 
chaosmotic dimension but also generate a new type of refrain: 
 
One still needs to establish, contrary to what Proust suggests, that this is in no way a 
question of a hidden dimension, of a world of essences whose discovery is to be carried 
out in the manner of an explorer, but of a fundamentally micropolitical dimension leading 
to a subjective “reversal” and which involves the entry of a new type of refrain that works 
to empty the dominant redundancies of their content and deterritorializes and 
disindividuates the enunciation (Guattari 2011, 320). 
 
If we consider an isolated subjectivity to be that which still matches subject with identity, the 
creation of a new type of refrain is what creates a non-isolated subjectivity. In this context 
identity is considered the ‘identity of relation’. This is the unidirectional relation that projects a 
quality of experience to a fixed category of subject and object, following a linear logic of cause 
and effect. For instance, relation is thought of as identitarian when it relates a ‘sensation’ to the 
inside of a subject, from the outside of an object.  
 
 The semiotic segment (the partial enunciator) liberates (deterritorializes) the relation from the 
role of representing the projection of an effect to a cause, such as the effect of the human 
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memory to the cause of the madeleine. It goes beyond the representation of the cause and the 
effect, towards the intensity of the movement of relation between the elements. This is the 
movement moving (absolute movement (interval 3)), its intensive rhythm that composes the 
consistency of the event of perception across all the elements: madeleine, herb tea, cup, 
psychosomatic habits, etc. This is the refrain holding up the affective event; and again, not 
through identity but through the co-habitation of differences.  
 
What is remarkable is that the narrator finds the creative literary machine—the one that does not 
passively suffer the phenomenon of the schizo semiotic segment—at the moment in which his 
body is entirely shaken by the affective event. This is the moment in which the narrator, arriving 
at the court of the Guermantes’ hotel, does not notice a car coming towards him, and as the 
driver shouts out, he steps back and stumbles over a paving-stone. When he recovers his balance, 
a flow of chaosmic time suffuses the atmosphere. But this time, he is able to repeat the unfurling 
flow of chaosmic memory by moving the feet as if they were pressing the paving-stone. He finds 
the movement-moving of the refrain that gives consistency to the event of gaining balance. In 
turn, he finds the movement moving of the refrain that liberates the autonomous force of the 
chaosmotic time. The body of the narrator is possessed by the refrain as a ‘corporeal 
intermediary’ (interval 4). The autonomy of the refrain is found through the experimentation of a 
body trespassed by the movement moving across the schizo semiotic segments. What is found 
together with the autonomy of the refrain, is a schizosomatic experience of the body. An 
experience of corporeality that is inseparable from the intermediary quality that makes it part of 
the whole event (assemblage). In this sense, to have a schizosomatic experience is to follow the 
movement moving of the assemblage of enunciation throughout all the partial semiotic segments. 
These allow the assemblage to become a collective (as more than individual) enunciator. 
 
The creative instrument no longer rests upon one or several semiotic components; it 
involves the entirety of the subjective assemblage which constitutes it (…) This process 
of discernibilization of matters of expression has no other finality: the clang of a spoon 
against a dinner plate, the vibrations of a flow of water, the evocation of the noise of a 
hammer against the wheel of a train on the way to the station are so many instruments of 
transformation of the subjective assemblage of enunciation (…) (Guattari 2011, 322). 
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During the schizosomatics sessions at SenseLab, there were countless moments in which the 
techniques offered by the invitees generated the detachment of partial enunciators (schizo 
semiotic segments), that made-felt the movement moving of the refrain. Usually, the detachment 
of partial enunciators was experienced in a casual manner, almost as a banal occurrence, but their 
capacity to carry the movement moving indexed the undercurrent refrain that, if followed, would 
propose an alternative subjectivity (an alternative collective event of enunciation). And the 
movement-moving of the partial enunciators always demanded that the individual body would be 
distributed as an environmental force, as a corporeal intermediary.  
 
For instance, one Wednesday afternoon Csenge Kolozsvári and Mariana Marcassa activated a 
workshop through voicing and sculpting. The participants were seated around one long piece of 
clay that was constantly kept wet with water. They were asked to sound voice by pressing 
horizontally the clay with their hands, trying to keep the contact with the clay as continuous as 
possible. The rhythm of the voices echoing the room, and the dynamic of thirty-something hands 
moving along the clay produced a collective feeling in which the individual parts of the bodies 
were blurred. Some sound reverberating the room would influence the tone of contact with the 
clay, and some pressure point in the clay would result in the calibration of the voice spread 
through the air. The partial enunciators expressed by the rhythm of voicing and of contact, 
together with the multiplication of arms moving across the clay—through all their enmeshed 
movement—generated an alternative subjectivity, like a corporeal intermediary. This corporeal 
intermediary was felt collectively as a ‘pathic subjectivity’.  
 
Guattari calls a ‘pathic subjectivity’ an “absorbent subjectivity given immediately in all its 
complexity (Guattari 1995, 25)”. When the subject is decentered by undoing the individual body 
limits, the generation of subjectivity feels the experience in a pathic manner, because the limits 
of sense perception overflow. Following Daniel Stern, Guattari would say that the absorbent and 
immediate feeling, is felt in an ‘amodal’ way (Guattari 1995, 65). Amodal perception is the 
perception felt by infants during their first eight weeks of life, when they are in the ‘emergent 
self’ phase of development. Stern argues that, in this phase, the infant is active, hyper relational 
and already emergently social, contrary to the traditional knowledge (Piaget) that considers this 
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period of the infant as presocial, precognitive and preorganized (Stern 1985, 36-7). Through 
‘amodal perception’, the child registers the global quality of perceptual events, such as shapes, 
intensities and temporal patterns, without dividing the perceptual event into separate sense 
modalities (touch, sound, sight). One of the examples used by Stern is that of a child’s perception 
of a patch of yellow sunlight on the wall. For the infant, the patch of ‘yellow’ color (sight) does 
not qualify the perceptual experience as mainly visual. Because “the child is engaged in a global 
experience resonant with a mix of all the amodal properties, the primary perceptual quality, of 
the patch of light- its intensity, warmth, and so on (Stern 1985, 176)”. Furthermore, amodal 
perception is not lost after the initial eight weeks of life, but is carried throughout adult life, 
backgrounded because of the separation of perceptual senses.  
 
One of the conversations we had after the experiment with the clay, centred the haptic experience 
of ‘sliding’. As the activity of sliding intensified through the surface of the clay, the eyes, the 
voice, and overall thoughts and feelings in germ began to slide as well. There was a third entity 
generated between the collective bodies of persons and clay. It was the amodal perception of 
sliding. It was felt as a haptic image because it happened through all the senses (touch, sight, 
sound) and in excess of all them, as if floating in-between of all them. An amodal perception was 
enunciated and detached by the machinic assemblage. The partial enunciators of the clay, hands, 
and sounds knotted by a refrain that carried their different rhythms generated an amodal 
perception from and out of the collective-machinic assemblage.  
 
At another schizosomatics session, Maria Kefirova and myself proposed a workshop on cutting. 
Each participant was given a pair of scissors and was asked to cut the contour of the things in the 
room (sofas, chairs, tables, cables, lamps, etc) then to pause for a short while to absorb the 
resonant effects, to then continue again. After a while, the participants were given colorful 
cardboards and were asked to cut through them as they cut the contour of the things in the room. 
Finally, the participants were asked to couple two by two, and cut the cardboard following the 
contour of the parts of the back of the body of the other participant. They were then asked to give 
the person standing in the front the cut pieces, by reaching for them from the back, along the 
sides of the bodies. In such a way that the person standing would receive a hand from the back 
with a cut piece of cardboard, as if the pieces were appearing from an invisible dimension.  
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The conversation on this particular experiment moved around the feeling of decompressing the 
connective tone of the things in the room, including the physical human bodies. As if each action 
of cutting around the contour of things would make felt an invisible reorganization of the space 
between. In turn, the bodies felt like if they were being cut into pieces, and they carried the same 
experience of decompression, especially in the moments of receiving the cardboard piece from 
the back. Finally, the partial enunciators generated a refrain that expressed an ‘amodal 
perception’. This was an amodal perception of ‘decompression’, of un-knotting and re-knotting. 
This perception did not exist in any single perceptual sense. It was felt with a global and 
collective body, one that speculated with its perceptual capacity. It was a corporeal subjectivity 
fully immersed in the chaotic textures emerging with it.  
 
Throughout the entire year, during the schizosomatic sessions, many partial enunciators were 
detached in order to generate this pathic subjectivity that registered amodal perceptions. It is hard 
to say when these partial detachments such as the ‘sliding’ and ‘decompressing’ snowballed into 
a new mutant subjectivity. As was mentioned before, at times the experience of a collective 
subjectivity was already there, together with the partial enunciators. At other times, the 
experience would trigger something after the persons carried into their life beyond the SenseLab. 
For sure, many partial detachments fed forward into other schizosomatics sessions. For instance, 
something of the amodal perception of ‘sliding’ snowballed into the rhythm in which we were 
playing with the schizo-session lead by Sean Smith, k.g Guttman and her six-month-old baby, 
Twila. At the beginning of the session, through simple physical techniques, Sean introduced 
three different topologies of perception: the stone (vertical plane of architecture), the oceanic 
(cosmic durations), and the digital (the flat-plastic surface that opens to the multilinear planes of 
the internet). By then the bodies of the participants in the room had been elasticized towards less 
familiar corporeal limits. This is when k.g and baby Twila arrived with the concept of ‘affective 
attunement’, borrowed as well from Daniel Stern. We were asked to hold Twila for as long as we 
could match our attunement with her. This meant passing Twila to another person, or holding her 
along with two or three other persons around the moment in which she would begin to feel 
uneasy. Different collective bodies, in numbers and attunements (smiles, bounces, pattings), 
were required to get, practically, what an ‘affective attunement’ meant. The topology of the 
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collective was ready to shift through several modes of attunement, not only because of the real 
imperative brought by the affective mood of Twila, and not only because of the topologies of 
perception distributed by Sean, but also due to the lived ‘amodal perception’ of ‘sliding’ that 
capacitated the bodies to slide away from their interiority, towards speculation. The collective 
topology of the room carried the contour of ‘sliding’, and probably many other past 
schizosomatics; and it/they were felt as a lived contour holding the affective shape of the room. 
This is to say, that the amodal perceptions carried their rhythmic refrain beyond the actual 
moment of their crystallization into consistency.  
 
In Daniel Stern’s vocabulary, the perceptions generated by the partial enunciators operated as 
‘activation contours’:  
 
An activation contour can be abstracted from one kind of behavior and can exist in some 
amodal form so that it can apply to another kind of overt behavior or mental process. 
These abstract representations may then permit intermodal correspondences to be made 
between similar activation contours expressed in behavioral manifestations. Extremely 
diverse events may thus be yoked, so long as they share the quality of feeling … (Stern 
1985, 58).  
 
This is to say, that something of the feeling of ‘sliding’ carried its quality of a collective opening 
towards the future. Another schizosomatic experience could match the dynamic feeling of the 
amodal perception of sliding and then activate the contours of relation. The experience in-
process would be co-influenced by the dynamic pattern of sliding. The body of the participants 
would carry some rhythmic refrain of sliding (the concatenation of points of pressures, the 
qualities of relation) that would make ingress—as an invisible membrane—to shape the actual 
event in process. Another example: when Andre Fogliano would talk about the presence of the 
schizzes in the Capoeira movements, something of a past ‘amodal perception’—maybe of 
‘decompression’—would pop in and make them felt along the curvy duration of a kick.  
 
At the end of the year, while preparing a second workshop on the ‘extra-economical body’, we 
had a last conversation about the pedagogic potential of the schizosomatics practices. There was 
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a very simple conclusion about the topic: each time we learn something we need a new body. 
After that day Erik Bordeleau sent us the following quote: “To what are we dedicated if not to 
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